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1. Introduction to Polar Law 
 
Natalia Loukacheva 
1.1 What is Polar law? 
There may be multiple approaches to the understanding of this term. For 
the purposes of this textbook, however, the definition of “polar law” is 
limited to general international law regulations that are applicable to both 
the Arctic and the Antarctic (e.g., the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea-UNCLOS). The definition used here also covers international law 
treaties or conventions that deal with issues specific to the Polar Regions 
(e.g., for the Arctic – Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears; for 
the Antarctic – Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, the 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 
etc.). At the same time, “polar law” also refers to the domestic law of the 
eight Arctic States (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Swe-
den, the Russian Federation, and the U.S.A.) with special reference to the 
different branches of law that address various Arctic-related matters (e.g., 
Canada’s Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act). It is also inclusive of 
the laws of sub-national Arctic jurisdictions (e.g., Nunavut Wildlife Act, 
etc.). Plus, as far as the South Pole is concerned, some regulations resul-
tant from the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) need to 
be incorporated in the national legal systems of each of the Consultative 
parties (and some non-consultative parties do so). Thus, broadly speak-
ing, “polar law” is a developing field of law that deals with the interna-
tional and domestic legal regimes that are applicable to the Arctic or the 
Antarctic, or both.  
At the same time, aside from the hard law regulations relevant to Polar 
Regions, one should not discard the benefits of “soft-law” instruments, 
especially in the Arctic where at the time of writing there is no general 
international legally-binding Arctic Treaty in place.1 Unlike the Antarctic 
Treaty of 1959, which has been in force since 1961, the possibilities of an 
Arctic treaty are subject to ongoing academic legal discourse and policy 
developments. On the one hand, the existing web of soft-law – non le-
                                                     
1 For examples of multilateral legal initiatives in the Arctic see: the historic 1911 Convention be-
tween Great Britain, Japan, Russia and the United States respecting Measures for the Preservation 
and Protection of Fur Seals in the North Pacific Ocean; The 1920 Treaty Concerning the Archipelago 
of Spitsbergen – Svalbard that deals with the issue of the legal status and sovereignty of this archipel-
ago; and the above-mentioned 1973 Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears between Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, the USSR, and the USA.  
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gally-binding instruments in the Arctic – (e.g., declarations, resolutions, 
memorandums of understanding, cooperation accords, etc.) that are 
mainly issued or concluded by various Arctic forums (e.g., the Arctic 
Council, the University of the Arctic, etc.) or can be signed by other Arc-
tic actors (e.g., indigenous groups, or Northern governments, or industry 
representatives, etc.), often prove to be efficient in dealing with various 
Arctic-related matters. On the other hand, despite the numerous pros and 
cons attached to having an international Arctic Charter or Treaty,2 the 
debate over the need for legally binding agreements in the region versus 
the benefits of soft-law, points to the complexity of this issue. Therefore, 
any attempt to understand the scope and applicability of “polar law” 
needs to consider both the hard and soft law approaches. 
Despite some obvious similarities between the both Poles, in reality, 
they each function under divergent legal regulations which can, in part, be 
explained by their differences. One noticeable distinction is that the Arctic 
has been inhabited with many Indigenous peoples and other Northerners, 
whereas the Antarctic has neither permanent residency nor an Indigenous 
population (although numerous scientists and their families live and work 
there, and young children even go to school there for short periods of time). 
For this reason then the application of International Human Rights law in 
the Antarctic is possible but not to the same degree as in the Arctic (e.g., 
one can argue that the Antarctic is a “common heritage of mankind” exam-
ple). Furthermore, in the Arctic, the domestic law of the Arctic States with 
clearly recognised territorial sovereignty (one exception is an ongoing dis-
agreement between Denmark and Canada over Hans Island) has an impor-
tant influence on how various issues are dealt with. In the Antarctic, territo-
rial sovereignty claims are “frozen” (Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty). In 
other words, “polar law” refers to different areas of international law con-
cerning the Arctic and the Antarctic and domestic law but the degree of 
application of certain legal principles or branches of law may be different 
in each Polar region. Thus, a detailed analysis within a specific area of law 
may be needed to understand certain particularities of the legal regime as it 
applies to Arctic – and Antarctic-related issues.  
At the same time, similarities between the Poles in relation to a range 
of emerging issues, in particular with regard to climate and environmental 
change, indicate that international environmental law or international law 
of sea regulations have special significance for both the Arctic and the 
Antarctic.  
For example, the growing number of climate change tourists and other 
adventurers in both areas has serious ramifications for environmental 
protection and the preservation of wilderness areas. In addition, growth in 
                                                     
2 There now exists a growing academic discourse on this issue: see, for example, The Circle, Vol. 1, 
2009 (published by the WWF international programme); Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ilulissat 
Declaration, May 28, 2008; Timo Koivurova, “Alternatives for an Arctic Treaty-Evaluation and a New 
Proposal,” RECIEL 17 (1), 2008: 14–26; Olav Schram Stokke, “A legal regime for the Arctic? Interplay 
with the Law of the Sea Convention,” Marine Policy Vol. 31 (4), 2007: 402–408, etc. 
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the volume of shipping given the increased level of navigable accessibil-
ity due to melting ice also poses new challenges in respect of pollution, 
has a negative impact on wildlife (e.g., noise) and biodiversity more gen-
erally in both Polar areas.  
Climate change poses a threat to the extinction of Polar species (e.g., 
there is now an ongoing debate over the future of the polar bear popula-
tion in the Arctic and on the possibility of the disappearance of certain 
micro-organisms in the Antarctic). At issue here is also the question of 
regulating access to various biological and non-renewable untapped re-
sources that are now becoming more accessible due to the warming cli-
mate and the availability of new technologies. Although in the Antarctic 
the exploitation of minerals is currently forbidden this issue may be revis-
ited in the future.  
In the Arctic, for example, the exploration and exploitation of new 
fields of the offshore non-renewable resources of the seabed is already on 
the legal and political agenda of several Arctic and other States (e.g., the 
stance of several policy entities on Arctic Policy). Some of the Arctic 
Ocean coastal States namely, Canada, Denmark and the Russian Federa-
tion, have ratified the UNCLOS and may be able to extend their continen-
tal shelves up to the North Pole. Under Article 76 of this convention a 
country needs to provide scientific evidence to the UN Commission on 
the Limits of the Continental Shelf which may then allow the country to 
extend its rights to the potentially lucrative resource-rich seabed in the 
Arctic Ocean beyond the existing 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic 
Zone (EEZ).  
For example, the Russian Federation and Norway have made such sub-
missions and Norway has already received recommendations from the 
Commission. The Russian Federation was, however, asked to submit addi-
tional data. Canada has to make its submission by 2013, Denmark by 2014. 
At the current time of writing, the USA has not acceded to the UNCLOS 
but it is already studying the outer limits of its continental shelf. The UN-
CLOS is also applicable in the Antarctic where, for example, some historic 
claimant States to the Antarctic Treaty (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, 
New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom) reaffirmed their interests 
via Article 76 (see Koivurova 2009 for details).  
The utilisation of a “bipolar” approach (namely – the consideration of 
legal regimes for both Poles) is useful in understanding Polar law which 
puts emphasis on various areas of international and domestic law. Those 
areas may cover, for example, the branches of: 
 
 Environmental law, including climate change and biodiversity (both 
international and domestic) 
 Human Rights law (e.g., including the rights of the Arctic’s Indigenous 
Peoples and self-government) – (both) plus, the viability of the 
Antarctic approach 
 Polar Law Textbook 16 
 The law of Sustainable Development (both) 
 Resources law (non-renewable/renewable) (both) 
 Administrative law (both) 
 Criminal law (both) 
 Trade law and Economics (both) 
 Law of the Sea/ maritime law (both, includes maritime boundaries 
disagreements) 
 Transportation law (both) 
 Labour law and Social securities (mainly domestic) 
 Wildlife law (both, may also fit into resources law) 
 Constitutional law (mainly domestic, includes governance and 
sovereignty claims) 
 Sports law (domestic) 
 Health law (both) 
 The law of International organisations (mainly international) 
 Entertainment and Internet law (mainly domestic), etc. 
 
This admittedly inexhaustive list reveals that many issues that are rele-
vant to the Polar areas are addressed in legal regulations for other regions 
of the globe. These branches of law are functioning in the legal systems 
of non-Arctic States or States that do not express interest in the Antarctic 
Treaty System (ATS).  
Depending on the stakeholders involved in the particular issues of 
concern their interests may point to the fact that certain areas of law are 
more important when the Arctic or the Antarctic are concerned. Since the 
legal regimes for the Poles differ in a number of ways, (e.g., the Arctic 
does not have a legally-binding treaty), it is impossible to generalise in 
respect of which area or branch of law is more important in addressing 
Polar issues. This will depend on the particular case in hand. Clearly, 
because of the mounting environmental problems faced (e.g., climate 
change or persistent organic pollutants) and their potential global conse-
quences, the matter of environmental protection in both Poles has become 
one of the utmost importance internationally. The impact of those 
changes not just on biodiversity in the Arctic and the Antarctic but also 
the health, sustenance and the livelihood of the Arctic’s indigenous peo-
ples has therefore helped to introduce a human rights law discourse into 
the environmental law debate. In other words, depending on the case 
study in question several areas of law may be of crucial importance. 
Thus, “polar law” is an inter-disciplinary and developing area of law. 
There are also important linkages between Polar Law issues and ques-
tions that are addressed in other realms of the humanities and social sci-
ences. Many of the Arctic or Antarctic developments are a result of, or 
the subject of ongoing political or international relations discourses. For 
example, various current and emerging security issues in both areas; the 
adaptation or mitigation capacity-building of communities in facing their 
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attempt to face the consequences of climate change or bi- or multi-lateral 
diplomacy and political controversies in the negation of outstanding legal 
disagreements in the Arctic; the impact of the cold war on the outcome of 
the Antarctic Treaty provisions (e.g., the principle of demilitarization), to 
name but a few. In other words, as a discipline, “Polar Law” is develop-
ing in a multi-disciplinary direction suggesting that it is of the utmost 
significance for the discipline to utilise information gained from, and 
maintain linkages with, the various cognate humanities and social sci-
ences (e.g., Human Geography, Anthropology, Economics, Political Sci-
ence, and International Relations).  
Polar Law is also developing as an educational discipline. This text-
book is partially based on courses taught in the context of the Master’s 
programme in Polar Law (University of Akureyri, Iceland) and it is 
hoped that eventually long-distance courses in Polar Law will be offered 
internationally. At the same time, recently, several universities have be-
gun to offer special courses or visiting lectures on Polar Law issues 
within their law school curriculums and in other departments. Moreover, 
the level of public attention given to the Polar issues has in recent years 
increased dramatically on the basis of the numerous media statements 
made. Several Polar-related reports and studies have been commissioned 
domestically and internationally all addressing legal issues. The continu-
ing legacy of the International Polar Year (2007–09) and materials from 
numerous conferences that included legal questions also suggest that in 
the near future “Polar Law” will become as important as it is topical at 
many educational, political and legal venues.  
In addition to its educational value Polar Law is not just a developing 
academic discipline it is also a practical tool in resolving current and 
emerging legal issues at both the international and domestic levels. For 
example, the above-mentioned question of the extension of continental 
shelves by several Arctic States may potentially lead to the overlapping of 
continental shelves which may cause legal and political tensions. Most 
current unresolved legal disagreements in the Arctic concern the delimita-
tion of maritime boundaries (e.g., Canada-USA in the Beaufort Sea, the 
boundary dispute between Denmark and Canada in the Lincoln Sea). For 
example, in the Beaufort Sea the boundary issue is of legal and economic 
importance because of potential access to the deposits of oil and gas which 
bring the interests of powerful energy corporations into play. Each of these 
issues will potentially require the expertise of domestic and international 
energy law specialists. Moreover, access to and ownership of other re-
sources will inevitably pose further questions for legal practitioners.  
The question remains, however, whether there is any need to define 
“Polar law” as a new and specialised area of legal studies, academic and 
scientific discourse or even a practical discipline? Or is this “bipolar,” 
inter-disciplinary and where possible multi-disciplinary nexus the best 
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way to understand the various legal developments currently taking place 
in the Arctic and the Antarctic? 
One can argue that there is no need to determine any special legal re-
gime for both Polar Regions, as international law is universal and if the 
required criteria are met (e.g., the State has signed and ratified an interna-
tional convention, which is governed by customary law of treaties, etc.), all 
relevant international law instruments shall apply to those areas. In other 
words, there is no need for any distinctive “Polar” international law regime. 
Furthermore, in some cases, not all Arctic and other States may rec-
ognise existing legal theories or claims that support the interests and cur-
rent claims of certain Arctic States (e.g., Canada-USA disagreement over 
control of the Northwest Passage). The USA among others claims that, 
according to international law, the Northwest Passage is an International 
Strait and thus is open to international navigation. Canada insists that the 
waters of the Arctic Archipelago are Canada’s internal historic waters, 
and thus Canada should have the exclusive say in control over them. Fur-
ther, in the exercise of its sovereignty in the region and in the protection 
of its interests in the Northwest Passage, Canada relies on the reinforce-
ment of the application of domestic legislation when it concerns the Arc-
tic. Thus, despite the fact that both Canada and the USA are major allies 
and economic partners, they “agree to disagree” over the interpretation of 
international law and tend to use different legal arguments and theories to 
bolster their own stakes over control and navigation in the waters of the 
Arctic Archipelago.  
This example points to the fact that although international law is uni-
versal its interpretation and application may not, in practice, be easy par-
ticularly where the Polar Regions are concerned as numerous specific 
pre-conditions exist which may influence the result. Importantly, this 
example also indicates that domestic law (i.e., dealing with environ-
mental monitoring; control of and the mandatory regulatory regime for 
shipping in the Arctic) is also vital (see, e.g., 2009 amendments to Can-
ada’s the Arctic Water Pollution Prevention Act or the anticipated mak-
ing of the NORDREG – the Arctic marine traffic system mandatory). It 
further shows that despite the provisions of international or domestic law 
each of the States in question is pursuing its priorities and its own agenda 
in meeting this legal challenge. National interest or politically-based dif-
ferences may not however allow the issue at hand to be dealt with by 
legal means alone. Clearly then arguments can be deployed against the 
“Polar law” terminology or the concept as such, but as this textbook 
shows, Polar Law is evolving and it undoubtedly has its own niche to fill. 
The bipolar approach is useful but, as noted previously, given the ex-
isting differences between both areas it is not always applicable to the 
same degree. Historically, the Antarctic has been at the centre of “polar” 
legal and political discourse since the signing of the Antarctic Treaty and 
the subsequent legal documents that form the crux of the Antarctic Treaty 
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System. Several legal developments concern the Antarctic and parallels 
may be drawn in places with the Arctic (see the chapters by Koivurova, 
VanderZwaag, and Potts in this textbook).  
However, as most chapters in this textbook will show, the situation in 
the Arctic is different in a number of ways from that of the Antarctic. 
Over the years, many experts have suggested that useful lessons for the 
Arctic could be learned from the Antarctic Treaty System. At the same 
time, despite various differences between the two Poles, especially with 
respect to their legal regimes and governance systems, to a certain degree, 
the Arctic experience may be of learning significance to the South Pole 
(e.g., in the area of environmental monitoring).  
The growing importance of both Polar Regions in various aspects of 
global and regional development also suggests the need for further in-
quiry into the role of law in dealing with many of the current and emerg-
ing issues concerning the Arctic and Antarctic. As this textbook shows, in 
the context of the fundamental environmental, economic, political and 
other changes taking place in these regions, law may not be a panacea for 
all challenges, but it has its own role to play in the regulation and solution 
of many of them.  
Generalisations on this issue are simply not possible here, as each le-
gal challenge may require a solution within a specific area of law or 
within several areas of law simultaneously, or may even demand addi-
tional expertise from other sciences. Thus, specific and detailed analysis 
of each situation or legal case study may be needed. In conclusion, this 
chapter summarises some of the most recent tendencies, primarily taking 
place in the Arctic but which may also have implications for the Antarc-
tic. A more detailed analysis of some of these developments is outlined in 
the subsequent chapters of this textbook and is now increasingly accessi-
ble from within the growing body of scholarship now being undertaken in 
this field.  
The Arctic will have a vital bearing on the future development of the 
circumpolar nations, non-Arctic States and the globe. Aside from histori-
cal perception of the region as “resource rich” or “the last” frontier, 
within the last two decades the Arctic has become a new scientific and 
intellectual frontier with promising prospects for development across 
many fields. At the same time, the Arctic’s growing economic, commer-
cial, geostrategic and political importance is often hampered by increas-
ing problems and pressures, especially in the environmental and social 
realms. The various stakeholders engaged in the development of the Arc-
tic, moreover, are seeking to pursue their many interests at the global, 
national, sub-national and regional scales. 
In dealing with Arctic-related issues, depending on their agenda and 
the scope of jurisdiction, the stakeholders employ different approaches 
that may involve unilateral, bi-lateral or multi-lateral policies or the com-
bination of all three. For example, the apparent desire of the eight Arctic 
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States to put their national interests first does not imply that unilateral 
actions in the region are always efficient as certain issues of concern 
would benefit more from multilateral or bi-lateral approaches. In other 
words, despite differences and specific national policies or interests in the 
area, all Arctic States and other stakeholders are to a certain degree inter-
dependent and share common areas of concern or benefits that may be 
best addressed by means of multilateral or bi-lateral diplomacy and col-
laboration. This cooperation takes place at various levels and in different 
sectors (e.g., see chapter on Arctic Governance in this book), including 
the area of law.  
As noted above, legal developments take place at the global, regional, 
national and sub-national levels. They form one aspect of, and are influ-
enced by, the general processes of globalisation, internationalisation and 
the multi-faceted changes that occur in the regions. Global and local pres-
sures are, moreover, becoming ever more obvious in both Poles. It is no 
accident that several Arctic States have recently issued or are about to 
formulate their new or revised Arctic policies (e.g., Norway –2007, 
Denmark –2008, the Russian Federation –2008, and the USA and Iceland 
–2009, while Canada released the pillars of its Northern Strategy in 2009 
and Finland is expected to release its strategy soon, so as possibly Swe-
den). Importantly, since Denmark, Sweden and Finland are members of 
the EU their Arctic policies need to be coordinated with EU Arctic pol-
icy. Furthermore, non-Arctic States (e.g., China and Japan) and suprana-
tional entities like the EU have also expressed a special interest in Arctic 
politics and policies (e.g., see: Communication of the European Commis-
sion on its Arctic Strategy –2008, and Council of the EU conclusions on 
Arctic issues –2009 both of which provide policy guidelines).  
Potentially emerging and ongoing disagreements among some of the 
Arctic States and other States over several claims and issues in the area 
stimulate international attention and legal discourse on the need for a 
special legal regime for the Arctic. As noted previously, there is already 
an ongoing discourse on the pros and cons of the Arctic Treaty including 
attempts to employ the Antarctic “model” to the Arctic. It remains how-
ever to be seen whether any kind of general Arctic Treaty will be feasible 
as numerous impediments exist preventing this becoming a reality. 
As it will be shown in this textbook in several areas international law 
has an important influence on the state of affairs at both Poles (e.g., envi-
ronmental protection; sovereignty matters; the law of sea; the climate 
change regime; resources and sustainable development), etc. The opening 
of the new shipping routes, increased navigation, tourism, economic and 
commercial activities (e.g., bio-prospecting) in both Polar Regions each 
present new opportunities but also pose new challenges often requiring 
legal solutions.  
As it will be further seen from several chapters national legal and politi-
cal developments are also significant and influence the development of any 
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legal regime in the Arctic. Although the consideration of “Arctic interna-
tional law” – or the Arctic legal regime is possible (e.g., see Rothwell 
1996), the terminology of “Arctic law” is confusing and requires further 
analysis (e.g., see Loukacheva 2008). Perhaps, one solution is to look at 
“Polar law” as the developing and evolving concept that covers several 
legal regimes and branches of law.  
The content of this textbook is developed in line with the expertise 
garnered from different areas of law. Thus, chapters by Koivurova, Van-
derZwaag and Potts provide us with an analysis of various aspects of 
international environmental law and the law of sea in relation to the Arc-
tic and the Antarctic (including matters of environmental protection, 
shipping and marine living resources). The chapter by Bankes provides us 
with a useful overview of energy resources law highlighting the relevant 
developments in the Arctic. The chapters by Alfredsson, Kleist, Lou-
kacheva, and Sambo Dorough form the bedrock of the theoretical analy-
sis undertaken here while also highlighting a number of practical exam-
ples in the areas of international and domestic human rights law and the 
constitutional law in the Arctic. They also touch upon the questions of 
self-governance, sustainable governance and indigenous peoples’ rights.  
The textbook also contains valuable information on regional and local 
economies in the Arctic (see the chapter by Larsen), political matters and 
international relations (see chapters by Kleist, Diatchkova and Lou-
kacheva). Despite its comprehensive content, the textbook nevertheless 
leaves room for further research in the area of Polar Law and its connection 
to other cognate disciplines. Notwithstanding the various limitations im-
posed (e.g., it was not possible to include more detailed analysis of some 
developments in both Polar Regions), this textbook is the first educational 
material of its kind in the field and can be seen as a milestone in the promo-
tion of legal values in both the Nordic community and indeed globally. 
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Websites: 
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For information about the Antarctic Treaty 
System see: http://www.ats.aq  
Questions:  
1. What is the role of law in dealing with different developments in the 
Arctic and Antarctica? 
2. What is “Polar law” and how does it intersect with various social and 
other sciences? 
3. What are the most topical current and emerging legal issues in the 
Polar Regions?  
 
2. Environmental Protection in 
the Arctic and Antarctica 
 
Timo Koivurova  
2.1 Introduction  
If one compares the two poles, there seem to be many differences: the 
Arctic consists of ocean surrounded by continents, whereas the Antarctic 
is a continent surrounded by ocean; the Antarctic has no permanent hu-
man habitation, while the Arctic is inhabited by indigenous peoples and 
other local communities. Yet, the two Polar areas resemble each other in 
many respects. Both are exposed to extreme climatic conditions, receiv-
ing less radiation from the sun than other parts of the globe while their 
ecosystems have had to adapt to very cold and dark environments with 
short and bright growing seasons. In such conditions, the ecosystems are 
simple containing only a few key species. Both regions are also relatively 
inaccessible, given the extreme conditions, although this is rapidly chang-
ing in the context of ongoing climate change.  
From the environmental protection point of view it is indeed signifi-
cant that the Polar Regions are similar. Their ecosystems and environ-
ments share important characteristics and are deemed to be more vulner-
able to human-induced pollution than other areas of the world. This 
would seem to suggest then that similar types of environmental protection 
measures may be called for to protect these unique environments.  
Can we then tailor special environmental protection rules to protect the 
Polar Regions? This is one of the pertinent questions examined in this 
chapter. Presumably, the most important legal rules and principles applica-
ble in the Polar Regions are contained in international environ-mental law 
(IEL). This branch of international law, notwithstanding its importance, 
nevertheless remains in its infancy given that it was only in 1972 at the 
Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment that the intensive regu-
lation of international environmental problems by States was effectively 
launched.  
Since international environmental law has grown to be a vast body of 
rules and principles, some of them legally binding on each and every 
State in the form of customary international law (CIL), these rules and 
principles apply also in the Polar Regions. There are also a plethora of 
near-universal multilateral environmental agreements (MEA) and re-
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gional MEAs to consider here which are binding only on States party to 
these treaties. If Arctic States are parties to these treaties, they also apply 
in the Arctic, since the States are required to implement the MEAs 
throughout their jurisdiction. Since IEL applies across the planet, it is 
reasonable to examine some of the principles and MEAs that apply also 
in the Polar Regions. For these reasons, it is useful to have an overview 
of how IEL has evolved and what basic principles of IEL guide State 
behavior in section 2.  
As the Polar Regions are large and indeed rather unique ecosystems it 
would be interesting to determine whether IEL has developed special 
rules for such unique conditions. Important work in this respect has al-
ready been done in the two Polar regimes – the Arctic Council and the 
Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).  
One way of determining the applicable rules and instruments of envi-
ronmental protection applying in the Polar Regions is by studying various 
sources of pollution or environmental problems regulated in IEL and com-
paring how these general rules and principles have been implemented in 
and/or adapted to the unique environments of the Polar Regions. It is im-
portant to note that, given the normal constraints on the space available, 
this chapter can only provide a brief overview of the international envi-
ronmental regulations in place in the Polar Regions. Moreover, national 
systems of environmental law and European Environmental Law cannot be 
studied in this article, given that these systems of law include far too many 
individual rules and principles to be covered in one short chapter.  
2.2 The Development of International Environmental Law  
There are many ways to reconstruct the evolution of IEL with each nec-
essarily being a simplification of the actual process. It is possible to dis-
cern at least three stages of evolution each raising certain core features of 
the way environmental protection developed, the identification of the 
major tasks and problems etc. To conclude this overview it is important 
to examine what the current principles of IEL are as well as identifying 
their current status and content.  
With growing awareness of the importance of environmental issues in 
the industrialised world in the 1960s and 1970s environmental protection 
emerged as an important domestic policy issue. The real launch of IEL 
was, however, the UN 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Envi-
ronment, which provided an action plan for the international community 
over international environmental protection and prompted the UN to es-
tablish the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). This first 
period (running approximately from the beginning of 1970s to the start of 
1980s) was primarily geared towards protecting the marine environment, 
with oceans constituting most of the planet’s space and ocean ecosystems 
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already experiencing serious damage from human-induced pollution. 
States concluded universal treaties on the dumping of waste in the marine 
environment and on ship-based pollution as well as regionally on land-
based pollution of the marine environment. During the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea negotiations, which lasted from 1973 
to 1982, the international community laid foundational rules to protect the 
marine environment from all sources of pollution in part XII of that 
document.  
The next significant period in the evolution of IEL ran approximately 
from the beginning of 1980s to the start of 1990s and saw the emergence 
of new environmental problems such as air and atmospheric pollution. 
The 1979 UN Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE) Convention 
on Long-Range Trans-boundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), with its subse-
quent protocols over various substances negotiated during 1980s and 
1990s, can be viewed as the beginning of this period. The 1985 Vienna 
Convention on Ozone Depletion was significant in that it was the first 
international treaty to combat a global environmental problem, depletion 
of the ozone layer, with the parties taking more stringent action with the 
1987 Montreal Protocol and subsequent amendments and adjustments. 
The most difficult environmental problem ever confronted – global cli-
mate change – was first tackled by the 1992 United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which became one of the 
instruments adopted in the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and 
Development.  
Nature protection does not fit in with this chronology since instances 
of species protection can be traced back to the beginning of the 20th Cen-
tury. Among the most important treaties here is the 1946 International 
Whaling Convention (with its administering body the International Whal-
ing Commission), which adopted its famous moratorium on whaling in 
1982. In addition, a number of other treaties adopted at the beginning of 
1970s, such as the 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International Impor-
tance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, the 1973 Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 
the latter of which tries to influence species protection by establishing 
strict controls over the trade in species (or their body parts), and the still 
Arctic-only 1973 Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears, could also 
be cited here. This type of species-specific or habitat-specific interna-
tional regulation was given a more holistic foundation by one of the trea-
ties signed during the 1992 Rio Conference, the Convention on Biologi-
cal Diversity, which protects diversity within species, between species 
and of ecosystems.  
The 1992 Rio Conference marks the beginning of the third period in 
international environmental protection. Before this Conference, environ-
mental protection was not so clearly connected to other policy fields and 
was instead pursued through various treaties. The 1985 Brundtland Re-
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port had however already paved way for the wholesale adoption of the 
concept of sustainable development, which was ultimately to dominate 
outcomes at the Rio Conference. The developing States asserted their 
right to develop while the industrialised north pursued environmental 
protection. The end result was a compromise to pursue sustainable devel-
opment, which should take into account environmental concerns but also 
poverty alleviation, free trade, etc. What this meant for IEL was that the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, namely, that all 
States bear some responsibility for environmental protection but that de-
veloped States must carry a heavier burden, very much dominated nego-
tiations of the Rio conventions and other instruments, but also future 
conventions.  
The follow-up conference to Rio, the 2002 Johannesburg World 
Summit on Sustainable Development – with its Declaration and Plan of 
Implementation – continued even more forcefully with the trend that is 
apparent today. All major global problems are tightly interlinked and 
hence to achieve sustainable development we need to pay attention to 
each of them. Poverty, overpopulation and major diseases each contribute 
to environmental degradation and vice versa. Another highlight of this 
third period of the establishment of IEL is the increasing emphasis placed 
on the implementation of international environmental treaties. From the 
1972 Stockholm Conference onwards the speedy and steady adoption of 
international environmental protection treaties can be seen to have taken 
place. Yet, at the end of 1990s there was an increasing realisation that 
even with all of these treaties in force, the state of the environment keeps 
deteriorating further. With this recognition also came a shift in emphasis 
to ensuring that real implementation took place in respect of these treaties 
primarily via a focus on methods of national implementation, capacity-
building, the dissemination of information and education.  
2.2.1 Principles of International Environmental Law 
What is important here is that even though we can distinguish a number of 
distinct stages in the development of IEL this does not mean that the older 
treaties are now without legal significance. On the contrary, it is better to 
see the development of IEL as a process of the accumulation of legally 
binding standards over how states are obligated to behave as regards the 
protection of the environment. There are currently in existence a large 
number of MEAs legally obligating the entire international community. In 
addition, with this fairly rapid legal development some significant princi-
ples have emerged binding all states legally on the basis of customary in-
ternational law or at least politically, if the principle in question has not yet 
matured into a principle of CIL. These principles were articulated in the 
Declaration adopted at the 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and De-
velopment.  
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Only the so-called “no significant harm” (or due diligence) principle is 
clearly a part of general international law obligating all States. It reads as 
follows: 
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Princi-
ples of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursu-
ant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility 
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to 
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdic-
tion. (Principle 2)  
 
Another candidate for a CIL principle is the “precautionary principle” 
which was articulated in Rio principle 15 in the following way:  
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely 
applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious 
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a rea-
son for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.  
 
The principles of common but differentiated responsibilities (principle 7 
of the Rio Declaration) and “polluter pays principle” (principle 16, i.e., 
that national authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization 
of environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into 
account the approach that the polluter should bear the cost of pollution) 
are still widely seen as political principles, but have clearly guided vari-
ous treaty negotiation processes.  
2.3 General Comparisons of the Polar Regions from the 
Perspective of Environmental Protection  
Two starting-points are available to us when seeking to examine the envi-
ronmental protection rules pertaining to the Polar Regions. First, as men-
tioned previously, there is good reason to examine whether similar envi-
ronmental protection rules should exist in both Polar Regions. If their 
ecosystems and environments share important characteristics and are 
deemed to be more vulnerable to human-induced pollution than other 
areas of the world, this would indeed seem to suggest that similar types of 
environmental protection measures might be called for to protect these 
unique environments. Yet, this is more easily said than done.  
Secondly, however, it must be admitted that the Polar Regions remain 
highly differentiated when it comes to how environmental protection rules 
are enacted, implemented and applied. Of particular importance here is the 
issue of whether the regions concerned are part of the sovereign territory of 
a State or not. If a territory is under the sovereignty of a State, it is this 
State that has competence in enacting, implementing and applying rules in 
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respect of environmental protection, notwithstanding the fact that it has to 
observe all of the MEAs and other IEL rules and principles in the process.  
Here the Arctic and the Antarctic differ greatly. In the Antarctic, the 
sovereignty question has been “frozen” and thus there are no territorial 
sovereigns on the continent. With sovereignty claims frozen by the 
Treaty, there are no coastal States in the Antarctic that could establish 
maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Southern Ocean, meaning 
that the Southern Ocean can be regarded as a high seas area in respect of 
the law of the sea, although not in the usual sense (see below 4.2.). Seven 
States (see below) claimed parts of the Antarctic as their sovereign area 
before the conclusion of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. Yet, with this legally 
binding convention, these “claimant States” agreed not to consolidate 
these claims into full sovereignty for the duration of the Treaty, which is 
likely to continue far to the future. The situation in the Arctic contrasts 
sharply with this. All of the land area – continents as well as islands – is 
firmly under the sovereignty of the Arctic States, and much of the Arctic 
waters now fall under their maritime jurisdiction. The core of the Arctic 
Ocean remains part of the high seas with three high seas areas clearly 
established, namely, the Barents Sea (loophole), the North Atlantic (ba-
nana hole) and the Bering Sea (donut hole). 
Environmental protection is a complex issue in the Arctic because 
competence is divided between various levels of governance. The three 
federal States – the Russian Federation, the United States and Canada – 
exercise some powers in respect of environmental protection at the fed-
eral level and some at sub-unit level, e.g. Alaska in the USA or Nunavut 
in Canada. Even though the European Union (EU) is not a state in the 
eyes of international law, it is functionally very close to being one. As 
regards environmental protection the “federal level” of the EU can al-
ready be seen to have enacted a vast number of directives and regulations 
in respect of its Member States. The EU Arctic States are Finland, Swe-
den and Denmark. Yet, it is important to note that the Faroe Islands and 
Greenland are not part of the EU, while Greenland was recently elevated 
to the status of self-government (in contrast to its old Home-Rule status), 
with new powers in the area of environmental protection. The EU’s influ-
ence extends also to the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) States 
of Iceland and Norway, which, via the European Economic Area (EEA) 
agreement are obligated to implement much of the environmental protec-
tion rules enacted in the EU. Iceland has, however, applied for member-
ship of the EU. The Svalbard Islands, even though they are under the 
sovereignty of Norway, are excluded from the EEA agreement, and are 
governed by an international treaty concluded in 1920 (Treaty Concern-
ing the Archipelago of Spitsbergen). Nevertheless, Norway is competent 
to enact environmental protection rules for the Svalbard Islands, and in 
2001 enacted strong environmental protection rules for the Islands.  
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It is thus easy to see that the Polar Regions are indeed Polar opposites 
from the perspective of environmental protection, the details of which 
will be surveyed when we examine the regional implementation of IEL. 
At this point, however, it is useful simply to note the basic differences. 
Since there are no territorial sovereigns in the Antarctica, international 
institutions have, historically, both enacted and overseen environmental 
protection efforts in the region. This has also led to the Antarctic Treaty 
System (ATS) devising and implementing its own environmental protec-
tion rules rather than implementing what IEL, and in particular MEAs 
require. This contrasts starkly with prevailing practice in the Arctic where 
it is the nation-States (and their sub-units) that primarily have compe-
tence in environmental protection, and are also required to implement and 
apply the obligations of IEL. Yet, if we want to understand international 
environmental protection rules in the Arctic it is of utmost importance to 
understand that there is no “Arctic” for these national systems of envi-
ronmental law and policy: there is only the various States’ environmental 
policies and laws that also apply in their northern regions. Even if a soft-
law body, it is the Arctic Council that enables us to see the Arctic as a 
specific region – a vulnerable and unique environment that needs to be 
protected.  
For this reason, the way the chapter proceeds is by first giving a brief 
outline of how the Polar regimes – the Arctic Council and the Antarctic 
Treaty System – have evolved and how the region has been defined in the 
context of these regimes. It is interesting to note that even though the 
Polar Regimes are very different both have done most of their work pre-
cisely in the field of environmental protection. Thereafter, given that 
there are already a large number of environmental regulations and poli-
cies applicable in these regions, it is practical but still useful to take only 
a few examples of how environmental protection is undertaken in each 
region and compare them. In this way it is possible to clarify the differ-
ences which are manifest in the way in which environmental protection is 
undertaken in each. Finally, given the numerous environmental chal-
lenges both Polar Regions face it is imperative to examine some of these 
challenges and also to ponder whether the Polar regimes could learn from 
each other in the field of environmental protection.  
2.4 Overview of the Two Polar Regimes  
Before comparing the Polar regimes it will be useful to outline the differ-
ent ways in which the Polar Regions can be defined. Already here we 
have clear differences. In the Antarctic, the northernmost boundary can 
be either that adopted in the 1959 Antarctic Treaty, i.e., 60 degrees south, 
or the natural boundary known as the Antarctic convergence, a maritime 
zone where the warm waters of the northern seas meet the cool and less 
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salty waters of the Southern Ocean which was used in the 1980 Conven-
tion on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR).  
While the two definitions of the Antarctic have been enshrined in le-
gally binding treaties, there is no such definition of the southernmost 
boundary of the Arctic. As a matter of fact, several different criteria can 
be presented in the drawing of this boundary. Possible natural boundaries 
are, for instance, the tree line (the northernmost boundary where trees 
grow), or the 10 degree isotherm, i.e., the southernmost location where 
the mean temperature of the warmest month of the year is below 10 de-
grees. In Arctic-wide co-operation, the Arctic Circle has been used as a 
criterion for full membership, with only those States invited to participate 
in the co-operation that possess areas of territorial sovereignty above the 
Arctic Circle. Yet, it has been left for each State and working-group of 
the Council to define which southernmost boundary it wants to use.  
2.4.1 The Arctic Council  
The initial idea of Arctic-wide co-operation was launched in 1987, in 
Murmansk, by former Soviet Secretary-General Mikhail Gorbachev. The 
Soviet leader proposed that the Arctic States could initiate co-operation in 
various fields, one being protection of the Arctic environment. This idea 
was concretized in part when Finland convened a conference of the eight 
Arctic States – Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, the 
Russian Federation and the United States – in Romanism in 1989 to dis-
cuss the issue. After two additional preparatory meetings – in Yellow-
knife, Canada, and Kiruna, Sweden – the eight Arctic States, as well as 
other actors, met again in Rovaniemi in 1991 to sign the Rovaniemi Dec-
laration, by which they adopted the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy (AEPS). The AEPS identified in its introduction the reason for 
the strategy: 
The Arctic is highly sensitive to pollution and much of its human population and 
culture is directly dependent on the health of the region’s ecosystems. Limited 
sunlight, ice cover that inhibits energy penetration, low mean and extreme tem-
peratures, low species diversity and biological productivity and long-lived organ-
isms with high lipid levels all contribute to the sensitivity of the Arctic ecosystem 
and cause it to be easily damaged. This vulnerability of the Arctic to pollution re-
quires that action be taken now, or degradation may become irreversible.  
 
The AEPS identified six priority environmental problems facing the Arc-
tic – (persistent organic contaminants, radioactivity, heavy metals, noise, 
acidification and oil pollution), most of which can be traced either to 
prior environmental accidents having an effect in the region (the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill in Alaska and the Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in 
the former Soviet Union) or increasing awareness of long-range transport 
of pollutants to the Arctic from southern centres. It also outlined interna-
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tional environmental protection treaties that apply in the region and, fi-
nally, specified actions to counter these environmental threats.  
The eight Arctic States established four environmental protection 
working groups: Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Protec-
tion of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME), Emergency Prevention, 
Preparedness and Response (EPPR) and the Arctic Monitoring and As-
sessment Programme (AMAP). Three ministerial meetings (after the 
signing of the Declaration and the Strategy) were held in this first phase 
of Arctic co-operation, generally referred to as the AEPS process. The 
meetings were held in 1993 (Nuuk, Greenland), 1996 (Inuvik, Canada) 
and in 1997 (Alta, Norway). Senior Arctic Officials, normally officials 
from the foreign ministries of the eight Arctic states, guided the co-
operation process between the ministerial meetings. The last ministerial 
of the AEPS was held after the establishment of the Arctic Council and 
thus focused on integrating the AEPS into the structure of the Arctic 
Council.  
The Arctic Council was established in September 1996 in Ottawa, 
Canada, with the Arctic States signing a declaration creating the Council 
and issuing a joint communiqué to explain the newly created body. With 
the founding of the Council came changes in the forms of Arctic co-
operation that had been based on the AEPS document, clearly extending 
the terms of reference beyond the previous focus on environmental pro-
tection. The Council was empowered to deal with “common Arctic issues, 
in particular issues of sustainable development and environmental protec-
tion in the Arctic.”  
This yielded a very broad mandate, since “common issues” can in-
clude almost any international policy issue; however, in a footnote the 
declaration provides that “the Arctic Council should not deal with matters 
related to military security”. Environmental co-operation is now included 
as a principal focus within the mandate of the Council, with the four envi-
ronmental protection working groups set up in the context of AEPS co-
operation continuing under the umbrella of the Council.  
The second “pillar” of the Council’s mandate is co-operation on sus-
tainable development, whose terms of reference were adopted in the sec-
ond ministerial meeting of the Council, held in 2000 in Barrow, Alaska. 
Co-operation here is managed by the Arctic Council Sustainable Devel-
opment Working Group (SDWG). Recently, a sixth working-group was 
established, the Arctic Contaminants Action Programme (ACAP).  
The declaration establishing the Arctic Council amends and greatly 
elaborates on the rules on participation vis-à-vis those of the AEPS. It 
provides for three categories of participants: members, permanent partici-
pants and observers. The eight Arctic States are members; the three or-
ganizations which represent the indigenous peoples of the Arctic are 
permanent participants. The declaration also lays down the criteria for 
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observers, as well as the criteria for the status of permanent participant 
and the decision-making procedure for determining that status.  
The decision-making procedure of the Arctic Council, which had de-
veloped in the context of AEPS co-operation, is made explicit in the dec-
laration. Article 7 provides that: “Decisions of the Arctic Council are to 
be by consensus of the Members.” In Article 2, “member” is defined as 
including only the eight Arctic States. This decision-making by consen-
sus is to be undertaken only after “full consultation” with the permanent 
participants, i.e., the organizations of the Arctic indigenous peoples. Al-
though these permanent participants do not have formal decision-making 
power, they are clearly in a position to exert much influence in practice 
on the decision-making of the Council.  
The function of the Arctic Council is much dictated by its chair States. 
The first was Canada (1996–1998), followed by the United States (1998–
2000), Finland (2000–2002), Iceland (2002–2004) and Russia (2004–
2006). Currently, the so-called Scandinavian chairs have taken over with 
their common priorities for the period 2006–2012, Norway being the first 
chair with Denmark now acting as the chair. Since the Council has no per-
manent secretariat, the chair State has a great deal of freedom to choose its 
priorities during its tenure. This does however undoubtedly hinder the for-
mation of long-term policies (during the Scandinavian chair period, there is 
also a common secretariat in Tromsø, Norway).  
The Arctic Council has in recent years focussed most of its energy on 
making large-scale scientific assessments, starting with the 2004 Arctic 
Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), which established the Arctic as a 
barometer of climate change. Given the projected intense change in the 
Arctic, many scientific assessments have been produced with more al-
ready underway dealing with the consequences of climate change in the 
Arctic for oil and gas activities (assessment finalised in 2008 but released 
in 2009), shipping (2009) and biodiversity (2011). In addition, the Coun-
cil has increasingly taken action in international environmental protection 
processes, such as the negotiations on the Stockholm Convention on Per-
sistent Organic Pollutants, which was adopted in 2001 and in the Johan-
nesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002.  
2.4.2 The Antarctic Treaty System  
The impetus for the development of the Antarctic Treaty was the Interna-
tional Geophysical Year (1957–1958). By the time the Geophysical Year 
was declared, seven States (Chile, Argentina, the United Kingdom, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Norway and France) had made claims for territorial 
sovereignty over parts of the Antarctic continent. The Cold War had also 
started, and the two superpowers – the Soviet Union and the United 
States – had established scientific stations in the Antarctic, although they 
had not made any claims for territorial sovereignty or recognized the 
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claims that had been made by others. The sovereignty situation was quite 
volatile and thus the States concerned – the United States, the Soviet Un-
ion, the seven claimant States, and a number of others that had scientific 
activity in the region – agreed to begin negotiations on the prospects of 
resolving several problematic issues that had arisen regarding the govern-
ance of the Antarctic.  
The Antarctic Treaty was concluded on 1 December 1959 and entered 
into force on 23 June 1961. Perhaps most importantly, the Treaty re-
solved the sovereignty question in the Antarctic through its famous 
“agreement to disagree” (article IV). All States could hold to their legal 
positions as to the sovereignty claims: those who had made them, agreed 
not to consolidate them during the duration of the Treaty and Soviet Un-
ion and the USA did not have to recognise such claims. By “freezing” the 
sovereignty question for the duration of the Treaty the States that negoti-
ated the Treaty were able to focus on demilitarizing the region and estab-
lishing it as a location for scientific research.  
According to the Treaty, Antarctic governance was to be implemented 
in Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings (ATCMs) by the original sig-
natory States known as Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs). 
The Treaty was not intended to be an exclusive club for its 12 original 
signatories, however; it provided the possibility for other States to accede 
to it. If an acceding state wanted to become an ATCP with full rights 
under the Treaty, it needed to conduct “substantial research activity” in 
the Antarctic as described in Article IX (2); otherwise, the State could 
only participate in the ATCMs as a non-Consultative Party.  
Initially, the ATCPs conducted Antarctic policy through the means of 
recommendations as provided in the Treaty. These recommendations, 
which despite their name were perceived by many States as legally bind-
ing internationally, have been an important means for the ATCPs to de-
velop the regime in many policy areas.  
A second approach has been to conclude international treaties in order 
to attract the participation of other than Consultative Parties, particularly 
in the management of the Southern Ocean. The rationale for this is 
straightforward. With sovereignty claims frozen by the Treaty, there were 
no coastal States proper in the Antarctic that could establish maritime 
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Southern Ocean, meaning that it 
could be regarded as a high seas area in respect of the law of the sea, 
although not in the usual sense (since some of the claimant States have 
adopted maritime zones for their Southern Ocean waters). If the whole 
Southern Ocean were deemed high seas, however, it would be open to 
economic exploitation by all States, including those that had not taken 
part in the Treaty and whose behaviour the ATCPs could thus not control.  
Three international treaties were concluded to address this situation – 
the 1972 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS), the 
1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Re-
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sources (CCAMLR) and the 1988 Convention on the Regulation of Ant-
arctic Mineral Resource Activities (CRAMRA) – but these have not 
worked as originally planned, because it is mainly the ATCPs that have 
participated in them.  
A third method used to implement Antarctic policy has been to con-
clude an international treaty connected to the original Antarctic Treaty. 
This occurred after France and Australia abandoned the CRAMRA as a 
solution to the mining issue and the need arose to find a new one. The 
outcome was the Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty, which prohibited mining indefinitely. The Protocol, 
which was adopted in 1991 and entered into force in 1998, is open only to 
the contracting parties of the Antarctic Treaty, and, according to its Arti-
cle 4, is meant to supplement the Treaty, not to modify or amend it. Im-
portantly, the Protocol explicitly defines the legal acts mentioned above 
that formed the ATS. Article 1e states:  
“Antarctic Treaty system” means the Antarctic Treaty, the measures in effect un-
der that Treaty, its associated separate international instruments in force and the 
measures in effect under those instruments.” The Protocol also established an or-
gan to administer it, the Committee on Environmental Protection (CEP), which 
reports annually to the ATCM.  
 
The driving force of the ATS has been the ATCMs, which at first took 
place biennially but since 1994 have been organized annually. There are 
now 28 Consultative Parties to the Treaty with full voting rights and 19 
non-Consultative Parties, making a total of 47 States in the ATS. In 2004, 
the permanent secretariat to the ATS commenced its work in Buenos 
Aires, Argentina.  
2.5 Environmental Protection: Similarities and 
Differences in the Polar Regions  
It is important to note that both of the Polar regimes have focused their 
work on environmental protection though this work began in the Antarc-
tica much earlier than in the Arctic. The 1959 Treaty already provided in 
Art IX (1) that one of the areas in which the ATCMs could make recom-
mendations was in the “preservation and conservation of living resources 
in Antarctica.” Already in 1964, three years after the entry into force of 
the Treaty, the ATCMs adopted Agreed Measures for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Fauna and Flora. These required the Consultative Parties to 
protect the fauna and flora in the region as well as to establish special 
protected areas for this purpose. Most of the recommendations adopted in 
the ATCMs have concerned environmental protection, and much of the 
environmental regulation that was part of the 1991 Madrid Protocol had 
already been adopted earlier in the form of recommendations, e.g., Rec-
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ommendation XIV–2 in 1987 implementing an environmental impact 
assessment procedure for the region. Environmental protection has also 
been the main focus of the associated international treaties that have been 
concluded, i.e., the CCAS, and the CCAMLR.  
A similar focus on environmental protection can be seen in the Arctic. 
Of all the policy areas which Secretary-General Gorbachev enumerated, 
it was environmental protection that served as the basis for the Finnish 
initiative for Arctic-wide co-operation, a process that led to the signing of 
the 1991 Rovaniemi Declaration and the Strategy for the Protection of the 
Arctic Environment. Even after the creation of the Arctic Council, with 
its new emphasis on sustainable development issues, it has been the four 
environmental protection working-groups (CAFF, PAME, EPPR and 
AMAP) that have been the main agents of this co-operation.  
From the perspective of environmental protection, a clear difference 
between the Antarctic and the Arctic is that the Arctic has human habita-
tion in general and is home to indigenous peoples. A rough estimate, 
which naturally depends on how one defines the region, puts the number 
of people living in the Arctic at 10 million, of whom 1.5 million are of 
indigenous origin. No permanent human habitation exists in the Antarc-
tic, although there are, of course, many scientists working there part-time. 
In addition, increasing number of tourists visits the region annually. Both 
poles thus face different issues where environmental protection is con-
cerned. With no permanent human habitation in the Antarctic, there is no 
need to take into account considerations such as the necessary balancing 
of human needs with the goal of environmental protection. In addition, as 
the Arctic is home to a large number of indigenous peoples, there is a 
need to take account of their special rights and interests in environmental 
protection, which are developing in international and national law.  
This difference can well be illustrated in the way marine mammals are 
conserved and managed in the Polar Regions, particularly whales. As is 
well-known, the International Whaling Commission – established via the 
1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling – set up a 
moratorium against all whaling in 1982, which entered into force in 1986. 
This controversial decision is still in force, even though the scientific 
committee has recommended its partial revision. The Antarctic Treaty 
System – in particular the CCAMLR and Annex II of the Madrid Proto-
col – ensure that the global whaling regime functions also in the Southern 
Ocean. However, the situation is very different in the Arctic. First of all, 
two of the Arctic States withdrew from the Whaling Convention and its 
Commission because of the moratorium on all whaling: Canada and Ice-
land. Even though Iceland returned in 2002, it made a reservation to the 
effect that it could commence – on the basis of sound science – commer-
cial whaling after 2006. Norway objected to the moratorium and is thus 
not legally bound by it and has continued whaling. It has set its national 
catch limits for its coastal whaling operations over minke whales. Abo-
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riginal subsistence hunting is provided for in the Whaling Convention, 
and thus the indigenous peoples of Alaska, Greenland and Russia con-
tinue hunting on that basis. There is then a stark contrast between how 
whaling is regulated in the Polar Regions.  
There is even a special co-operative body (Commission) to conserve 
and manage cetaceans (whales and dolphins) and pinnipeds (seals and 
walruses) in the Arctic, established via the Agreement on Cooperation in 
Research, Conservation and Management of Marine Mammals in the 
North Atlantic (NAMMCO Agreement). The NAMMCO Commission is 
an international body for cooperation on the conservation, management 
and study of marine mammals in the North Atlantic. The agreement was 
signed in Nuuk, Greenland on 9 April 1992 by Norway, Iceland, 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands and aims to provide a mechanism for 
cooperation on the conservation and management of all cetaceans and 
pinnipeds found in the region.  
2.5.1 Differences between the Environmental Protection Approaches of 
the Polar Regimes  
The approaches to environmental protection in the two Polar regimes 
have differed markedly. From the outset, environmental protection in the 
Antarctic has been regulated by international law, simply because the 
“freezing” of the sovereignty question meant there were no territorial 
sovereigns in the region that would have their environmental protection 
systems operating in various parts of the continent. These international 
environmental regulations have then been incorporated into the national 
legal systems of the ATCPs. In the Arctic, the situation is the reverse in 
that national environmental laws apply to most of the region, except for 
the international areas, e.g. the high seas and deep sea-bed.  
In the Antarctic, the institutional structure and the regulations have been 
adopted in internationally legally binding forms – the so-called hard-law 
approach. The Antarctic Treaty and its Protocol, as well as the associated 
agreements, have all been adopted using the conventional treaty format. 
Even the recommendations, which are easily associated with soft-law in 
effect, have had to be ratified by the ATCPs and were considered by many 
States as legally binding already at the start of the ATS.  
Arctic co-operation, in contrast, has been based on instruments that 
are widely regarded as soft-law instruments. AEPS co-operation was 
implemented through the signing of a declaration and the Strategy for the 
Protection of the Arctic Environment, and even the Arctic Council was 
established through a declaration. Since it is the national environmental 
laws of the eight Arctic States that apply in their Arctic areas, the most 
the Arctic Council has been able to do – as a soft-law organization – has 
been to adopt guidelines and recommendations on how the Arctic States 
should apply their regulations in those areas.  
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Within these limits, the Council has done lot of useful work: e.g., it 
has reviewed the international environmental laws and treaties applicable 
to the Arctic region, produced guidelines and manuals on various fields 
of environmental protection where application in the Arctic would require 
special measures, made an inventory of existing nature protection areas, 
and studied the environmental problems that are damaging the environ-
ment. Sometimes these programmes have made a difference, but outright 
failures have also occurred. The problem is made more difficult by the 
fact that the Arctic Council does not regularly evaluate whether these 
projects and guidelines it has produced actually attain their goals.  
The two Polar regimes also differ with respect to the basic approach 
they have adopted in their environmental protection work. The Antarctic 
approach could be loosely characterized as one of precaution or prudence 
whereas the Arctic Council has focused on sponsoring vast scientific 
assessments rather than trying to regulate the issues. The ATS approach 
can be demonstrated in reference to a number of examples. For example, 
the CCAS established protection measures for Antarctic seals at a time 
when there was no major pelagic sealing but only fears that it might be-
come a reality, and many of the protective measures had already been 
implemented in the 1964 Agreed Measures. The CCAMLR applied the 
same precautionary approach to the conservation of marine living re-
sources. The main motivation for negotiating the Convention was the 
increasing level of krill fishing, krill being a key species in the Antarctic 
marine food chain. Yet, even though there had been a clear increase in the 
krill catch during the 1970s, there was still no fear of the krill stock being 
overexploited. The Convention was thus put in place even before any 
serious likelihood of damage to the environment existed.  
A more dramatic example of this precautionary approach can be seen 
in the way the ATCPs negotiated on mineral exploitation in the Antarctic. 
Even though no minerals had been mined in the Antarctic, the ATCPs 
decided that since there was potential for exploitation, mineral develop-
ment should start only after an international convention had been con-
cluded to regulate mining activities, and especially their environmental 
impacts.  
They also decided, in Recommendation IX–1, that before such a con-
vention could be concluded, there should be a moratorium on all mining 
activity in the region. The outcome of the negotiations between the 
ATCPs on the minerals issue was the 1988 CRAMRA, which in principle 
permitted mineral resource development but also established very strict 
controls on mining. Even this proved to be too little, however, because, as 
mentioned earlier, under the lead of France and Australia, the CRAMRA 
was rejected. This prompted a new set of negotiations between the 
ATCPs, the outcome of which was the 1991 Madrid Protocol, which pro-
hibited mining indefinitely and established tight regulation on all kinds of 
human activities in the Antarctic.  
 Polar Law Textbook 38 
The final difference that may be noted between the environmental pro-
tection agendas of the two Polar regimes is their stance on international 
environmental protection efforts. The ATCPs have not found it necessary 
to try to influence the negotiation processes that aim to combat global 
environmental problems, whereas the Arctic Council has been active in 
this regard. For example, the Council actors were active in negotiating 
what was to become the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Or-
ganic Pollutants, a role readily apparent in the preamble to the Conven-
tion “Acknowledging that the Arctic ecosystems and indigenous commu-
nities are particularly at risk because of the biomagnification of persistent 
organic pollutants and that contamination of their traditional foods is a 
public health issue.”  
2.6 Similarities between the Environmental Protection 
Approaches of the Polar Regimes  
It is also important to note that the most pressing environmental problems 
in respect of the Polar Regions are not generated from within the regions 
themselves, but rather emanate from the outside. It is the commercial cen-
tres of North America, Europe and Asia that contribute most to Polar envi-
ronmental problems primarily through the emission of persistent organic 
pollutants, heavy metals, greenhouse gases and chlorofluorocarbons. Some 
of these pollutants travel long-distances from the mid-latitudes to the Polar 
Regions by prevailing wind patterns and the ocean circulation system caus-
ing, ultimately, various environmental and human health problems in the 
Polar Regions. Yet, even though both regions can be seen as victims of 
global environmental problems – in the sense that the regions do not really 
contribute to these problems but suffer from them – it has only been the 
Arctic Council that has been able to make a difference on how these global 
problems are tackled, not the Antarctic Treaty System.  
As was mentioned above, the Arctic Council actors made a concerted 
effort to influence the negotiations over what became the 2001 Stock-
holm POPs Convention. It was the successful AMAP compiled informa-
tion over how the POPs end up in the Arctic, and the way the region’s 
indigenous peoples could gave a human face to the problem that made a 
difference in the negotiations. The Inuit could show on the basis of sci-
ence that because they still eat traditional foods, POPs end up in their 
body, and for instance cause harm to the human embryo. The Arctic 
Council has been able to influence only indirectly the problems of ozone 
depletion and climate change caused by chlorofluorocarbons and green-
house gases respectively. By sponsoring the Arctic Climate Impact As-
sessment (ACIA), it was able to feed regional scientific information to 
the respective global regimes tackling these problems.  
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Biodiversity protection is undertaken, to some extent, similarly in 
each of the Polar Regions. Evidently the difference referred to above that 
the ATS system has drawn up its own rules for biodiversity protection 
and not simply tried to implement the Convention on Biological Diversity 
in the Antarctica is important here. Seven of the eight Arctic States are 
parties to the Biodiversity Convention so except for the U.S. the main 
work related to biodiversity is focused on the implementation of this 
Convention in the Arctic. Yet, there are some similarities in biodiversity 
protection. Both Polar Regions have a conservation treaty for the unique 
species of the region.  
The 1973 Agreement on Conservation of Polar Bears and the 1971 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals both aim to protect 
the species in their Polar environments. Both regions have, in their own 
way, special legal regulations and programmes focusing on certain plants 
and animals. Annex II of the Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty on 
Environmental Protection focuses on the conservation of Antarctic fauna 
and flora and has, as one of its protective measures, the designation of 
specially protected species. The CAFF set up its flora and seabirds group 
to advance biodiversity in a programmatic manner, mobilising already 
existing resources from the Member States to do this work. Both regions 
have – at least on the surface – protected area systems in place, which are 
one of the main means to conserve biodiversity. Annex V of the Madrid 
Protocol established a system of three classes of protected areas. In a 
similar vein, even though a soft-law process, the CAFF commenced in 
the early years of the AEPS the Circumpolar Protected Area Network 
(CPAN). Yet, such a system is currently non-functioning in the Arctic 
Council, given that no country is willing to take the lead over the CPAN.  
Article 8 of the Madrid Protocol and its Annex I governs the way envi-
ronmental impact assessment (EIA) is to be undertaken in Antarctica. The 
trigger for different levels of EIA is to evaluate whether the proposed activ-
ity is likely to produce less or more “minor or transitory impact.” As part of 
the final ministerial meeting of the AEPS in 1997 in Alta Norway, Guide-
lines for Environmental Impact Assessment in the Arctic were adopted 
together with another document – Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines. 
The EIA Guidelines instrument provides important guidance for Arctic 
EIAs, but as independent research has shown, the instrument has not been 
used and very few are even aware that it exists. The Arctic Offshore Oil 
and Gas Guidelines, which also contain strict EIA procedures for these 
particular types of activities, were revised for the third time in the Arctic 
Council ministerial meeting of April 2009, but it is difficult to say whether 
it has actually been made use of since the Arctic Council does not evaluate 
the effectiveness of the instruments it produces.  
The only legally binding Article that recognizes the special vulnerabil-
ity of the Arctic environment (not the Antarctica) is Article 234 of the 
LOS Convention:  
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Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and 
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from ves-
sels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where 
particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas 
for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and 
pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible dis-
turbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due re-
gard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment 
based on the best available scientific evidence.  
 
This provision mandates those Arctic coastal States that control sea areas 
under the ice-coverage for most part of the year to adopt and enforce non-
discriminatory “regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of 
marine pollution from vessels” within the limits of their exclusive eco-
nomic zones. Two Arctic States have made use of this provision, namely 
Canada and Russia, and have availed themselves of stronger powers to 
control ship traffic partly for the reason of protecting the marine envi-
ronment. The International Maritime Organisation adopted non-legally 
binding Guidelines for shipping that applied only in the Arctic (as had 
been the case for Article 234). These Guidelines provide important guid-
ance for construction requirements for ships entering Arctic waters, simi-
lar to those adopted by International Association of Classification Socie-
ties (IACS). They also recommend equipment standards, various types of 
operational measures and environmental protection and damage control. 
Recently, the IMO Assembly has adopted such Guidelines to apply in 
both Polar Regions and the IMO has a process in motion to consider mak-
ing these legally binding by 2012.  
Even if it was the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM) that 
adopted the Practical Guidelines for Ballast Water Exchange in Antarctic 
waters – which were then later adopted by IMO – these contain proce-
dures for vessels that operate in both Polar Regions. The Guidelines aim 
to ensure that vessels operating in both the Arctic and the Antarctic han-
dle ballast water responsibly and in such a way that invasive marine or-
ganisms are not transported between these regions.  
2.7 Emerging Issues and Conclusions  
As the discussion above has shown, there are some similarities – but, 
more importantly, noticeable differences – between the two Polar re-
gimes. The major question then is whether the Polar regimes have enough 
in common for the Arctic Council to benefit from the long-standing high-
quality environmental protection regime created for the Antarctica and 
whether there might be something that the ATS could learn from the Arc-
tic Council. It may also be useful here to discuss some of the emerging 
issues in environmental protection in respect of the Polar Regions.  
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It is important to stress that even though the differences between the 
two regions are stark from the viewpoint of governance, we should not 
underestimate their similarity in the minds of the general public and gov-
ernments. After all, regime formation is not always a rational process, 
and thus the imagined commonality of the poles may enable the Polar 
regimes to draw lessons from each other, even in designing an Arctic 
environmental protection treaty. In addition, in many countries, for one 
reason or another, polar issues are dealt with together, and many of the 
Arctic States (e.g. the USA, Norway, Sweden, Finland and the Russian 
Federation) are also Consultative Parties in the ATS (and Denmark and 
Canada non-consultative ones). In recent years the Polar regimes them-
selves have started to oversee each others actions, this culminated in the 
joint Antarctic Treaty – Arctic Council meeting at the end of the Interna-
tional Polar Year 6 April 2009, which also served by marking the 50 year 
celebration for the Antarctic Treaty. The meeting also issued the Wash-
ington Declaration on the International Polar Year and Polar Science.  
With this as a background, we can ask whether the vulnerable Arctic 
environment would be best protected by borrowing from the long-
standing high-quality environmental protection regime created for the 
Antarctica, the ATS. The World Conservation Union (IUCN) – a type of 
hybrid international organisation, given that it has a vast number of states 
and governments as members – initiated a project on this possibility at 
the beginning of 2000.The project, however, did not come to any clear 
conclusions. The most recent attempt to revive the Antarctic model for 
the Arctic governance was made by the European Parliament, in its Octo-
ber 2008 resolution which:  
[…] suggests that the Commission should be prepared to pursue the opening of in-
ternational negotiations designed to lead to the adoption of an international treaty 
for the protection of the Arctic, having as its inspiration the Antarctic Treaty, as 
supplemented by the Madrid Protocol signed in 1991, but respecting the funda-
mental difference represented by the populated nature of the Arctic and the conse-
quent rights and needs of the peoples and nations of the Arctic region; believes, 
however, that as a minimum starting-point such a treaty could at least cover the 
unpopulated and unclaimed area at the centre of the Arctic Ocean.  
 
Nevertheless, serious obstacles remain to any attempt for the Arctic to 
directly borrow from the ATS, particularly in relation to environmental 
protection. As all claims in respect of territorial sovereignty over the Ant-
arctic continent were “frozen” by the Antarctic Treaty, environmental 
protection of the Treaty area was and is not based on each territorial State 
establishing its own environmental protection system but on the ATCMs 
laying down of international environmental protection rules for the whole 
region. National legislation serves only to implement what is required by 
international legislation.  
The situation is totally different in the Arctic. The eight Arctic States 
have established territorial sovereignty and sovereign rights over all of the 
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land areas and much of the waters as well, with the rest of the waters being 
part of international areas, the high seas and the deep sea-bed. Accordingly, 
the States have established their own environmental protection systems 
governing the way the Arctic environment is protected, within the limits of 
international environmental law. This structural difference clearly mani-
fests itself in the way environmental protection has been managed at both 
poles and prevents any easy borrowing from one to the other.  
The growing challenge to both regions however comes from global 
climate change and economic globalisation. The Polar regimes affirmed 
in their 2009 Washington Declaration that scientific information from the 
Polar Regions should feed into our overall understanding of the climate 
science, and in particular the findings produced in the context of the In-
ter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Climate change will 
clearly be the biggest challenge to the Polar Regions in the years to come, 
and for the Polar regimes that try to keep their development sustainable. 
In response to the rapid changes now being experienced in the Polar areas 
various new kinds of economic activities are increasingly being devel-
oped. This clearly presents a formidable challenge to the Polar regimes. 
In the Antarctic, the ATS is well equipped to conserve the environment as 
well as the region’s fauna, flora and ecosystems, but it will face increas-
ing pressures from economic activities particularly from tourism and 
biological prospecting. The challenge for the ATS then is how it could 
become active internationally, especially in the climate regime, since 
together with the Arctic Council they have the potential to deliver a 
strong message to the global community in respect of the already damag-
ing consequences of climate change in the Polar Regions. Joint interna-
tional policy encompassing both the Arctic Council and the ATS will also 
be important in influencing the way the Stockholm Convention on POPs 
develops as both poles are sinks for persistent organic pollutants which 
end up there due to atmospheric circulation and ocean currents.  
The Arctic is arguably facing very serious development pressures in 
the near and mid-term future. Given the melting sea ice and warming 
waters, shipping, offshore oil and gas exploitation, fisheries and tourism 
are increasing in prominence presenting difficult governance challenges 
for the Arctic Council. With the rapid environmental and economic 
changes, discussion over the need for stronger Arctic environmental gov-
ernance has commenced among various Arctic constituencies, in particu-
lar those of the Arctic States and the European Union. It is to be expected 
however that the principles and rules of IEL and MEAs will continue to 
play an important role in meeting the challenges faced in respect of envi-
ronmental protection in the Polar Regions.  
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Questions: 
1. In what way do you think that the principles of international 
environmental law are relevant in the Arctic and the Antarctic? 
2. How does the task of environmental protection change when humans 
are living in a region needing such protection measures? 
3. What is the biggest environmental threat to the Polar Regions? Can 
the Polar legal regimes contribute in any way to mitigating climate 
change and adapting to its consequences?  
 
 
 
3. Law of the Sea and Governance 
of Shipping in the Arctic and 
Antarctic 
 
David L. VanderZwaag 
3.1 Introduction 
The 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention (LOSC), which came into force 
in November 1994, might be described as setting the legal foundations 
for marine environmental protection and controlling marine resource 
exploitations in all the world’s oceans, including the Polar seas. Having 
320 articles and nine Annexes, the Convention sets out a basic require-
ment for all states to protect and preserve the marine environment (Art. 
194) and to cooperate in developing global standards for shipping (Art. 
211) and global and regional standards for land-based marine pollution 
(Art. 207), ocean dumping (Art. 210) and seabed activities (Art. 208). 
States also have an obligation to subject all activities under their jurisdic-
tion or control which may cause substantial pollution or significant harm-
ful changes to the marine environment to environmental impact assess-
ment procedures (Art. 206). 
While LOSC clearly applies to both the Arctic and Antarctic marine 
areas, two major differences in application stand out in light of the pres-
ence of recognised coastal states and port states in the Arctic but not in 
the Antarctic. Many of the Convention’s provisions focus on clarifying 
the rights and responsibilities of coastal states in the five zones of na-
tional jurisdiction, internal waters, the territorial sea, a contiguous zone, 
the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and a continental shelf. While five 
coastal states (Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Norway, the Russian Fed-
eration and the United States) surround the Arctic Ocean and thus those 
states are clearly bestowed powers to pass and enforce national laws in 
those zones, the Antarctic does not have generally recognised coastal 
states. Seven states (Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, 
Norway and the United Kingdom) have historic territorial claims on the 
continent which have been “frozen” by the Antarctic Treaty (Art. IV). 
The LOSC also recognises the powers of port states over ships choosing 
to enter their ports, such as the right to inspect vessels for their seawor-
thiness and to prevent unseaworthy ships from sailing before being re-
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paired. While all five Arctic coastal states are clearly port states with 
corresponding inspection and enforcement powers, the Antarctic conti-
nent does not have generally recognised port states in the actual region. 
Shipping is a growing concern in both Polar Regions. Cruise ship vis-
its have been on the increase with corresponding human safety and envi-
ronmental concerns. The Arctic appears to be on the verge of a new era in 
commercial shipping with vast hydrocarbon and mineral resources and 
growing interest in transpolar shipping that may substantially cut trans-
port distances between Europe and Asia. Navigation in the Arctic by 
military vessels and other ships on governmental service is also expected 
to rise. For example, the Government of Canada has announced a com-
mitment to build new Arctic patrol vessels and to construct a vessel refu-
elling facility in Nanisivik, Nunavut. Both Polar Regions are remote, 
raising special challenges for emergency responses and search and rescue 
in case of accident. Navigating in ice and freezing temperatures are 
common challenges although the Arctic may be even more treacherous in 
light of a greater proportion of thicker multi-year ice.  
A key social and political difference between the Polar Regions is the 
presence of indigenous communities and an overall human population of 
about 4 million in the Arctic, while the Antarctic hosts scientific stations 
with temporary teams of scientists. The potential human impacts of ship-
ping which are a special concern in the Arctic include the interference 
caused to traditional hunting and harvesting activities and the overwhelm-
ing of small communities with tourists. Indigenous rights over marine areas 
and resources have yet to be fully resolved in the Arctic adding another 
layer of political and legal complexity not present in the Antarctic. 
This chapter provides a broad overview of the law of the sea and ship-
ping governance arrangements applicable to the Arctic and the Antarctic. 
The realities and challenges connected with the LOSC are first described 
for each region. The similarities and differences in regional approaches to 
addressing shipping safety and vessel-source pollution, including related 
environmental threats, are then surveyed. The maritime safety and pollu-
tion “main sails” are highlighted, namely, the (1974) International Con-
vention on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the (1973) International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as modified by 
the (1978) Protocol Relating Thereto (MARPOL 73/78) as well as further 
supportive conventions and guidelines (‘jib sails’) to the two central 
agreements governing international shipping. The chapter concludes by 
summarising the differences and commonalities in law of the sea and 
shipping governance approaches in the Polar Regions and highlights the 
many issues still needing to be resolved such as the adoption of a manda-
tory code for shipping in Polar waters. 
This chapter, by attempting to provide a broad overview of Polar law 
relating to law of the sea and shipping governance, by necessity omits 
detailed discussion of some legal topics. A review of international agree-
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ments relating to liability and compensation in case of marine accidents, 
such as an oil spill, is therefore beyond the scope of this paper. The effort 
to address seafarer working and living conditions, such as food, medical 
care and wages, through a consolidated 2006 Maritime Labour Conven-
tion, is not discussed nor are the international customs and contractual 
practices of ship owners and commercial interests surveyed. For example, 
marine insurance contracts may be critical for ensuring Polar shipping 
ventures actually occur and the cost of insurance may be a major con-
straint. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has developed 
over 50 treaty instruments and hundreds of other measures, including 
codes and guidelines, over the years to control shipping and only some of 
the most important and relevant documents to Polar shipping can be 
summarised. 
3.2 Law of the Sea Realities and Challenges 
3.2.1 Arctic Law of the Sea Realities 
The law of the sea reality for the Arctic is at the same time both simple and 
complex. The LOSC provides as easy to understand division of rights to 
living and non-living marine resources. Arctic coastal states are given ex-
clusive rights to exploit fisheries, minerals, hydrocarbons and energy re-
sources within their 200–nautical mile (n.m.) EEZs. Where the natural 
prolongation of continental shelves extends beyond 200–n.m., coastal 
states have the right to exploit sedentary species, such as shellfish, and 
mineral resources on the seabed. In the high seas water column beyond 
national 200–n.m. zones, various freedoms of the sea apply whereby all 
states may have access to living resources and shipping routes. For the 
deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, the International Seabed Author-
ity, a management organisation established pursuant to the LOSC and 
based in Jamaica, would be responsible for licensing and regulating any 
mineral exploration or exploitation activity should it arise. The Agreement 
to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, adopted in 1994, sets out further 
“rules of the game” in relation to deep seabed mineral policy including 
provisions on technology transfer and the financial terms of contracts.  
The 1982 Convention also clearly bestows substantial coastal state ju-
risdiction to undertake and control marine scientific research in Arctic 
waters. Coastal states have the exclusive right to conduct marine scien-
tific research in their territorial seas and such research can only be under-
taken with the express consent and under conditions set by the coastal 
state (Art. 245). Marine scientific research in the EEZ and on the conti-
nental shelf is also subject to coastal state consent which should be nor-
mally given (Art. 246(2)). Exceptions where consent may be refused 
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include where a project is of direct significance for the exploration and 
exploitation of natural resources or where a project involves drilling into 
the continental shelf, the use of explosives or the introduction of harmful 
substances into the marine environment (Art. 246(5)). 
The LOSC is also straightforward in establishing various state respon-
sibilities both within and beyond national zones of jurisdiction in the 
Arctic. For example, coastal states are obligated to ensure proper conser-
vation and management measures so living resources in the EEZ are not 
endangered by over-exploitation and such measures must avoid seriously 
threatening the reproduction levels of associated or dependent species 
(Art. 61(2)(4)). States are required to cooperate directly or through sub-
regional or regional organisations to ensure the conservation of fish 
stocks shared across national EEZs (Art. 63(1)) and stocks that straddle 
an EEZ and the high seas (Art. 63(2)). States must take all measures nec-
essary to prevent, and control pollution of the marine environment from 
any source (Art. 194(1)) and seek to minimise to the fullest possible ex-
tent the release of toxic or noxious substances (Art. 194(3)(a)). States are 
required to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems and the habitat 
of threatened or endangered species (Art. 194(5)). The intentional or ac-
cidental introduction of alien species to the marine environment which 
may cause significant harmful changes is to be avoided (Art. 196(1)). 
States are also required to cooperate in conserving and managing living 
resources in the high seas and to consider establishing sub-regional or 
regional fisheries organisations (Art. 118).  
With broad acceptance that the Arctic Ocean is a semi-enclosed sea, 
Article 123 of LOSC urges states bordering such an area to cooperate in 
managing the conservation of living marine resources, in protecting and 
preserving the marine environment and in coordinating scientific research 
activities. Two key criteria must be met for the Arctic Ocean to be con-
sidered a semi-enclosed sea as defined in Article 122 of LOSC. First, the 
Arctic Ocean must be deemed a “sea,” a term that is not defined in the 
Law of the Sea Convention. Second, the Arctic Ocean must consist en-
tirely or primarily of the territorial seas and EEZs of two or more coastal 
states. 
A further overlay of cooperative obligations emanates from the 1995 
UN Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Agree-
ment for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the 
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks). The Agreement urges the application of precau-
tionary and biodiversity protective approaches to fisheries management 
(Art. 5). The Agreement also calls for the strengthening of existing re-
gional fisheries management organisations and arrangements with man-
agement mandates for straddling or highly migratory fish stocks (Art. 
13). Coastal states and states fishing on the high seas are to consider es-
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tablishing a new regional fisheries management organisation or arrange-
ment where no such organisation or arrangement exists (Art. 8(5)). This 
latter obligation might be described as a “prospective” for the Arctic as it 
remains to be seen whether viable commercial fish stocks exist in the 
high seas pocket in the central Arctic Ocean and whether states will wish 
to support the opening up of new fisheries areas. 
The LOSC has cast a complex web of jurisdictional entitlements and 
limitations for the three categories of states concerned with Arctic ship-
ping – coastal states, flag states, and port states. These categories are 
reviewed in turn.  
3.2.1.1 Coastal State Jurisdiction and Control 
Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway, the Russian Federation and the 
United States have coastal frontage on the Arctic Ocean and thus are 
considered as coastal states which can exert legislative and enforcement 
control over foreign ships in offshore waters. The amount of control var-
ies with the zones of coastal state jurisdiction. The greatest powers exist 
in internal waters, the waters closest to the coastal state, and the powers 
become less according to the distance offshore with least control existing 
over foreign vessels navigating above an extended continental shelf be-
yond 200–n.m. 
In internal waters, a coastal state has total sovereignty. Thus, if it 
wishes, the state may prohibit entry of certain ships, such as those carry-
ing hazardous cargoes and may impose “zero discharge” limits on spe-
cific pollutants. The only limit on this maximum power is the customary 
duty to allow foreign ships in distress, such as those facing a major storm, 
to seek refuge in sheltered waters.  
Internal water status can be claimed in various ways. LOSC recog-
nises the right of coastal states to draw closing lines across mouths of 
geographical bays, ports and harbours and the marine areas on the land-
ward side of the lines are considered internal. A coastal state is allowed to 
draw straight baselines around a deeply indented coastline or where there 
is a fringe of islands in the immediate vicinity of the coast, and the waters 
enclosed would be internal. Internal waters might also be claimed based 
upon their being recognised as such historically. 
Within the territorial sea limit which may extend 12–n.m. from the 
low-water line along the coast or outside enclosed internal waters, the 
coastal state has full sovereignty but that sovereignty is subject to the 
right of foreign ships to enjoy innocent passage. Passage is considered 
innocent so long as it is continuous and expeditious and not prejudicial to 
the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state. The Convention 
lists various activities that are considered non-innocent including: carry-
ing out of research or surveys, any fishing activities and any act of wilful 
or serious pollution in contravention of the Convention. 
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While the LOSC allows coastal states to adopt pollution control and 
navigational safety laws applicable to foreign ships transiting through the 
territorial sea, it places key limits on this authority. Coastal states cannot 
impose design, construction, crewing or equipment standards on foreign 
ships unless giving effect to generally accepted international rules or 
standards. Coastal states are also prohibited from imposing requirements 
on foreign ships which have the practical effect of denying or impairing 
the right of innocent passage. Coastal states can require foreign ships to 
use designated sea lanes or traffic separation schemes, but before doing 
so the state must consider the recommendations of the IMO and take into 
account any channels customarily used for international navigation. 
Coastal states may also claim a 12 n.m. contiguous zone adjacent to 
the territorial sea to a seaward limit of 24 n.m. In a contiguous zone a 
coastal state may exercise necessary control over foreign ships to prevent 
infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and to 
punish infringement of such laws committed within its territory or territo-
rial sea. For example, a state might seek to enforce a law prohibiting any 
garbage disposal in its territorial sea against a foreign ship navigating 
within the contiguous zone that had previously disposed of garbage in the 
territorial sea.  
In a coastal state’s 200–n.m. EEZ, legislative and enforcement juris-
diction over foreign vessels is substantially curtailed. A coastal state can-
not impose its own pollution standards on such vessels but is restricted to 
only imposing international pollution standards. Actual arrests and deten-
tion of a foreign ship is only allowed if there is a discharge causing or 
threatening major damage to the coastline, interests or resources of the 
coastal state. Monetary penalties may only be imposed for such EEZ 
pollution infringements. 
Where the natural prolongation of a coastal state’s continental shelf 
extends beyond 200–n.m. from the baselines from which the territorial 
sea is measured, the coastal state has very limited control over foreign 
shipping activities occurring in waters above the extended continental 
margin. A coastal state may establish safety zones around artificial is-
lands or structures involved in seabed exploration or exploitation activi-
ties, and no such activities may be carried out without the coastal state’s 
consent. A coastal state in exercising its rights over the continental shelf 
must not cause any unjustifiable interference with navigation or with 
other freedoms such as fishing.  
A coastal state bordering a strait used for international navigation is 
severely restricted in controlling foreign shipping because of the right of 
all ships to transit passage. A coastal state may only impose international 
pollution control standards, not stricter national regulations. Sea lanes and 
traffic separation schemes may be established but only with IMO ap-
proval. A submarine exercising transit passage may remain submerged 
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whereas an innocent passage through the territorial sea a submarine is 
required to navigate on the surface and to show its flag.  
While the various national zones of jurisdiction are applicable to all 
the world’s oceans including the Arctic, the LOSC has recognised special 
hazards of navigation in ice-covered waters and has given extra powers 
for coastal states to pass and enforce laws for control of vessel source 
pollution for those waters. A coastal state may adopt stricter than interna-
tional pollution standards normally applicable in the EEZ. Article 234 
provides: 
Coastal States have the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and 
regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from ves-
sels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone, where 
particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas 
for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and 
pollution of the marine environment could cause major harm to or irreversible dis-
turbance of the ecological balance. Such laws and regulations shall have due re-
gard to navigation and the protection and preservation of the marine environment 
and be based on the best available scientific evidence. 
 
Article 234 leaves open many questions of interpretation. For example, 
what is the significance of recognising special coastal state powers spe-
cific to the EEZ? One interpretation is that coastal states are given no 
greater powers than those granted for the territorial sea and thus no uni-
lateral right exists to adopt special ship construction, crewing and equip-
ment standards. What extent of ice coverage is required to invoke this 
article? The application of Article 234 to straits used for national naviga-
tion may also be questioned, although the LOSC does not explicitly ex-
empt straits from application.  
3.2.1.2 Flag State Jurisdiction and Control 
A flag state, referring to the country granting its nationality to a ship and 
allowing a ship to fly its flag, has extensive jurisdictional control over its 
vessels. The flag state’s national laws including criminal laws, apply to 
those aboard its ships. The flag state has exclusive jurisdiction over its 
vessels on the high seas with limited exceptions, for example, if the state 
consents to boarding and inspection by officials from other states pursu-
ant to a regional fisheries enforcement agreement. A flag state has a duty 
to ensure that its ships conform to international standards in relation to 
safety at sea, pollution control and communications. 
Two potential “weak links” in the flag state control approach stand 
out. First is the “flag of convenience” challenge where some states con-
tinue to register ships without having adequate capacity and political will 
to ensure their vessels live up to international standards and commit-
ments. The International Transport Workers’ Federation lists over 30 
countries, including Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, the Cayman 
Islands, Liberia and Panama, that are considered flags of convenience 
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where vessels are registered for the purposes of reducing operating costs 
and avoiding strict regulations. Second is the sovereign immunity reality. 
Article 236 of the LOSC exempts warships and government owned or 
operated ships used for non-commercial service from the marine and 
environmental protection provisions of the Convention. States are merely 
required to ensure such vessels act consistent “as far as is reasonable and 
practicable” with the Convention’s provisions. 
3.2.1.3 Port State Jurisdiction and Control 
When a vessel is voluntarily within a port or off-shore terminal of a state, 
the state possesses broad powers of inspection and enforcement. Article 
218 of the LOSC recognises the right of a port state to investigate and 
institute proceedings regarding illegal pollution discharges even if outside 
its own maritime zones, specifically on the high seas or within the juris-
dictional zones of other states (if they request institution of proceedings). 
Article 219 of the LOSC requires port states to prevent unseaworthy ships 
from sailing and authorises port states to require a vessel to proceed to the 
nearest repair yard. 
Most marine regions around the globe are covered by memorandums of 
understanding (MOU) on port state control, including the Paris MOU cov-
ering Europe and the North Atlantic and the Tokyo MOU applicable to 
Asia and the Pacific, whereby maritime administrations agree to cooperate 
in undertaking inspection of ships visiting their ports to ensure compliance 
with key international conventions relating to maritime safety and pollu-
tion. With the projected increase in Arctic commercial shipping the ques-
tion arises as to whether the maritime authorities of the Arctic states should 
develop a new MOU specific to port state control in the Arctic. 
3.2.2 Arctic Law of the Sea Challenges 
At least four main “law of the sea” challenges can be seen to directly 
concern Arctic waters. First, two ocean boundary disputes continue to 
fester in the region. Canada and the United States disagree over the mari-
time boundary in the Beaufort Sea. Canada and Denmark (Greenland) 
contest a small area of jurisdiction in the Lincoln Sea. Until such disputes 
are resolved, ship operators may face uncertainty over which national 
shipping laws are applicable in a contested zone. While Norway and the 
Russian Federation had a long-standing ocean boundary dispute in the 
Barents Sea, they reached a preliminary agreement in April 2010 to fi-
nally delineate their maritime border. 
Second, the five coastal states of the Arctic Ocean have yet to finally 
determine the outer limits of their continental shelves. The Russian Fed-
eration, made its initial submission for an extended continental shelf to 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in December 
2001, but was requested to submit a revised submission as to a possible 
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Arctic extension and that submission is expected in 2010 or possibly 
later. Norway, filing its submission to the Commission in November 
2006, received recommendations from the Commission in March 2009 
and at the time of writing had yet to formally establish the outer limits. 
Canada, Denmark (Greenland) and the United States are still in the proc-
ess of collecting scientific and technical data in order to establish their 
claims. The United States has not yet acceded to the LOSC and there is 
increasing pressure on it to become a Party in order to legitimise its po-
tential extended continental shelf through the Commission on the Limits 
of the Continental Shelf. 
Resolving disagreements over the jurisdictional status of some marine 
waters in the Arctic is a third challenge. For example, the United States 
and other states have objected to Canada’s enclosure of its Arctic Archi-
pelago with straight baselines and the status of those waters as internal. 
The United States considers the Northwest Passage and parts of the 
Northern Sea Route off the Russian Federation as straits used for interna-
tional navigation where the right of transit passage would apply, while 
Canada and the Russian Federation vehemently contest such status.  
The status of maritime zones off Svalbard is also open to contention. 
While the Treaty of Spitsbergen (Svalbard) adopted in 1920, recognises 
Norwegian sovereignty over the archipelago subject to equal rights of 
access, fishing and hunting for other parties, the application of the treaty 
beyond the territorial sea is disputed. Norway maintains the treaty’s ap-
plication ends at the territorial sea limit and, therefore, Norway is entitled 
to an EEZ and continental shelf off Svalbard. Tensions over the legal 
status of waters seaward of the territorial sea have been partly quelled by 
Norway’s restraint in only establishing in 1977 a Fisheries Protection 
Zone out to 200 n.m., and granting fisheries access to contracting parties 
to the treaty founded on historical fishing patterns. 
A fourth challenge is the need to consider possible future directions 
for strengthening international cooperation in protecting the marine envi-
ronment in the large pocket of high seas beyond natural jurisdiction in the 
central Arctic Ocean. With various freedoms of the sea, including fishing 
and navigation, a looming challenge is to initiate international discussions 
on future development and conservation objectives and options for pro-
viding further protective measures. Various governance options have 
been proposed by various authors including the establishment of a re-
gional ocean management organisation (ROMO), the creation of a re-
gional fisheries management organisation (RFMO) and the negotiation of 
a high seas marine protected area. 
Future directions for high seas governance for all the world’s oceans, 
including the Arctic, has become an international cauldron of contro-
versy. The UN General Assembly has established an Ad Hoc Open-ended 
Working Group to study issues relating to the conservation and sustain-
able use of marine biological diversity beyond areas of national jurisdic-
 Polar Law Textbook 54 
tion (ABNJ Working Group). The ABNJ Working Group has met three 
times, most recently in February 2010, and has not been able to resolve 
deep divisions of opinion over such issues as whether an Implementation 
Agreement on High Seas Marine Biodiversity should be forged and 
whether bio-prospecting for genetic resources on the high seas should be 
subject to a special access and benefit sharing arrangements supportive of 
developing countries.  
3.2.3 Antarctic Law of the Sea Realities and Challenges 
With no generally recognised coastal states in the Antarctic region with 
national zones of jurisdiction and concomitant control over the activities 
of foreign vessels, the Antarctic law of the sea reality is the primacy of 
flag state jurisdiction. Each state authorising ships to fly its flag is re-
sponsible for ensuring its vessels operating in the Antarctic comply with 
international treaty and customary law obligations relating to such areas 
as shipping, fishing, ocean dumping and marine biodiversity conserva-
tion. For example, the Basel Convention on the Trans-boundary Man-
agement of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal requires parties to pro-
hibit the export of hazardous wastes for disposal within the area south of 
the 60o South latitude, and it is the flag state that bears prime responsibil-
ity for ensuring its flagged vessels do not undertake such shipments. 
While ocean dumping in most regions would be strictly regulated by 
coastal states, in the Antarctic control measures for potential dumping 
from outside the region would fall on the shoulders of flag states. 
Two main law of the sea challenges continue to hover over Antarctic 
waters. First is the potentially frayed regulatory nets opened by reliance 
on flag state jurisdiction as the prime means of controlling human uses. 
Flag states may not become party to key multilateral environmental or 
fisheries agreements aimed at protecting Antarctic waters. For example, 
the Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 
which sets out environmental impact assessment obligations for contract-
ing parties authorising activities in the Antarctic, has only 34 parties. 
Thus, the danger exists that states not party might allow their flagged 
vessels to undertake tourism visits to the region without imposing any 
environmental impact assessment (EIA) requirements. 
A second challenge is ensuring territorial claimant states in the Ant-
arctic do not “rock the boat” in relation to contested offshore jurisdiction. 
For example, while Australia has passed national legislation prohibiting 
the taking of whales in its 200 EEZ declared off its claimed Antarctic 
Territory, it has thus far chosen not to enforce the legislation against for-
eign vessels. Political pressures continue within Australia for the gov-
ernment to take effective action against Japanese whaling allegedly un-
dertaken for scientific research purposes. Potential extended continental 
shelf claims by territorial claimant states is a further jurisdictional issue. 
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For example, Australia in making its extended continental shelf claims to 
the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf gave notice of its 
potential claim off Antarctica but requested the Commission not to con-
sider the submission relating to the continental shelf appurtenant to Ant-
arctica. 
Numerous issues lurk in the background regarding maritime claims in 
the Antarctic. They include: how to determine baselines for measuring 
maritime zones where the normal “low-water line along the coast” may 
not be possible to determine due to ice-cover; whether ice shelves can be 
equated with land and be used as base points; and how to treat ice for 
maritime boundary delimitation purposes if claimant states in Antarctica 
choose to delimit boundaries between themselves. 
The legal status of icebergs, which have potential for commercial ex-
ploitation, is a further looming issue. Whether coastal claimant states 
might eventually exert “ownership” rights over icebergs within 200 n.m. 
zones remains to be seen. A freedom of the high seas approach is also 
possible where “harvesting” would be open to anyone, but a common 
heritage of humankind approach whereby exploitation would be subject 
to equitable sharing of benefits through an international management 
scheme might also be considered. 
3.3 Governance of Polar Shipping: Similarities and 
Polarities 
3.3.1 Similarities 
Shipping standards for the two Polar Regions are common on many 
fronts. Global conventions relating to maritime safety apply to both the 
Arctic and Antarctic as do some vessel-source pollution and marine envi-
ronmental protection provisions. Various guidelines, some specifically 
tailored to address the special challenges of Polar shipping, have also 
been forged. 
3.3.1.1 Maritime Safety Agreements 
The “main sail” agreement setting out international safety standards for 
shipping in all oceans, including Polar seas, is the (1974) Safety of Life at 
Sea Convention, (SOLAS) as amended. The Convention casts a broad net 
of rules and standards in such areas as construction, steering gear re-
quirements, fire detection and extinction, life-saving equipment including 
lifeboats and life jackets, radio communications, carriage of dangerous 
goods and maritime security. Chapter V of SOLAS addresses safety of 
navigation in various ways: by imposing navigational equipment re-
quirements like radar and eco-sounding devices (to display available wa-
ter depth); by requiring vessels to carry adequate and up-to-date nautical 
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charts; and by providing for the imposition of mandatory ships routeing 
systems through application to the IMO. 
Four other maritime safety “jib sails” are also particularly important. 
The (1966) International Convention on Load Lines, is aimed at ensuring 
ships are not overloaded by requiring adequate freeboard, that is, the dis-
tance between the ship’s deck and the waterline. The (1972) Convention 
on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, (COL-
REGS) sets out various speed, lookout and navigational rules to help 
avoid collisions and also requires various lighting arrays and sound sig-
nals. The (1979) International Convention on Maritime Search and Res-
cue provides the legal umbrella for countries to cooperate in ensuring that 
adequate search and rescue capabilities are in place in all marine regions. 
The (1978) International Convention on Standards of Training, Clarifica-
tion and Watch-keeping for Seafarers, significantly amended in 1995 and 
again in June 2010, establishes training and competency requirements for 
ship officers and crew and covers hours of work and rest. 
3.3.1.2 Vessel-source Pollution and Marine Environmental Protection 
Provisions 
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL 73/78), the “main sail” for addressing vessel-source pollution, 
is applicable to both Polar Regions and establishes detailed marine pollu-
tion and protection standards through six annexes. Annexes I (oil) and II 
(noxious liquid substances) are mandatory for all parties to the Conven-
tion while the others Annexes III (harmful substances in packaged form), 
IV (sewage), V (garbage) and VI (air emissions) are optional. 
While substantial differences in vessel discharge standards for the 
Arctic and Antarctic exist in relation to oil, noxious liquid substances, 
and garbage as discussed below, two major commonalities stand out. 
First, Annex VI of the MARPOL 77/78 which seeks to control air emis-
sions such as ozone-depleting substances, nitrogen oxides and sulphur 
oxides, applies uniformly to ships operating in both Polar Regions. One 
of the key control mechanisms is to generally limit the sulphur content of 
ship fuels at 4.5 percent, but special Emission Control Areas can be es-
tablished where the sulphur content would be capped at 1.5 percent. 
Amendments to Annex VI in 2008 will gradually decrease the general 
cap from 4.5 percent to 0.5 percent (effective from 1 January 2020) and 
the Emission Control Areas standard from 1.5 percent to 0.1 percent (ef-
fective from 1 January 2015). The revised Annex VI allows an Emission 
Control Area to be designated not to just control sulphur oxides but also 
nitrogen oxides. Neither Polar Region has yet been proposed for special 
emissions status, thus the general sulphur content standards will apply. 
While some differences do exist over how the Antarctic and Arctic re-
gions address sewage discharges from ships, such as which ships are 
subject to controls, the two regions are also subject to quite similar sew-
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age discharge standards. Annex IV to the Protocol on Environmental 
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty in Article 6 allows untreated sewage 
from a holding tank to be discharged beyond 12 n.m. from land or ice 
shelves at a moderate rate while the ship is en route at a speed of no less 
than 4 knots. This is consistent with Regulation 11 of MARPOL’s Annex 
IV which sets a global standard from sewage discharges also applicable 
to the Arctic so long as coastal states do not adopt stricter standards. 
Other global “jib sails” aimed at protecting the marine environment 
are also applicable to both Polar Regions. The (1972) Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 
permits ocean dumping if authorised pursuant to a national ocean dump-
ing permit but prohibits disposal of wastes listed on a global prohibited 
list, such as industrial and radioactive wastes. A 1996 Protocol to the 
Convention adopts a precautionary approach whereby only wastes listed 
on a global “safe list’; such as dredged materials and organic wastes of 
natural origin, may be disposed of subject to a waste assessment review 
and a national permit.  
The International Convention on the Control of Harmful Anti-fouling 
Systems on Ships, which came into force on September 17, 2008, re-
quires ships to either not use organotin compounds on their hulls by 
January 1, 2008 or to have a protective coating to prevent leaching of 
organotin compounds. Organotin compounds, such as tibutylin (TBT), act 
as biocides to prevent marine life such as algae and molluscs from attach-
ing themselves to ship hulls and TBT has been shown to cause sex 
changes in whelks and deformities in oysters. 
The International Convention for the Control and Management of 
Ships’ Ballast Water and Sediments, adopted in 2004 but not yet in force, 
seeks to avoid transfer of invasive alien species across marine regions 
through ballast water exchange obligations (whenever possible conduct-
ing exchanges at least 200 n.m. from the nearest land in water at least 200 
metres in depth) and ballast water management systems. Shifting from 
ballast water exchange to treatment systems to control the levels of viable 
organisms is to occur for all ships by 2016. 
Two global agreements seek to ensure adequate preparations for pre-
venting and responding to pollution incidents. The (1990) International 
Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation, 
requires contracting parties to require ships flying their flags to have on 
board a shipboard oil pollution emergency plan, to provide a minimum 
level of pre-positioned oil combating equipment, and to cooperate upon 
the request of any party in responding to an oil pollution incident. The 
(2000) Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to Pollution 
Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious Substances, extends the obligations 
to cover carriage and spills of hazardous and noxious substances. 
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3.3.1.3 Shipping Guidelines 
Three key sets of guidelines, adopted under the auspices of the IMO, seek 
to address the special conditions posed by shipping in Polar waters in-
cluding remoteness and the dangers posed by ice. First, the Maritime 
Safety Committee in May 2006 adopted a Circular (MSC. 1/Circ. 1184) 
on Enhanced Contingency Planning Guidance for Passenger Ships Oper-
ating in Areas Remote from SAR Facilities. The guidance document 
urges companies operating passenger ships in areas remote from search 
and rescue facilities to develop contingency plans in case of emergencies 
which should consider, among other things, the possibility of voyage 
“pairing” where other passenger ships operating in the same area might 
be used as a search and rescue facility. 
Guidelines on Voyage Planning for Passenger Ships Operating in Re-
mote Areas, adopted by the IMO Assembly in November 2007, further 
urge passenger ships to develop detailed voyage and passage plans. Such 
plans for ships operating in the Arctic or Antarctic waters should address 
such factors as safe distance from icebergs, safe speeds in the presence of 
ice, no entry areas and special preparations necessary before entering 
waters where ice may be present, such as abandoning ship drills. 
A third set of guidelines was adopted by the IMO Assembly in De-
cember 2009 which revised Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-
Covered Waters (2002) and extended coverage to both the Arctic and 
Antarctic waters (See Figures 1 and 2). The Guidelines for Ships  
Operating in Polar Waters provide a four-part overlay to existing in-
ternational maritime agreements in order to address the special situation 
of ships operating in Polar waters. The Guidelines are applicable to ships 
subject to regulations under the SOLAS Convention which generally 
covers passenger ships and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage or more 
when engaged on international voyages but not warships, pleasure yachts 
or fishing vessels. Part A of the Guidelines provides construction, stabil-
ity and other technical requirements for new Polar Class Ships. The 
Guidelines, adopting the seven Polar classes recognised by the Interna-
tional Association of Classification Societies (IACS), seek to ensure ships 
can withstand flooding 
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Figure 1: Maximum extent of Arctic waters application 
Source: IMO, Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, Assembly Res. A. 1024(26) (2009), p. 9  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Maximum extent of Antarctic Waters application 
Source: IMO, Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, Assembly Res. A. 1024(26) (2009), p. 9.  
 
Resulting from hull penetration due to ice impacts, advocate against Polar 
Class ships carrying any pollutant against the outer shell, urge appropriate 
anchoring and towing arrangements, and call for all equipment on a ship 
to not be susceptible to brittle fracture.  
Part B, applicable to Polar Class and other ships, sets out various 
equipment suggestions. These include, among others, the design and lo-
cation of fire detection and extinguishment systems to avoid freezing 
temperatures, the provision of personal survival kits capable of protecting 
against severe weather conditions, the carrying of partially or totally en-
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closed lifeboats, and redundancy in key navigational systems such as 
radar and depth sounding devices. 
Part C, also applicable to Polar Class and other ships, sets out various 
operational suggestions. A checklist of what crew members should con-
sider in an evacuation drill is provided. Carriage of at least one qualified 
Ice Navigator aboard all ships operating in Polar ice-covered waters is 
advocated, but with no detail on what would constitute adequate on-the-
job training or simulation training. Reserve supplies of fuel and lubricants 
are urged in light of heavy fuel consumption in heavy ice. 
Part D encourages the equipment and preparation for Polar Class and 
other ships navigating in Polar waters to control damage to the marine 
environment. Proper equipment and training to ensure minor hull repairs 
is urged along with the capability to contain and clean up minor deck or 
over side spills. 
A process is currently underway within the IMO to make the volun-
tary Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar waters mandatory with 2012 
being a target completion date. Various issues are being discussed includ-
ing the geographic scope of application, appropriate classroom and prac-
tical experiences that should be required for ice navigators, possible ex-
tension of coverage to barges, fishing vessels and pleasure craft, phase-in 
requirements for existing ships, and possible expansion to cover ballast 
water and hull-fouling. 
A more general set of IMO guidelines also has potential to be applied 
to Polar waters. Guidelines for the Identification and Designation of Par-
ticularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSAs), undergoing substantial revision in 
2005, provide for the designation of PSSAs for areas particularly vulner-
able from international ship traffic where special associated protective 
measures may be imposed such as areas to be avoided, traffic routeing, 
mandatory ship reporting, and discharge restriction. However, to date 
PSSA designations have not been applied to either Polar Region. 
3.3.2 Polarities 
With the Antarctic listed as a special area under Annexes I (oil), II (nox-
ious liquid substances) and V (garbage) of MARPOL, stricter than global 
discharge standards have been established for the marine region south of 
the 60o South latitude. These stricter standards have been further solidi-
fied by inclusion in Annex IV to the Madrid Protocol on Environmental 
Protection. Article 3 of Annex IV prohibits the discharge into the sea of 
oil or oily mixtures from ships with limited exceptions such as a dis-
charge relating to accidental damage to the ship or equipment. Article 4 
prohibits the discharge of any noxious liquid substance and any other 
chemical substances in quantities or circumstances harmful to the marine 
environment. Article 5 prohibits disposal of all plastics into the sea from 
vessels and most other garbage with the exception of ground up food 
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wastes if disposed of 12 n.m. or more from the nearest land or ice shelf. 
The question of whether the Antarctic special area designations should be 
extended northward from the present area south of the 60o South latitude 
to the Antarctic convergence is under discussion by Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties. 
The MARPOL Convention provides special reception facility re-
quirements to support Antarctic special area designations in relation to oil 
and garbage. Parties to MARPOL at whose ports ships depart en route to 
or arrive from the Antarctic area must ensure adequate facilities for the 
reception of oily residues and garbage from all ships. Each Party to 
MARPOL is also required to ensure that all ships entitled to fly its flag, 
before entering the Antarctic area, have sufficient capacity on board for 
the retention of oily residues and garbage and have concluded arrange-
ments for the discharge of oily residues and garbage at a reception facility 
after leaving the area.  
With no area of the Arctic Ocean having been designated as a special 
area under MARPOL, the pollutant discharge standards for some areas of 
the Arctic are less strict than for the Antarctic. Unless coastal states 
choose to impose stricter than global standards pursuant to the special 
legislative and enforcement powers granted by Article 234 of the LOSC, 
global standards will apply. Annex I of MARPOL allows oily ballast 
water discharges from tankers if they are over 50 n.m. offshore at a rate 
of 30 litres per nautical mile while en route, and the Annex also allows 
oily bilge waste discharges from oil tankers and other ships with a 15 
parts per million (ppm) limitation. Annex II allows some discharge of 
noxious liquid substance residues based on the level of toxicity. Annex V 
allows considerable garbage deposits, other than plastics, including pack-
ing materials if more than 25 n.m. from the nearest land and glass, metal, 
paper products, rags and similar refuse if more than 12 n.m. from the 
nearest land. 
Canada and the Russian Federation exemplify how coastal states may 
choose to impose stricter than global discharge standards. Canada prohib-
its all oil discharges from ships in Arctic waters with limited exceptions, 
as well as garbage and other waste deposits. The Russian Federation has 
prohibited the discharge of oily ballast water from tankers and the deposit 
of garbage for the Northern Sea Route. 
Regional differences have also emerged in relation to the carriage of 
heavy grade oil and the control of ballast water in Polar Regions. A pro-
posal to prohibit the use of carriage of heavy grade oil in the Antarctic 
was adopted by the IMO’s Marine Environment Protection Committee in 
March 2010 and the ban on the use and carriage of heavy fuel oil by ves-
sels operating in Antarctic waters will take effect from 1 August 2011 
through a regulatory amendment to Annex I of MARPOL. In 2007, non-
binding Guidelines for Ballast Water Exchange in the Antarctic Treaty 
Area were adopted by the IMO with various control measures suggested 
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including the exchange of ballast water before arrival in Antarctic waters. 
To date regional approaches to addressing heavy grade oil carriage and 
ballast water controls have not been developed for the Arctic region. 
3.4 Conclusion 
As this chapter has sought to highlight the Arctic and Antarctic are in 
many ways “poles apart” in relation to law of the sea contexts and ship-
ping discharge standards. While the Arctic, being an ocean surrounded by 
continents, is largely subject to the jurisdiction of five coastal states, the 
Antarctic, constituting a continent surrounded by an ocean, remains in a 
law of the sea “twilight zone” with no generally recognised coastal state 
offshore jurisdiction and thus the primacy of flag state legislative and 
enforcement controls. While the Antarctic has been designated as a spe-
cial area under three of MARPOL’s annexes where stricter than general 
international vessel-source discharge standards apply for oil, noxious 
liquid substances and garbage, the Arctic has not yet been globally desig-
nated for special pollution control measures. 
However, shared commonalities in the areas of maritime safety, vessel 
discharge standards and marine environmental protection obligations 
have emerged. For example, The Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar 
Waters (2009) establish a common framework for construction and op-
erational requirements for ships in the Arctic and Antarctic. Consistent air 
emission and sewage discharge standards for ships have been adopted for 
the two regions. International agreements relating to ocean dumping, anti-
fouling agents, ballast water management and emergency preparedness 
are also applicable to both regions. 
The quest for effective governance in both Polar regions is thus far 
from over. The Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters have yet 
to be made mandatory and numerous issues remain to be resolved, such 
as the geographical scope of applications, the types of vessels covered 
and the strength of regulatory measures. Efforts continue within the IMO 
to further tighten controls on sewage and garbage from ships. The regula-
tion of greenhouse gas emissions from ships has become a topic of im-
portant but unresolved debate. Pressures to better control vessel noise in 
order to protect marine mammals have also not abated. 
Both Polar Regions are currently experiencing increased attention in re-
spect of the inadequacies of existing shipping governance measures and the 
need to strengthen international and regional rules and standards. The Arc-
tic Council’s comprehensive Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA), 
published in April 2009, offered numerous recommendations under three 
themes. For example, to enhance Arctic marine safety, AMSA urged Arctic 
states: to work through the IMO to augment global ship safety and pollu-
tion prevention conventions with specific mandatory requirements for ship 
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construction, design, equipment, crewing, training and operations aimed at 
Arctic shipping safety; to explore harmonisation of national Arctic ship-
ping regulatory regimes; and to develop a multi-national Arctic Search and 
Rescue (SAR) instrument including aeronautical and maritime SAR. To 
protect Arctic people and the environment, AMSA recommends that Arctic 
states: identify areas of heightened ecological and cultural significance and 
implement protective measures from marine shipping impacts; explore the 
need for specially designated Arctic marine areas as “special areas” or 
“particularly sensitive sea areas” through the IMO; enhance cooperation in 
oil spill prevention; and support reduction of air emissions of greenhouse 
gases, nitrogen oxides, sulphur oxides and particulate matter. To build Arc-
tic marine infrastructure, the third theme, AMSA urges Arctic states: to 
improve infrastructure in the areas of ice navigation training, navigational 
charts, communication systems, port services, reception facilities for ship-
generated waste, and icebreaker assistance; develop circumpolar pollution 
response capabilities; and increase investments in securing adequate hy-
drographic, meteorological and oceanographic data to support safe naviga-
tion. At the Sixth Ministerial Meeting of the Arctic Council in Tromsø, 
Norway, April 29, 2009, Ministers approved the actual establishment of a 
task force to negotiate an international SAR instrument for the Arctic by 
the next Ministerial meeting in 2011. 
The Antarctic Treaty Meeting of Experts on Ship-borne Tourism in 
the Antarctic Treaty Area, hosted by New Zealand in December 2009, 
also produced a set of recommendations to be forwarded to the next Ant-
arctic Treaty Consultative Meeting. For example, Antarctic Treaty Parties 
are urged to: consider the development of a specific checklist for inspec-
tions of tourist vessels in Antarctica; contribute to hydrographic and 
charting information in the Antarctic Treaty Area; proactively apply port 
state control regimes to tourist vessels bound for the Antarctic; exchange 
information on contingency planning preparedness; and consider mecha-
nisms for enhancing coordination with respect to Antarctic-related mat-
ters within the IMO. 
The time is ripe for the further strengthening of shipping governance 
and cooperative arrangements to protect the marine environment in both 
Polar Regions. However, it remains to be seen how far the vested social 
and economic interests of states and their constituents will constrain pro-
gress. The voyage towards safe and sustainable seas in both regions is 
thus likely to be a long and arduous. 
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Questions: 
1. What are the main differences in the Law of the Sea contexts for the 
Arctic and the Antarctic? 
2. What is the main Law of the Sea challenge for each Polar region? 
3. Are shipping activities in the Arctic and Antarctic adequately 
controlled? 
4. What governance strengthening, if any, would you recommend for 
the Arctic? For the Antarctic? 
 
4. The Management of Living 
Marine Resources in the Polar 
Regions 
 
Tavis Potts  
4.1 Introduction  
The exploitation of marine resources in the Polar Regions includes activi-
ties that have occurred for hundreds of years. In the Southern Ocean, 
uncontrolled industrial exploitation of these natural resources has taken 
place for centuries, generally following a “boom or bust” cycle until the 
1980s with several species hunted almost to extinction. In the Arctic, the 
human presence in the region over thousands of years has ensured that 
coastal fisheries and marine mammals have been exploited for genera-
tions. This however has predominantly been small-scale coastal and re-
gional fisheries in harmony with the ecosystem. Commercial fishing has 
however grown to be a major industry in the Arctic with fleets fishing for 
a variety of species such as cod, haddock, herring, and pollock and sup-
plying world markets.  
The two regions have very different regimes for fisheries manage-
ment. In the Southern Ocean the key regime is the Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), an in-
ternational treaty that regulates marine resources including fisheries on 
the high seas. In the Arctic region, a mix of instruments and agreements 
exist to regulate the fisheries industry. This includes agreements between 
individual countries and regional fishery agreements that cover the high 
seas also known as regional fishery management organisations (RFMOs).  
The issues facing the fisheries sector in the Polar Regions display both 
common and discrete elements. In the Antarctic, the fisheries sector is 
managed under a single international system. The key issues here concern 
the implementation of the ecosystem approach, the management of IUU 
fisheries, and the intensification of industrial fishing for krill, a small but 
protein-rich shrimp that lies at the centre of the Southern Ocean food 
web. In the Arctic, key issues include the improved coordination of fish-
eries under national and international jurisdiction, the response of the 
fisheries sector to ecosystems shifts, and improving precautionary and 
ecosystem approaches.  
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This paper does not advocate the imposition of an Antarctic style fish-
eries regime in the Arctic as the two systems are very different. However, 
what we will explore is the development of the regime in the Antarctic 
and the somewhat unique policy instruments it has produced to deal with 
ecosystem and precautionary approaches. This paper asks the question: 
despite the different ecological and political differences, can some of the 
innovative approaches in the Antarctic be used in reforming Arctic man-
agement?  
4.2 Antarctic Fisheries Exploitation  
The Southern Ocean has been exploited by industrial fisheries for hundreds 
of years (Kock 2000). The harvesting of seal pelts was initiated on sub-
Antarctic islands in the late 1700s. From 1801 to 1822 over 1.2 million 
Antarctic and sub-Antarctic Fur Seal skins were taken by hunters on South 
Georgia. Shore-based commercial whaling in this area initiated a period of 
unsustainable exploitation. Initially, shore-based whaling generated limited 
impact by restricting harvesting to whaling stations. With the arrival of 
“factory ships” in the 1920s exploitation exponentially increased, with 1.5 
million whales taken until management measures through the International 
Whaling Commission (IWC) were introduced in 1946 and a Southern 
Ocean Sanctuary declared in 1994. With current turbulence in the IWC, 
limited “scientific” whaling of Minke and increasing numbers of Fin 
whales by Japanese fleets still occurs within the sanctuary.  
The 1960s saw the large-scale exploitation of finfish and krill stocks 
in the Southern Ocean. Soviet fleets targeted the marbled rock cod around 
South Georgia, with the catch rising 90 000 tonnes in 1968/69, and to a 
peak of 400 000 tonnes in 1969/1970. In the following years stocks 
crashed and the fish became commercially extinct. Antarctic krill were 
experimentally fished in the 1960s, with catches increasing through the 
1970s and peaking at 528 000 tonnes in 1980. After a brief hiatus in fish-
ing, krill catches have crept up to higher levels. In the 2007/08 season, 
764 000 tonnes were caught. This is driven by technological advances in 
processing at sea an increase in demand for omega 3 products and feed 
for global aquaculture.  
The 1980s and 1990s have also seen a rapid expansion in the popular-
ity of the Patagonian and Antarctic Toothfish and a rapid expansion in the 
size of the catch. Landings peaked in the late 1990s at an average of 40 
000 tonnes per annum (FAO 2004). There have been considerable man-
agement problems with this species as illegal, unregulated and unreported 
fishing (IUU) has decimated sustainable fisheries and has proved to be a 
major challenge to the effectiveness of CCAMLR. During the height of 
the IUU problem in the 1990s, catches from illegal fishing were equal to 
or exceeding legal catches. For example, in area 48.3 (South Georgia) 
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legal landings in 1993 were 3000 tonnes while the IUU catch was esti-
mated at 4000 tonnes (CCAMLR 2008). In area 58.5.2 (the Kerguelen 
Islands) legal landings in 2001 were 2153 tonnes with IUU twice the 
limit at 4500 tonnes. Current legal and IUU landings in this formerly 
lucrative area have however dropped substantially with considerable ef-
fort being taken to address the problem in recent years. In South Georgia 
and the Kerguelen Islands the IUU catch was estimated at 0 and 489 ton-
nes respectively (Brown 2007; CCAMLR 2008).  
4.3 The Development of CCAMLR  
The unsustainable “boom and bust” approach of Southern Ocean fisheries 
led to growing concern within the Antarctic Treaty nations over the man-
agement of fishing activity and the impacts of fishing on the marine eco-
system. Central to this concern was the development of krill fishing. Krill 
are a keystone species within the Southern Ocean ecosystem, being a 
major prey for several bird, whale, seal and squid stocks.  
The CCAMLR came into force in 1982 (CCAMLR 2010). It has been, 
by and large, a successful regime in managing the exploitation of South-
ern Ocean Marine resources. Membership has grown to include most 
nations fishing in the region and most parties tend to conform to the over 
200 regulations and measures that aim to protect the resources and the 
ecosystem (Brown 2007). The CCAMLR is unique in terms of being the 
first regional fishery management organisation to recognise and attempt 
to implement the ecosystem approach (Constable 2000). Early conception 
of the ecosystem approach is written into the core text of the convention. 
For example, the boundaries of the CCAMLR regime reflect ecological 
realities, applying to all marine living resources within the region.1 The 
Convention applies a natural oceanographic boundary from the Antarctic 
Polar Front to the Antarctic continent as stated in Article I of the Conven-
tion (Figure 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 CCAMLR does not apply to seals or whales, which are covered by the Convention for the Con-
servation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS) and International Convention on the Regulation of Whaling. 
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Figure 1. The boundary of CCAMLR (from CCAMLR 2010) 
 
The Convention lays the foundation for CCAMLR as a management re-
gime for the regulation of fisheries resources combined with an ecosys-
tem approach. This “long term” ecosystem management mandate distin-
guishes CCAMLR from other multilateral, single species based fisheries 
agreements. The CCAMLR articulated the ecosystem approach (3a and 
3b) and the precautionary approach (3c) well before the terms were used 
in mainstream management. Article 2 specifies the objectives and is high-
lighted in the box below.  
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CCAMLR Article II 
1. The objective of this Convention is the conservation of Antarctic 
marine living resources; 
2. For the purposes of this Convention, the term “conservation” 
includes rational use; 
3. Any harvesting and associated activities in the area to which this 
Convention applies shall be conducted in accordance with the 
provisions of this Convention and with the following principles 
of conservation: 
a) Prevention of decrease in the size of any harvested population 
to levels below those which ensure its stable recruitment. For 
this purpose its size should not be allowed to fall below a level 
close to that which ensures the greatest net annual increment; 
b) Maintenance of the ecological relationships between harvested, 
dependent and related populations of Antarctic marine living 
resources and the restoration of depleted populations to the 
levels defined in subparagraph (a) above; and 
c) Prevention of changes or minimisation of the risk of changes 
in the marine ecosystem, which are not potentially reversible 
over two or three decades, taking into account the state of 
available knowledge of the direct and indirect impact of 
harvesting, the effect of the introduction of alien species, the 
effects of associated activities on the marine ecosystem and of 
the effects of environmental changes, with the aim of making 
possible the sustained conservation of Antarctic marine living 
resources. 
 
The CCAMLR, which meets annually in Hobart in Australia, currently 
has 24 members with voting rights and an additional 8 members who are 
party to the Convention but who do not have voting rights (See 
http://www.ccamlr.org/pu/E/ms/contacts.htm). The governance structures 
of the regime consist of a Commission and a Scientific Committee. The 
Commission functions as the central policymaking and administrative 
body. The Commission meets annually to review member activities over 
the past year and for the next year, to review compliance and conserva-
tion measures and to review existing regulatory measures. Important de-
cisions are made by consensus in CCAMLR and become legally binding 
in international law on members after 180 days should no objections be 
lodged.  
The Scientific Committee provides advice that is the basis of man-
agement decisions and is supported by two working groups: ecosystem 
monitoring and management (WG-EMM) and fish stock assessment 
(WG-FSA). Working groups are also convened for important issues, for 
example the ad hoc Working Group on the Incidental Mortality Arising 
from Longline fishing (WG-IMAF). The Scientific Committee is in-
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tended to be a consultative body for the exchange of scientific informa-
tion and the formulation of recommendations for the Commission. 
Agreement on issues is reached via peer review and debate rather than by 
the consensus approach employed in the Commission.  
4.4 Ecosystem and Precautionary Approaches in 
CCAMLR  
The CCAMLR has developed innovative strategies for the implementation 
of the ecosystem and precautionary approach. The challenges have been 
formidable, especially within the context of the political and economic 
pressures that arise with decision-making between 24 national governments 
and a scientific foray into ecosystem management. Despite these chal-
lenges the CCAMLR has developed a comprehensive regime for monitor-
ing, research and decision-making for fisheries within an ecosystem basis 
as prescribed by Article II, at a time when fishing conventions were less 
often utilised. The Article II objectives are operationalised by setting a 
range of conservation measures of which over 200 have been formulated. 
Measures have been adopted for mesh sizes, area closures, limiting catch, 
reporting systems and methods, and closed seasons (Brown 2007). They 
are enforced by system of flag state and CCAMLR-based observation and 
inspection mechanisms.  
The harvest of krill has a variable history in CCAMLR and was the 
focus for the writing of the convention’s ecosystem approach. In recent 
years, the krill catch has been increasing due to technical improvements 
that allow rapid processing at sea and the increase in demand for krill 
products, particularly Omega 3 supplements and high protein feed for 
aquaculture. In 2007/08 season 764 000 tonnes were harvested across the 
CCAMLR region.  
The CCAMLR has developed resource assessments that account for 
Article II principles. In 1990 the Commission endorsed the objectives for 
harvesting the krill resource (Constable 2000). 
 
 To keep krill biomass at a level higher than would be the case for 
single species harvesting considerations and, in so doing, to ensure 
sufficient escapement of krill to meet the reasonable requirements of 
predators; 
 Given that krill dynamics have a stochastic component, to focus on the 
average biomass that might occur over a future period than on the 
average biomass at the end of that period, as might be the case in a 
single species context; 
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 To ensure that reduction of food to predators which may arise out of 
krill harvesting is not such that land-breeding predators with restricted 
foraging ranges are disproportionately affected compared with 
predators in pelagic habitats.  
 
The development of the Krill Yield Model (KLM) establishes catch limits 
for the annual yield of krill stocks. The yield is determined by a series of 
rules, based on the objectives above, that are applied to the pre-
exploitation biomass of krill (B0) and derive a proportion for harvesting 
(termed ). The decision rules state:  
 
 Choose 1 so that the probability of the spawning biomass dropping 
below 20% of its pre-exploitation median level over a 20 year 
harvesting period is 10%; 
 Choose 2 so that the median escapement in the spawning biomass 
over a 20 year period is 75% of the pre-exploitation median level; 
 Select the lower of 1 or 2 as the level of  for the calculation of yield.  
 
The first part of the rule is based on the target species and is linked to the 
requirement for stable recruitment in Article II (3a). It attempts to mini-
mise the risk that the target stock will be overfished and recruitment im-
paired. The second decision rule focuses on the maintenance of ecologi-
cal relationships between predators and prey as set out in Article II (3b). 
It limits the effects of harvesting on krill-based predators by setting a 
target of 75% median escapement (Constable 2000). This level is a com-
promise figure based on the assumption that in single species fisheries 
50% is an acceptable level of escapement and for predators, no fishing is 
preferred (i.e., 100% escapement). Once criteria 1 and 2 have been calcu-
lated the third part of the decision rule results in the lower of the two 
yields (or levels of harvest) being selected. Choosing the lowest yield 
means that both criteria in the decision rule can be fulfilled.  
Under Conservation Measure 51–01 (2008) the CCAMLR Scientific 
committee determined that the fishing limit for krill in area 48 would be 
3.47 million tonnes in any fishing season (note that the current catch in 
the total CCAMLR area is 764 000 tonnes). With further application of 
the ecosystem approach the CCAMLR has developed a mechanism to 
disperse the fishing effort once a trigger level is reached in order to avoid 
concentration of fishing in easily accessible areas or other negative ef-
fects on local populations of marine animals. Under Conservation meas-
ure 51–01 (CCAMLR 2008) in area 48, the Antarctic Peninsula, once a 
trigger level of 620 000 tones is reached the catch must be dispersed into 
smaller scale units. In further application of a precautionary approach the 
CCAMLR ruled that until the smaller scale ecosystem units are defined 
and the total catch dispersed amongst these units the trigger units of 620 
000 tonnes would be the maximum catch limit and this would be split 
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into smaller units around Area 48. For the other side of the continent, in 
area 58.4.1, the catch of krill was set under the KLM to 440 000t and split 
into an eastern and western division until further scientific measures are 
to hand.  
Not only does the CCAMLR set precautionary and ecosystem-based 
catch limits for individual species such as krill and fish stocks, it also 
endeavours to monitor the health of the ecosystem. The CCAMLR Eco-
system Monitoring Program (CEMP) was established in 1985 (Kock 
2007) to monitor key species that could be affected by the removal of 
prey by fishing activity. CEMP has the following aims:  
 
 To detect and record significant changes in critical components of the 
ecosystem, to serve as a basis for the conservation of Antarctic marine 
living resources; and 
 To distinguish between changes due to harvesting of commercial 
species and changes due to environmental variability, both physical 
and biological.  
 
Monitoring the entire Southern Ocean ecosystem is a huge task, as a re-
sult CCAMLR has adopted the notion of indicator species – dependent or 
related species that were likely to reflect changes in the availability and 
status of prey resource as a result of fishing. The prey species are selected 
for their key positions in Antarctic ecosystems and where the potential 
harvest would have a major effect on the marine system (Kock 2000). A 
number of parameters are monitored for each species reflecting the poten-
tial to respond to changes in the availability of prey or environmental 
factors. The CCAMLR has produced a set of standardised monitoring 
procedures that are used by participating member states across a series of 
Integrated Study Regions (ISR) where interactions between predators, 
prey, fisheries and the environment are examined in detail.  
The key challenge for CEMP is the implementation of ecosystem data 
into decision rules for fisheries management. This concept is the focus of 
current and future discussion within the Working Group on Ecosystem 
Monitoring and Management (WG-EMM). Despite the ecosystem being 
monitored since 1987 it has only been recently that attempts have been 
made at using this information to influence decision rules – partially be-
cause of the complexity of the ecosystem and ensuring consistent long-
term information on predator-prey relationships is available. Current as-
sessments focus on an inspection of trends in the predator parameters 
coupled with models to explain the trends. This process intends to inform 
the development of the small-scale management regime for krill and to 
ensure the dispersed fishing effort minimises the impacts on species de-
pendant or associated with krill.  
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The CCAMLR has developed several mechanisms that link scientific 
research with policy formulation above and beyond those that are men-
tioned here. Key areas of further interest include:  
 
 The approach to managing new and exploratory fisheries that 
stipulates that fisheries should be managed from the outset, and that 
new fisheries areas should not be allowed to develop faster than the 
information required to manage them can be gathered; 
 Substantially reducing the bycatch of seabirds in longline fisheries; 
 Addressing IUU fishing in the region, including the development of 
an international catch documentation scheme that attempts to control 
the illegal catch and trade of toothfish; continuing to implement policy 
instruments that reduce IUU fishing and working at the global level 
and with non-CCAMLR member states; 
 Applying the ecosystem approach to finfish and strengthening the link 
to decision-making; 
 Developing and managing marine protected areas.  
4.5 The Management of Fisheries in the Arctic  
The Arctic is a highly productive marine ecosystem and represents one of 
the few regions where fish stocks remain in a relatively healthy state. The 
Arctic has a wide range of marine ecosystems driven by different 
oceanographic conditions, and major fishing zones can be found in the 
North East Atlantic (Norwegian and Barents Seas), the Central North 
Atlantic (Iceland and Greenland), North East Canada (Newfoundland and 
Labrador Sea) and the North Pacific (Bering Sea). A range of commer-
cially important species are fished that support international markets in-
cluding the EU and North America and include Arctic, Pacific and Atlan-
tic cod, capelin, halibut, pollock, shrimp, crab, and herring.  
With a changing climate in the Arctic regional fisheries are expected 
to change in ways that are not obvious. Changes to food-webs are likely 
to impact on fisheries but the extents of impacts are relatively unknown. 
Climate change may also prove to be a positive factor in increasing the 
productivity of certain stocks. However, Arctic ecosystems are complex 
and not well understood in the context of changing climatic, ecological 
and oceanographic conditions, and while productivity may increase in 
some species, decreases could occur in other dependent and associated 
species. The migration of stocks is a factor that could complicate ecologi-
cal relationships between stocks and their management. Recent studies 
have shown that there is potential for populations of commercially impor-
tant fish species to shift northwards as water temperatures increase but 
research in this area is considered preliminary. The Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment (ACIA 2004) suggests that rising temperatures in the Bering 
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Sea are resulting in a northward shift in some fish stocks seeking colder 
and deeper waters potentially affecting predator-prey relationships. Po-
tential future opportunities and/or concerns here relate to the opening up 
of new fishing grounds in previously inaccessible areas as a result of 
reduced sea ice cover.  
The Arctic is host to a complex set of arrangements in fisheries that 
relate to a mix of national, bilateral, and international arrangements and 
jurisdictions. Koivurova and Molenaar (2009) identify the key regimes:  
 
 The International Commission on the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
(ICCAT), 
 The bilateral (Canada and the United States) International Pacific 
Halibut Commission (IPHC), 
 The bilateral (Russian Federation and the United States) 
Intergovernmental Consultative Committee (ICC), 
 The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), 
 The North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization (NASCO), 
 The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), 
 The North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission (NPAFC),  
 The Norway-Russian Federation Fisheries Commission, 
 The Western and Central Pacific Ocean Fisheries Commission 
(WCPFC), and 
 The Convention on the Conservation and Management of the Pollock 
Resources in the Central Bering Sea (CBS).  
 
Other bodies that have competence in the region include:  
 
 The OSPAR Convention that delivers assessments on marine 
pollution, biodiversity and environmental quality; 
 The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) that 
provides scientific advice and peer review for fisheries management 
throughout the region.  
 
New fishing opportunities in an ice-free Arctic require strict management if 
they are not to be short-lived. In the Arctic such regimes for the high seas 
areas are already in place, except for the high seas area in the Central Arc-
tic Ocean where only the European sector is covered by an RFMO (e.g., in 
the Northeast Atlantic the NEAFC regulates fisheries on the high seas. In 
the Northwest Atlantic the NAFO has a similar function while the loophole 
in the Bering Sea is covered by a six-party agreement). Existing agree-
ments such as the Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission cover the 
areas under national jurisdiction. The remaining area of high seas in the 
Central Arctic Ocean is not likely to witness major fisheries development, 
at least in the short term, but potential exists for a “tragedy of the com-
mons” problem to emerge that leads to unsustainable exploitation (Rayfuse 
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2007). This area however, will be ice-covered for most of the year for the 
foreseeable future. The key issue, therefore, is one of improving and devel-
oping the existing management regimes in areas under state sovereignty as 
well as the RFMOs covering the high seas. There is considerable debate 
over what instruments would apply to areas not covered by an agreement. 
Should a new instrument be negotiated or should an existing instrument 
such as NEAFC be extended? (See: Koivurova and Molenaar 2009; 
Schofield and Potts 2009). These debates are underpinned by the fact that 
there is a substantial lack of data over potential resources, their extent, their 
response to climatic shifts and potential impacts.  
One suggested area of reform is to further the implementation of eco-
system-based management across the Arctic. This is a particularly diffi-
cult issue in this region due to the size and complexity of ecological and 
social issues, including the separation of knowledge and expertise across 
sectors and jurisdictions, reflecting the complex mix of domestic and 
international interests. One example here is that the NEAFC is primarily 
responsible for the high seas and cross border pelagic fisheries in the 
Barents Sea, while in the same area, the Norwegian-Russian fishing 
Commission is responsible for demersal fisheries. The NE Atlantic spans 
a range of exclusive economic zones, regional environmental agreements 
such as the OSPAR Commission2 and five RMFOs, all with a remit or 
interest in fisheries management.  
Despite the challenges faced initiatives to deal with them are 
emerging (Hoel 2009). One of the main problems however is that 
Arctic states and actors have divergent views on what form ecosys-
tem-based approaches should take. Should sector-based approaches 
such as fisheries, shipping, and / or conservation be mixed? What is 
the appropriate spatial scale? Does room exist for cross border and 
regional initiatives? Should a soft law or regulatory approach be 
taken? In this context implementation of the CCAMLR approach 
has been easier than it could otherwise have been as all actors and 
interested states are bound by the Convention, Commission and 
broader Antarctic Treaty regime that predominantly applies to a 
single sector (fisheries) on the high seas (note, however, that pock-
ets of sovereignty do exist in the Southern Ocean, for example 
South Georgia (UK), Heard and Macdonald Islands (Australia) and 
Kergeulen Islands (France)).  
In the Northeast Atlantic a shift has taken place over the last decade to 
move towards ecosystem-based management but these approaches are 
still relatively new. The International Council for the Exploration of the 
Sea (ICES), which is providing scientific advice to member states on 
marine management in this region, has replaced its sectoral advisory 
                                                     
2 OSPAR is the mechanism by which fifteen Governments of the western coasts and catchments 
of Europe, together with the European Community, cooperate to protect the marine environment of 
the North-East Atlantic. 
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structure with one Advisory Committee on Oceans Management to im-
prove ecosystem-based scientific to governments. In addition ICES, the 
North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO), NEAFC and 
the OSPAR Commission are cooperating on joint research and policy-
making initiatives to implement an ecosystem-based approach. In 2008 
NEAFC signed a “memorandum of understanding” with its environ-
mental counterpart OSPAR in order to progress management on the eco-
system approach. A workshop is planned in 2010 to develop operational 
guidance and management objectives, significant progress however re-
mains to be made in implementing and ecosystem approach for fisheries 
and in respect of going further towards integrated management across 
sectors in the Arctic.  
4.6 Conclusion and Key Points  
What can the development of an ecosystem approach offer the Polar Re-
gions? In order to ensure future healthy marine ecosystems and the con-
tinuation of provisioning services to societies, resource management must 
move towards improved and integrated governance, conservation of spe-
cies and habitats, restoration of productive potential and elimination of 
bycatch and discards. The Polar Regions are complex and dynamic so-
cial-ecological systems, and the key to understanding and managing them 
in the face of change is to work with, not against, the linkages that exist 
between natural and human systems.  
Fundamentally, in the Polar Regions we are dealing with very differ-
ent systems and the transplantation of management regimes or policy 
instruments from one region to another must therefore proceed only with 
considerable caution. However, there are some areas where policy learn-
ing could progress in terms of instruments and processes to implement an 
ecosystem approach. The CCAMLR has been developed over 20 years of 
ecosystem-based and precautionary management and is thus at the fore-
front of developing innovative tools to manage marine resources in the 
international sphere. The Arctic has several regimes that operate and 
overlap in the same marine space. Despite this “patchwork quilt” ap-
proach a relatively healthy fisheries stock has been successfully main-
tained. It is important to acknowledge that both Polar Regions face sig-
nificant challenges in respect of adapting to climatic change, dealing with 
the potential impact of new economic sectors including expansion of 
industrial fishing, and with the reform of regimes from single species to 
ecosystem approaches. The following points outline key areas of poten-
tial synergy and mutual benefit:  
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 In the CCAMLR a centralised RFMO is able to coordinate scientific 
analysis, policy formulation, and apply conservation measures on a 
multi species and ecosystem basis. While arguably the CCAMLR 
applies to a “simpler” system in terms of jurisdiction, the counter 
argument is that the CCAMLR coordinates the actions of 34 states 
that are actively fishing or have coastal, port, and/or market status. In 
the Arctic, harmonisation should continue to occur between the 
various national, bilateral and regional fishing agreements and 
institutions on a regional and ecosystem basis. 
 The CCAMLR has delineated its boundaries under Article 1 on the 
basis of oceanographic and ecosystem considerations instead of 
arbitrary political boundaries. However, political factors were still 
important in the determination of boundaries, particularly in terms of 
sovereign rights. In the Arctic, the boundaries of fishing agreements 
and new potential area should be moved towards an ecosystem basis, 
with an exploration of the LME boundaries developed by the Arctic 
Council in PAME (Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment). 
This paper acknowledges that in the Arctic, sovereign maritime rights 
are a particularly sensitive issue and a balance should be found 
between rights and ecosystem (LME) boundaries.  
 Fishing has predominantly been left out of discussions in the Arctic 
Council and fisheries management is not in the Council’s remit except 
obliquely in CAFF (Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna) and 
PAME (Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment) documents. 
The future management of fishing on an ecosystem basis should be 
brought into the Arctic Council dialogue as this is the key forum for 
Arctic States, actors and jurisdictions. 
 It is clear that several Arctic regimes are in the process of updating 
themselves to incorporate the ecosystem approach to fisheries e.g., the 
NEAFC. These reforms should be open and transparent and draw 
upon the experience of the CCAMLR in terms of CEMP, impacts on 
dependant species including small-scale management areas and 
establishing precautionary measures for new and existing fisheries, 
including the development of environmental impact assessment. In 
addition there is a clear opportunity for the further exchange of 
knowledge and experience over what policy instruments work in 
particular contexts, for example, ecosystem monitoring, certification, 
enforcement and port/market state controls.  
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Questions:  
1. What is the ecosystem-based approach in fisheries and how does it 
relate to the idea of integrated management?  
2. What are the future challenges in respect of implementing the 
ecosystem approach for fisheries in the Southern Ocean?  
3. Describe the CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme and how this 
attempts to reduce illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean. Could it be 
replicated elsewhere?  
4. What is the OSPAR Commission and how can it potentially work 
with fisheries management in the NE Atlantic?  
5. Describe the various national, bi-lateral and international fishing 
management regimes in the NE Atlantic and assess their moves 
toward implementing the ecosystem-based approach? What are the 
potential challenges and opportunities here?  
6. Identify emerging issues and possible solutions in respect of Arctic 
fisheries?  
 
 
 
5. Economies and Business in the 
Arctic Region 
 
Joan Nymand Larsen 
5.1 Introduction 
The economies of the high North have a number of common characteris-
tics that set them apart from economies in the world beyond. Important 
differences between the regions as well as variations between local com-
munities within regions are however also important. While the formal 
economy of the North is characterised by resource extraction, the local 
economy can be described as a mixed economy where market and non-
market activities all play an important role in supporting community live-
lihoods. Wage employment, traditional pursuits, and transfer income 
from government all provide important sources of income. The relative 
size and importance of the market, non-market, and transfer sector varies 
throughout the North. The formal and market-based economy is charac-
terised by the role and presence of the large-scale capital and skill-
intensive nature of industrial resource production, whereas the informal, 
subsistence based – non-market – economy is characterised by traditional 
pursuits of hunting, trapping, gathering, but increasingly with connections 
to the local market economy.  
There is no doubt, however, that the Arctic region is a region of 
change. Local and regional economies are increasingly experiencing the 
effects of global change processes and the changes occurring in global 
markets in far distant places. The Northern economy – local and regional 
– is no longer an economy operating in isolation or shielded from the 
effects of external activities or decisions made in distant places. The Arc-
tic region faces several distinct challenges related to economic develop-
ment and the, primarily, large-scale resource extraction activities upon 
which it is based here. This includes permafrost and sea ice, remoteness 
and lack of accessibility, the high cost of production in the North, the 
availability of human resources for large-scale industrial projects, a frag-
ile eco-system, the consequences of environmental impacts, and the nega-
tive spill-over effects of industrial activity for local and indigenous com-
munities, culture and tradition. With rising global demand, and a growing 
desire for stable and secure resource supplies in world markets, industrial 
resource extraction activities in the Arctic will likely continue to expand 
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despite any observed and expected physical, environmental and human 
costs. Challenges related to climate change and globalisation can how-
ever be expected to play a growing role in decisions regarding resource 
allocation, resource use, ownership and control, with important conse-
quences for Arctic economies and their economic sustainability. 
This chapter presents an overview of the economies of the Arctic fo-
cusing on the market as well as the non-market or subsistence sectors of 
the economy. It examines the special characteristics of Arctic economies, 
their major challenges and opportunities while also addressing the issues 
surrounding economic development and large-scale resource exploitation 
in the North, including its impact on Arctic communities and indigenous 
livelihoods.  
5.2 Economic Analysis and the Northern Economy 
As a point of departure in our look at the Northern economy it is useful to 
first note a few core ideas in the economic way of thinking, and highlight 
the two fundamental assumptions about human beings that the study of 
economics rests upon: all human beings need some of the earth’s re-
sources in order to survive. The supply of these resources is limited. This 
is known in economics as the problem of scarcity. Because of this prob-
lem, human beings have to make choices, and economies have to find 
ways to allocate resources among the competing claims of different indi-
viduals and groups. If all the things people need were available in unlim-
ited amounts, there would be no economic problem. Scarcity is a situation 
in which there is not enough of a resource to meet everybody’s wants and 
needs. And thus, economics is the study of the choices people make and 
the actions they take as they attempt to match up scarce resources with 
their virtually unlimited wants and needs.  
People create economies to help them meet their needs. When wants 
exceed the resources available to satisfy them, there is scarcity. Scarcity 
is everywhere: people want good health and long life, cultural and mate-
rial well-being, security, physical comfort, and knowledge to name but a 
few. In the North we want a good quality of life, meaningful and reward-
ing jobs, a clean environment, and opportunities to participate in subsis-
tence and cultural activities. Sometimes we need to make choices, and in 
doing so we face trade-offs. Were all resources perfectly abundant, 
choices or tradeoffs would be unnecessary. We would not need market 
institutions or any other mechanism for allocating entitlements to re-
sources. In the North competing interests related to land use and use of 
renewable and non-renewable resources are a source of conflict between 
numerous competing stakeholders, and decisions regarding resource allo-
cation and use produce winners and losers. Thus, the fundamental prob-
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lem – the economic problem – is the fact that we have limited resources 
but unlimited wants and needs.  
Among the basic core ideas is the principle that there is scarcity eve-
rywhere, and because of scarcity we must make choices, and all choices 
have a cost, also referred to as an opportunity cost. At the same time, 
human beings respond to incentives; when the cost of something in-
creases we make substitutions – e.g., develop industrial substitutes for 
natural resources that we deplete. Provided with the right incentives we 
can find ways to help direct our economy in the direction of socially op-
timal solutions; e.g., we could think of a hypothetical scenario where a 
pollution tax is levied on an industrial polluter to provide the incentive to 
cut pollution and limit the damage to our environment.  
The key economic policy objectives designed to improve economic per-
formance – both in and beyond the Arctic – are improvements in economic 
efficiency, equity, economic growth, and stability. Equity can be defined as 
economic justice or fairness. An efficient economy is not necessarily an 
equitable or just one. Economic efficiency could deliver very large incomes 
to a few leaving the vast majority very low incomes. Indeed, policies 
geared towards reaching a higher level of efficiency may come at the cost 
of greater inequity, unemployment and displacement for some. 
The policy objective of economic growth refers to a rise in income 
and production per person, and is measured by an increase in Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) – which simply refers to the value of all final 
goods and services produced in an economy in a given year. It results 
from the ongoing advance of technology, the accumulation of increasing 
quantities of productive equipment, and improvements in educational 
attainment. Economic growth can be encouraged or discouraged by the 
policies that governments adopt, e.g., tax incentives for research and de-
velopment might stimulate growth. While growth is a key aim of policy, 
it can have undesirable societal effects, such as the depletion of scare 
natural resources and environmental degradation, or it can come at the 
cost of the livelihoods of local and indigenous communities. Reaching a 
higher level of economic stability is yet another common policy objec-
tive. It refers to the absence of wide fluctuations in the economic growth 
rate, the level of employment, and average prices. As we will discuss 
later, economic instability is a common problem in the North. It results, 
in part, from a lack of economic diversification, and a tendency to target a 
relatively narrow range of commercial natural resources as the basis for 
much of a region’s formal economic activity. Significant fluctuations in 
earnings may result if production is concentrated in one or a small num-
ber of products and if trade is geared only to a few external markets, as is 
often the case in the North. Indeed, economic growth, economic stability, 
efficiency and equity, are all aspects of policy objectives that have sig-
nificant impacts on the Northern economy. Sometimes reaching these 
objectives creates conflicts of interest between different Arctic stake-
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holders with competing interests concerning the environment, the alloca-
tion and use of natural renewable and non-renewable resources, and 
choice among options regarding the development of local economies. 
The formal and industrial segment of much of the Arctic economy is 
characterised by a relatively narrow natural resource base, including re-
newable and non-renewable resources such as metallic minerals, precious 
metals, hydrocarbons, precious and semi precious stones, and fish, all of 
which has the potential to create significant wealth. Resource develop-
ment, from exploration to extraction, can be described as highly capital 
intensive and frequently requiring the import of capital from outside the 
region. A major driver of the formal economy is the primary natural re-
source sector and its contribution to exports and trade in external markets 
far from the Arctic. Thus, a significant share of the resources extracted in 
the North leaves the North. This contributes to a common phenomenon 
describing much of the Arctic, namely that what is produced is being 
exported, and what is consumed is being imported – thereby limiting the 
sector linkages, restricting opportunities for value added, and dampening 
the local economic multiplier effects. The regional multiplier effect refers 
to the amount of economic activity generated from an initial injection of 
investments into the regional economy, with possible spin-off effects 
related to infrastructure development, transportation networks, and gen-
eral increase in demand for goods and services locally – and thus em-
ployment and income generation. The bigger the multiplier effect the 
bigger is the net-benefit for the regional or local economy. 
While resources may leave the region in vast quantities, their exploita-
tion can give rise to a number of positive spin-off effects related to its 
extraction, and important indirect effects related to secondary activities 
that develop to help support industry. Benefits to economic growth asso-
ciated with the primary resource trade may include improved utilisation 
of existing factors, expanded factor endowments, and economic linkage 
effects, where the resulting linkage effects are referred to as backward, 
forward and final demand linkages – thus contributing to value added and 
economic diversification. Still, the reality of large parts of the Northern 
economy is its limited economic diversification due to high costs of pro-
duction and the absence of a broad range of resources. High costs also 
prevent broad scale manufacturing and processing. Petroleum and min-
eral extraction activities are among the most valuable and leading non-
renewable resources in several regions of the North, with reserves located 
on land, on the coastal shelf, and under the Arctic Ocean. For example, 
on-shore and off-shore oil and gas activities are substantial in the Arctic, 
and they have a key role in industrial and overall economic development 
helping to shape the structure, conduct and performance of Northern in-
dustry, and economic activity in general.  
However, while exploration and the start-up phase may require sig-
nificant labour input, resource development is characterised by a process 
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of eventual declining labour demand and declining output. Significant 
economic benefits may result from extraction activity, but it may also 
come at a cost to the environment and the livelihoods of local communi-
ties in the North. While the financial returns from resource extraction can 
be significant, so are the environmental and human costs, and continued 
large-scale exploitation activities are often met with strong opposition 
from environmental groups concerned about the damage to the environ-
ment. A significant share of the wealth created through large-scale re-
source extraction often does not remain in the Arctic and may not benefit 
the residents of the region. Rather, large-scale exploitation activities are 
frequently carried out to supply markets outside the Arctic using labour 
and capital inputs from outside the region (AHDR, 2004). A significant 
share of GDP is generated in the form of resource rents and returns to 
capital leaving the area when control over resource use and capital own-
ership is located outside the region.  
It is useful to briefly consider the problems of one of the standard 
measures of economic size and performance in our economy – GDP. 
While official records will suggest that GDP is high throughout much of 
the North, thus suggesting that resource development is providing for 
high standards of living and quality of life regionally as well as locally, it 
may not accurately reflect what is actually available for consumption and 
investment in the region – just as it may not reflect actual differences that 
describe the North between and within local and regional economic set-
tings.  
As we will see, GDP as a standard measure of economic size has sev-
eral limitations when applied to the Arctic context. When we attempt to 
use GDP as a measure of more than it was intended for – using it also as a 
measure of our standard of living – limitations are even greater. The GDP 
measure simply covers activities and transactions that have a market price 
and which are officially recorded, and thus excludes non-market activities 
and household production. This drawback has long been recognised and 
emphasised as a limitation in using GDP as a measure of social welfare. 
Also, GDP does not discount for flow of resource rents and payment to 
non-resident workers or flow of income to residents from outside the 
region. Nor does GDP account for transfers and taxes in and out of the 
region. Since a large part of GDP in the Arctic comprises returns to fixed 
capital and resource rents that can be taken out of the region as income to 
owners situated elsewhere, it is hard to know what part of GDP is avail-
able for consumption and investments. GDP also ignores the distribution 
of income which presents a serious flaw when we attempt to use it indis-
criminately to describe both regional and local economic life. An unequal 
distribution implies unequal opportunities for personal development and 
well-being, and using GDP per capita as a measure of welfare means 
ignoring information on the distribution of income and hence inequality. 
This is particularly problematic if some segments of a population live on 
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the margin, are prevented from full participation, or are denied equal 
access to the benefits of economic production. GDP has also been criti-
cised for not taking into account the environmental damage and depletion 
of resources that may result from increased economic activity. More pro-
duction simply means a higher GDP regardless of what is being produced 
(see ASI, 2010).  
The non-market part of the Northern economy is described by subsis-
tence in the form of customary harvesting, and it continues to play an 
important role in many parts of the North. Subsistence activity refers to 
local production for local consumption. The livelihoods of a significant 
number of indigenous people – including also many non-indigenous resi-
dents – continue to depend largely on harvesting and the use of living 
terrestrial, marine, and freshwater resources. Many of these resources are 
used as food and for clothing and other products, and make important 
contributions to the cash economy of local households and communities. 
Local communities and indigenous people often mix formal sector activi-
ties (e.g., commercial fish harvesting, mineral resource extraction, and 
tourism) with traditional or subsistence activities, which include harvest-
ing a variety of natural renewable resources to provide for human con-
sumption and sustainable community livelihoods. Indeed, subsistence 
based household production requires substantial monetary investments to 
help purchase and maintain hunting and trapping equipment. Such in-
vestment may conceivably continue to rise with the strengthening integra-
tion of market and non-market production, and as climate and environ-
mental change may necessitate further travel to reach hunting grounds 
thus increasing the demand for modern harvesting and transport equip-
ment for example. 
Thus, a mix of wage employment and subsistence based activities 
constitute important sources of household income in the North. Many 
communities depend in large part on a combination of subsistence activi-
ties, public sector jobs, and public transfers. Communities without strong 
market connections combine subsistence activities and incomes from the 
public or corporate economies. A mix of a variety of income sources may 
be necessitated in part by a number of factors including the small size of 
the local market economy, limited access to full-time, permanent, and 
well paying modern sector jobs, the high costs of doing business in the 
North, and lack of access to markets and resources in general. This also 
explains why transfer income becomes an important third key source of 
household income for many. Transfers are a source of income for house-
holds in the North. They include direct income, goods and services pro-
vided by government, and jobs created by government. The Arctic econ-
omy is characterised by a large service sector, with the public sector ac-
counting for a significant share. In the case of Greenland and Nunavut, 
annual block grant payments from Denmark and Canada make up a major 
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share of revenue and help finance a large public sector with a significant 
public administration (AHDR, 2004).  
The mix of market and non-market production, and the close ties to 
outside markets describes well the local Northern economy. New threats 
and challenges to local communities and indigenous social and cultural 
sustainability have appeared, most of them fuelled by an increasingly 
rapid pace of externally forced, disruptive social change such as global-
isation and urbanisation. Climate change will likely increasingly impinge 
on both subsistence and commercial wildlife harvesting and fishing, with 
serious implications for local and regional economies (ACIA, 2005).  
The economic viability of Northern communities is closely linked to 
what power the local level has when it becomes involved in processes of a 
potentially global scale. An important factor in achieving community vi-
ability is ownership rights to, or other forms of control over natural re-
sources. Some of the principle strategies for human development by people 
in the Arctic include: forming partnerships with outside actors in develop-
ing natural resources; combining subsistence activities with government 
employment and welfare; negotiating with governments for policies on 
regional development to create jobs; and using business and political net-
works to ensure access to international markets (AHDR, 2004). 
A common characteristic of Northern communities is their economic 
vulnerability with significant dependency on the natural environment for 
direct household production, for wage work or commercial resource ex-
traction activities. Economic life in the North no longer takes place in 
isolation from the external environment. Existence in modern communi-
ties increasingly requires the maintenance of economic relations with the 
outside. Yet, the strength of these economic relations and the linkages 
between different sectors differ significantly due to broad variations in 
physical, natural, financial and human resources. Differences exist with 
respect to accessibility, remoteness, and economic and population size, 
ease of access to external markets in terms of distance and road connec-
tions, and differences in the natural resource base and infrastructure.  
5.3 Economic Development in the North 
The traditional view of economic development was that of a sustained 
increase in GDP, and a declining share of agriculture along with an in-
creasing share of manufacturing and service industries. The more con-
temporary view redefines development in terms of reductions in poverty, 
inequitable income distribution and unemployment. Broadening this nar-
row definition, development can be viewed as a process of expanding the 
real freedoms that people enjoy. Amartya Sen argues that development 
requires the removal of major sources of “uni-freedom,” including poor 
economic opportunities, poverty, social deprivation, inadequate housing 
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and lack of access to education. This broadened view of economic devel-
opment is not only appropriate but clearly also necessary. In studying the 
Northern economy, it allows us to go beyond a mere consideration of the 
contribution of resource extraction to also consider other critical aspects 
of economic wellbeing, and the many important factors that contribute to 
living conditions and quality of life.  
Thus, while traditionally economic development was equated with 
economic growth – a rise in GDP – the contemporary view of develop-
ment is much broader. There is a clear distinction between economic 
growth and economic development; economic growth is simply an in-
crease in GDP – it refers to a rise in national or per capita income or 
product, whereas economic development implies much more. Economic 
growth is a prerequisite for achieving economic development but it is not 
a sufficient condition. Key objectives of economic development centre on 
raising the standard of living and quality of life with higher incomes, 
more jobs, better education, greater attention to cultural and human val-
ues, and the expansion of the range of economic and social choices avail-
able. Also, important to the process of economic development is the par-
ticipation of stakeholders, where participation in the process of economic 
development implies participation in the enjoyment of the benefits of 
development as well as the production of those benefits. 
In this context the question arises of whether sustainability and im-
provements in the quality of life in the North is derived best from gearing 
our resources towards industrial development, or alternatively, from in-
vesting in the small scale economic development of local communities 
that involves local participation and decision-making, and where benefits 
accrue more directly to local stakeholders, and economic leakage to out-
side markets and economic interests is minimised. This also raises ques-
tions related to whether sustainability can be achieved by focusing on the 
extraction of non-renewable resource development, and also, what chal-
lenges have to be addressed to reverse regional financial leakages to help 
strengthen the regional multiplier associated with economic sustainability 
and local benefits. The net effect of regional investments or resource 
extraction is often limited because income, profits and rents leak out of 
the region when ownership and control over resource use is located else-
where. Where governance and national-local linkages are weak, commu-
nities may see little of the revenues from resource extraction. The solu-
tion is to find better ways to capture and manage resource wealth and to 
ensure that it is invested for lasting benefits in support of regional and 
local economic development. 
As described by Bone (2009) with reference to the Canadian North, 
patterns of resource development follow a classic core/periphery model: 
capital flows to the North from large companies and national corporations 
to construct large-scale projects that serve the interests of the whole na-
tion or the south and the international business community. The impacts 
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of industrial development may include: wages, salaries, and profits; pay-
ments to those who supply goods and services to the industrial operator; 
and the increase in payments to retail stores and their regional supplies 
that result from local residents and others spending the income generated 
from the resource project. However economic spin-off effects for local 
and indigenous communities may be slow to development or may not be 
generated at all – in particular if the local community does not participate 
in the industrial activity, or if the local market economy and labour force 
cannot meet the demands for labour, goods and services of the resource 
developer.  
This in turn means that economic benefits may leak out of the region. 
Also, while the construction phase of large-scale industrial projects may 
result in a high level of economic activity, it is often short lived and does 
not lead to the desired level of economic stability and diversification. 
Rather, large scale industrial resource extraction places a heavy burden 
on local infrastructure, services, housing and other facilities. It may draw 
on local labour otherwise engaged in traditional pursuits, who after the 
end of the projects may find themselves permanently displaced. Social 
problems may also result.  
Large corporations are a growing force in Northern resource devel-
opment, and they have the financial resources necessary to conduct ex-
ploration on a large scale. Market concentration is what characterises 
much of the Northern industrial economy, with a high frequency of a mix 
of oligopoly (a few firms dominating the market) and local monopoly 
(one firm controlling the entire market).  
The combination of market concentration together with ownership and 
control in the hands of a few economic interests, with headquarters often 
located outside the region, presents a double exposure that can leave the 
economic fate of Northern communities in the hands of large outside 
industrial interests. The growing presence of large corporations in the 
North can be partly explained by the fact that private capital gravitates 
toward countries and regions with the highest financial returns and the 
greatest perceived safety. Their main objective is to maximise profits. 
They are powerful companies who tend to have substantial bargaining 
power. Given their size and cost, it is primarily large corporations, espe-
cially multinationals, that have the capacity to finance, design, construct, 
and operate large scale resource development projects. These corpora-
tions can contribute to filling various gaps in the North – such as resource 
gaps related to investment and locally mobilised savings, gaps between 
targeted government tax revenues and locally raised taxes, and gaps in 
management, entrepreneurship, and skill. They also contribute to the 
transfer of technological knowledge, skills and modern machinery and 
equipment to capital-poor regions.  
It is nevertheless possible to identify several possible costs related to 
relying on this type of private investment, including the negative impacts 
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on local savings and investment rates associated with reduced local com-
petition; the economic leakage associated with non-retention of profits; or 
the import of intermediate products from outside the region rather than 
using local production, which inhibits the expansion of local firms.  
In sum, large corporations may suppress local or domestic entrepre-
neurship, drive out local competitors, and inhibit development of small-
scale local enterprises. To overcome these potential drawbacks and costs, 
it is necessary to arrive at more stringent regulation of foreign invest-
ment, a tougher local bargaining stance, clearer adoption of performance 
standards and requirements, and increased local and domestic ownership 
and control. 
A degree of economic dependency characterises many parts of the 
North and presents a significant challenge to the achievement of economic 
development and local sustainability. Economic dependency may be re-
flected in a situation where the economic linkages between market sectors 
are few and limited and only a very small fraction of production serves as 
inputs into other sectors of the domestic economy; resource use is less 
flexible and adaptable; constraints exist on the ability of product-mix to 
adapt to shocks and disturbances; and a disparity exists between structure 
of domestic demand and domestic resource use; and lastly, domestic insti-
tutions tend to be directed and controlled to a significant degree by the 
external environment. This may leave the economy vulnerable and prone to 
frequent high levels of economic instability (Larsen, 2010).  
A related challenge here is the dependency on external markets and 
the associated economic instability it gives rise to. As noted previously, 
much of the natural resource extraction in the North is geared to external 
markets. Theories have been developed to analyse the development of 
primary exporting countries. Among these is the staple theory (H.A. In-
nis; R.E. Baldwin; D.C. North; Watkins). A central feature of the staple 
theory is the spread effects and the process of diversification around the 
export base and the process of economic development that follows. Bene-
fits to primary-export-led growth may include improved utilisation of 
existing factors, expanded factor endowments, and linkage effects. The 
resulting linkage effects are referred to as backward, forward, and final 
demand linkages. 
Empirical evidence in the literature however suggests the contrary, 
namely, that primary exports may not be as effective in leading the way 
to economic development as the theory suggests. Weaknesses may result 
when markets for primary products grow slowly, when earnings are un-
stable due to price fluctuations, and when expected diversification around 
the export industry – including linkage creation – may be nonexistent or 
limited. 
Significant instability and fluctuations in earnings may result if pro-
duction is concentrated in one or a few products and if exports are geared 
only to a few external markets. A country will remain heavily dependent 
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on imports of both final and intermediate products, as well as imported 
personnel in many cases. At the same time, a number of challenges may 
persist in developing strategies to realise long-run sustained growth, in-
cluding the existing limits on resource flexibility, the constraints on enter-
ing into new and foreign markets, the difficulties associated with a very 
small and scattered population base which presents barriers to achieving 
economies of scale in domestic markets. In addition, the region is now 
faced with new challenges posed by climate change which may alter the 
composition, availability and value of commercial species in the region’s 
export trade (Larsen, 2010). 
The small size of internal markets and a narrow resource base are ba-
sic structural features that contribute to making the Northern economy 
dependent on external trade as a key source of income. Relying on a few 
primary resources is – as we would expect – a key source of instability in 
many parts of the North. Economic vulnerability can be largely attributed 
to a lack of economic diversification, heavy reliance on natural resources, 
and the associated narrow resource trade that constitutes a primary source 
of regional income. The high concentration in resource exports together 
with its high share in the region’s GDP help explain the volatility of the 
formal economy, where even small shocks and disturbances can have 
large and lasting impacts.  
Naturally, not all economic fluctuations are problematic in as much as 
they reflect long term shifts in consumer tastes, technology, or factor 
supplies. Economic fluctuations are undesirable however when they serve 
no useful purpose other than to trigger fluctuations in other variables such 
as government revenue and investment which may impact on short run 
macroeconomic stability and long run economic development. It is the 
sporadic elements of economic fluctuations that are the most problematic. 
For instance, it is possible for income to fluctuate over time and yet be 
known in advance with certainty. Events that are predictable or certain do 
not necessarily have adverse consequences, since regularly reversing 
fluctuations make it easier to predict the level of exports and income each 
year and to judge the correct timing for the implementation of stabilisa-
tion policies.  
In the Arctic region the scope for corrective action in response to lar-
ger economic out-swings may be more limited due to various resource 
constraints and limits to local and regional economic and political control 
and decision-making. The persistence of economic instability must also 
be viewed in combination with constraints on the region’s human, physi-
cal and financial resource endowment in general (Ibid.). 
Yet, another economic challenge related to resource extraction in the 
North is the risk it poses to the fragile environment. Environmental im-
pacts of resource development and the depletion of natural resource re-
serves all add to the costs of resource extraction activities. While resource 
development projects can be highly controversial with potentially large 
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shares of net-benefits accruing to stakeholders outside the local region, 
net economic benefits related to local job and income generation may still 
warrant their existence, just as opportunities to negotiate contracts that 
can help facilitate economic diversification and viable economic futures 
from these projects can help justify their presence in the North.  
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the 
present generation without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs. While non-renewable resources are finite and 
face eventual depletion, local economies do not necessarily need to be 
worse off than before the resources were exhausted. Sustainable devel-
opment – in terms of creating a future stream of economic benefits – 
might be possible to achieve even based on non-renewable resources, if 
those resources can be converted into benefits that have a lasting benefit, 
such as e.g., education and training to help create a more diversified 
economy. 
Capacity-building is an important approach to achieving sustainable 
development. As discussed by Mark Nuttall (2002) capacity-building 
enhances the capabilities of people and institutions to improve their skills 
and abilities to solve problems, and strengthen their prospects for achiev-
ing sustainable livelihoods. Local communities and regional and national 
governments can develop the necessary skills and expertise needed to 
manage their natural resources and environments in a sustainable manner 
through a process of capacity-building. This includes developing the ca-
pacity and skills of community members so they can identify and meet 
their needs, participate more fully in society, and meet the challenges of, 
and benefit from, the opportunities of change. It is a process of building 
relationships between people, groups, and communities and developing 
the kinds of networks that can support and promote communities and 
vibrant cultures (Nuttall, 2002). 
Under co-management stakeholders share power in managing re-
sources. This commonly refers to a shared decision-making process, for-
mal or informal, between government and user group for managing a 
resource. It is an institutional arrangement where stakeholders establish a 
system of rights and obligations; rules indicating actions that stakeholders 
are expected to take; and procedures for making collective decisions af-
fecting diverse interests. Co-management may include the use of tradi-
tional knowledge in resource management, where traditional knowledge 
refers to a body of knowledge, practice, and beliefs, which has evolved 
by adaptive processes and then been handed down from generation to 
generation (AHDR, 2004). One might also see it as management fitted to 
a smaller scale, with resource users taking more direct responsibility, and 
including utilisation of local knowledge. It is a flexible and participatory 
process, which can provide a forum for rule making, conflict manage-
ment, power sharing, learning, and development among resource users, 
stakeholders, and government (Kristoffersen and Berkes, 2002). 
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Fjellheim and Henriksen (2006) discuss the challenges facing indige-
nous peoples when it comes to large-scale resource extraction in the Arc-
tic. He points to Social Impact Assessments (SIA) as problematic for 
indigenous peoples. SIA is a tool for decision-making and planning – 
conducted to balance the interests of different parties, and indigenous 
peoples are often included as stakeholders. Problems here however in-
clude being denied inclusion, effective participation, and procedures that 
often fail to acknowledge indigenous peoples’ values and perspectives.  
Fjellheim and Henriksen argue that negotiations are an alternative or 
supplementary approach to SIA. To overcome the shortcomings of SIAs 
and to meet international human rights standards their concept of free, 
prior, and informed consent, direct and binding negotiations with indige-
nous peoples may be the best approach. “Free, Prior, Informed Consent: 
recognises indigenous peoples’ inherent rights to their lands and resources 
and respects their legitimate authority to require that third parties enter into 
an equal and respectful relationship with them, based on the principle of 
prior and informed consent” (Fjellheim and Henriksen, 2006, p. 13 ).  
5.4 Resource Extraction in the North: Costs and Benefits  
As we have seen, a number of unique features characterise Arctic econo-
mies, among these are: remoteness and lack of accessibility, small popu-
lation and economic size, and challenges and limitations with respect to 
infrastructure and transportation networks. These all present special chal-
lenges and add to the cost of resource development in the North. The 
North is rich in both renewable and non-renewable resources, and de-
pending on how, when and by whom those resources are exploited and 
used affects the region’s prospect for generating long-term benefits from 
this source of growth and economic diversification. Non-renewable re-
sources cannot be produced, re-grown, regenerated, or reused on a scale 
which can sustain their consumption rate. These resources often exist in a 
fixed amount, or are consumed much faster than our nature is able to 
recreate them. The North has considerable reserves of non-renewable 
resources such as coal, iron and ferroalloy minerals, non-ferrous minerals 
and precious metal ores.  
Non-renewable resources as a potential backbone for sustainable eco-
nomic livelihoods raises challenging questions related to how to convert 
those resources, just as it requires finding solutions to overcoming con-
flicts of interests between different groups of stakeholders. 
All of the Arctic regions are endowed with raw minerals but Russia 
has the largest reserves. The variety of minerals includes coal, iron ore, 
nickel, cobalt, chromite, titanium, tungsten, bauxite, zinc, lead, copper, 
palladium, gold, silver, platinum, diamonds, phosphate, and vermiculite 
(Economy of the North, 2006). Because of the high costs of resource 
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extraction many known reserves of Arctic mineral resources are not ex-
ploited. Where resource extraction does take place, eventual resource 
depletion is the reality, but such depletion and its effects on communi-
ties in the North can be partly mitigated through investments in human 
capital and innovation. 
Resource-based Northern economies have a number of common char-
acteristics: industrial development and the rate of growth of the economy 
are closely tied to world demand for the regions’ renewable and non-
renewable resources. A small range of primary natural resources de-
scribes the narrowly based economy, and lack of economic diversifica-
tion makes the economy vulnerable to economic shocks and disturbances 
associated with changes in the supply of resources, demand for the re-
sources in world markets, and changes to the world price of those re-
sources. The demand for resources is largely cyclical – with demand for 
minerals and other non-renewable resources following the global busi-
ness cycle – giving rise to boom-and-bust cycles that result in more vola-
tile markets and that affect the pattern and prospects of economic devel-
opment locally. The boom and bust cycle is characterised by the alternat-
ing expansion and contraction of economic growth.  
Because of the lack of financial resources along with the high cost of 
extraction, Northern resource development is largely carried out by big 
corporations including multinational corporations. The North has wit-
nessed an increase in the role and presence of these corporations, who 
with their capital, managerial expertise, and technology have become a 
leading force in the development of Northern non-renewable resources. 
As we saw previously, the involvement of non-local capital interests in 
industrial development and resource extraction activities, also means that 
much of the economic benefits generated are not retained or reinvested in 
the region, thus leaving the net economic benefits for the local or regional 
economy much smaller than it could otherwise be.  
The local economic impact is also determined by the extent of local 
labour utilisation, which tends to be less than it could be because resource 
projects often require only a small, but well-trained, labour force, leaving 
the labour requirement and potential for permanent employment creation 
somewhat small. In particular, while the construction phase may require a 
large number of workers, the operational phase usually has only a small 
demand for labour (Bone, 2009). Northern resource development faces a 
number of challenges which need to be overcome to generate a more 
diverse resource base that allows for broader diversification, less eco-
nomic volatility and better scope for economic sustainability.  
In sum, the resource industry has a number of distinct characteristics 
that make it a less than stable backbone for local economic development 
in the North: the capital intensive nature of the industry means that larger 
corporations who possess the financial capital, the expertise, and the in-
frastructure and technology are often required to undertake exploration 
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and operations; much risk and uncertainty is associated with natural re-
source projects and it is primarily larger corporations with access to fi-
nancial resources who can take on risks of this scale and nature, and who 
are able to invest large sums of money with no certainty of the size and 
timing of future returns to investments – with the period from exploration 
and feasibility studies till actual operation and extraction being poten-
tially several years with no certainty of a future stream of income; capital 
rich corporations with their greater capacity to undertake risk are also in a 
better position to face the potential large “sunk costs” related to resource 
extraction – i.e., when investments are made in fixed capital equipment 
that cannot be moved to a new location after operations stop; the industry 
and its impacts on the local and regional economy is determined by de-
mand conditions in external markets which presents considerable risk. 
Thus, changes in economic conditions and price fluctuations in commod-
ity markets in far distant places – the ups and downs of the global busi-
ness cycle with changes in consumption and investment spending – have 
direct local impacts. Due to large capital requirements, ownership and 
control of the industry tends to be concentrated in a small number of large 
corporations. Being in the business to maximise profits they may pack up 
and leave as soon as projects come to an end, searching for new large 
scale resource extraction opportunities, leaving behind potentially nega-
tive consequences for local employment, household income, local de-
mand for goods and services, including also the impact on social and 
political life of resource development. Thus, resource development activi-
ties can be hard to justify if they do not bring substantial economic bene-
fits to regional and local economies, including taxes, royalties, technol-
ogy transfers, meaningful local employment creation, infrastructure such 
as roads and other transportation networks, economic linkages upstream 
to industries that supply goods and services or downstream to industries 
that process mineral outputs.  
While the potential for Arctic natural resource development is enor-
mous, there are a number of financial considerations, such as for example 
the value of the currency, the cost of fuel, the cost of environmental dam-
age, increased costs related to climate change, a low regional multiplier 
effect to name but a few, which may render exploration a non-viable ven-
ture and thus leave reserves unexplored. 
The Arctic is very vulnerable to environmental impacts, and these im-
pacts present another cost of resource exploration in the North. The nega-
tive consequences of environmental impacts can be potentially very large 
because of the fragile environment and also the dependency of indigenous 
peoples and local communities on country food. The Arctic is vulnerable to 
the environmental impacts of large-scale resource exploitation projects for 
a number of reasons, including the cold climate which means that it takes 
longer for the biological regime to repair itself after environmental damage 
has occurred. Industrial projects such as mining activity may disturb the 
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permafrost layer which in turn may make it harder for example for reindeer 
to access food. In addition, airborne pollutants can enter the Arctic food 
chain, and may impact on the health of Arctic residents.  
For these and other reasons large-scale industrial projects in the North 
may be discontinued, down scaled, or denied permits to operate. Environ-
mental Impacts Assessments are conducted in the North and may lead to 
changes in the conduct of industrial development and its scale and location. 
Growing consideration of the negative spill-over effects of large-scale re-
source extraction in the North has added to the cost of Northern resource 
development, including costs for clean-up, decommissioning, and invest-
ment in safer and more environmentally-friendly technology.  
The extractive industry faces many challenges of its own, such as hav-
ing access to a safe, healthy, educated and committed workforce; access 
to capital; a social licence to operate; the ability to attract and maintain 
good managerial expertise; and the opportunity for a return on investment 
in a globalised economy with growing risks and uncertainty. Resource 
development remains one of a number of often competing land uses. As a 
result, there are often problems and disagreement around issues such as 
compensation, resettlement, land claims, and protected areas. Also, man-
aging environmental impacts more effectively requires dealing with 
waste handling, developing ways of internalising the costs of pollution 
and other environmental damage, and making improvements in the area 
of impact assessments and environmental management systems. 
For most non-renewable resources, supply has kept up with global 
demand as new resources are being discovered, new technologies in-
crease the efficiency of mineral extraction and processing, and innova-
tions in substitute resources are being developed. But non-renewable 
means a finite supply and ultimate depletion or running down reserves of 
the more easily accessible and more commercially profitable and higher 
grade reserves.  
In the longer term, more easily mined or exploited resources will be-
come harder to find, necessitating the exploration of reserves that may be 
of more marginal commercial value, harder to reach and more costly to 
access. Yet, as supplies shrink prices of even these reserves will start 
rising, and extraction may become profitable. Non-renewable resource 
depletion could be mitigated through investments in human capital and 
innovation. Before resources disappear mitigation strategies can be em-
ployed to help conserve those resources. This could include a reduced 
rate of resource exploitation, perhaps through economic diversification to 
spread economic activity among more projects and sectors, or through 
technical innovation to reduce demand for the resource. 
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5.5 Conclusion: Challenges and Emerging Issues of 
Northern Economies 
This chapter presented some of the basic characteristics and emerging 
issues of the Northern economy, and discussed some of the costs and 
benefits, challenges and opportunities, of large-scale resource develop-
ment. The increasing integration of the Northern economy with global 
markets, and the growing force of global change impacts the nature of 
Northern regional and local economies, and presents growing challenges. 
Global processes such as changing climate may present new risks to the 
Northern economy and threaten some of the region’s commercial re-
sources many of which are highly climate sensitive. Climate change can 
be expected to alter the composition and stock and flow of resources, 
although the nature and extent of this is highly uncertain and at best 
speculative.  
The ACIA science report (2005), IPCC (2007) report, and others, de-
scribe several possible impacts of projected climate change which high-
light the potential range of possible costs and benefits, and their associ-
ated uncertainty. While some of the climate change projections and their 
associated consequences may point to an uncertain future for the Arctic, 
they are expected to be gradual and will depend on factors such as the 
availability of resources and the importance of nature-based activities to 
the region. People and economies will surely adapt, but at a cost and 
speed that is still unknown. Local as well as regional economies – 
whether market or subsistence based – may feel the impacts of change. 
Nature-based activities in the Arctic are clearly sensitive to climate 
change, but uncertainty clearly remains as to which will be impacted 
negatively and which positively.  
The AHDR (2004) and the ICARP II science reports (2005) argued 
that new threats and challenges to indigenous social and cultural sustain-
ability have appeared with the increasingly rapid pace of externally 
forced and disruptive social change, including the withdrawal from tradi-
tional hunting, fishing or herding economies. Serious implications for 
local and regional economies may emerge if the consequences of global 
change continue to impinge – and at a rapid rate – on both subsistence 
and commercial wildlife harvesting and fishing, with serious implications 
for traditional diet and cultural identity (ACIA, 2005). Climate change 
will increase the need for protective institutions due to increased activity 
levels, while simultaneously making it harder to build and maintain the 
institutions. 
While the impact of climate change may be negative in some sectors it 
may be positive in others, and thus, the net economic effect for the re-
gional economy will depend on the relative size of the positive and nega-
tive effects. At the same time, we need to remember that uncertainty and 
economic instability is nothing new for Northern local economies. 
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Changes that may be regarded as minor elsewhere assume larger impor-
tance in Northern communities because of their amplification in a con-
fined eco-system.  
There are many other sources of stress facing Northern communities. 
Their adaptive capacity depends on technology, wealth, institutions, en-
trepreneurship, infrastructure, human resources, information and skills, 
income distribution and the social welfare system. Adaptation may be 
compromised due to limitations with human, technical and natural re-
sources. There are a number of basic options for adaptation to economic 
change, including: implementing measures to minimise negative impacts 
and costs; spreading the burden of costs among sectors; substituting with 
new activities that have fewer costs and are more sustainable; moving 
industrial activity to other locations; strengthening the adaptive capacity 
and resiliency of the socio-economic system.  
A key challenge facing the North is integrating economic activity with 
environmental integrity, social concerns, and effective governance sys-
tems. In the context of the minerals sector, the goal should be to maxi-
mise the contribution to the well-being of the current generation in a way 
that ensures an equitable distribution of its costs and benefits, without 
reducing the potential for future generations to meet their own needs. 
This requires a framework for sustainable development based on an 
agreed set of principles and an understanding of the key challenges and 
constraints facing the extractive industry at different levels and in differ-
ent regions and the actions needed to meet or overcome them.  
Attention must also be focused on the respective roles and responsi-
bilities of different actors, and consideration of the rights and interests of 
the various stakeholders. Policy instruments and institutional frameworks 
must be implemented that facilitate compliance with minimum standards, 
performance measures, environmental assessments and protection of our 
Northern environment. 
Achieving sustainable development may include attention to a range 
of principles, including implementing measures to maximise human well-
being, ensuring efficient use of all resources, natural and otherwise, and 
identifying and internalising environmental and social costs, and main-
taining the conditions for viable economic activity. Sustainable develop-
ment also means a fair distribution of the costs and benefits of economic 
development, and social and economic freedoms. It means minimising 
waste and environmental damage and promoting responsible use of natu-
ral resources. Sustainable development also depends on support for par-
ticipatory decision-making, implementation of fair rules and incentives, 
transparency and accountability, and avoidance of the situation where 
power is concentrated in the hands of the few. Sustainable development 
thus requires new integrated systems of governance that can help facili-
tate the process needed to transform resource extraction activity into sus-
tainable use for future streams of net economic benefits.  
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Questions: 
1. Describe the main characteristics of the Arctic market and non-
market economy. 
2. Outline the costs and benefits of large scale resource development in 
the North. 
3. List and carefully discuss what you consider potentially to be the 
greatest economic challenges and opportunities in respect of global 
change in the Arctic. 
4. Carefully describe the informal (subsistence-based) economy in the 
Arctic. Do you believe the informal economy is threatened by global 
change? 
5. What do you see as some of the key challenges of economic 
development in the North? What do you think is needed to increase 
the regional multiplier effect in the North? 
 
 
 
6. Oil and Gas and Mining 
Development in the Arctic: Legal 
Issues 
 
Nigel Bankes 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the legal issues associated with oil and gas and 
mining development in the Arctic. Mining and later oil and gas develop-
ments have both been significant in the Arctic for over a century. In many 
cases it has been the demand and exploration for these resources (e.g., the 
Yukon gold rush of the later 1890s and the first part of the twentieth cen-
tury) that has fuelled the settlement and colonisation of Arctic lands and 
the homelands of indigenous peoples across the Arctic and introduced 
indigenous communities to globalised labour and commodity markets. 
But sometimes, perhaps paradoxically, it is the potential for developing 
northern oil and gas and mineral resources and the promise of jobs and 
revenues (resource and tax revenues) that holds out the prospect for 
greater measures of self-government and autonomy, whether by means of 
devolution of authority from a central government (as in the case of 
Yukon, Canada) or self-government and possibly independence (as in the 
case of Greenland).  
Hanging over all talk of resource development in the Arctic is climate 
change and global warming. Climate change will improve access to these 
resources but northern communities are considered to be particularly 
vulnerable to the consequences of human induced climate change. In part 
this is because the consequences of climate change are expected to be 
particularly serious in the Arctic1 but in part also it is because of the lack 
of adaptive capacity of these communities. But northern governments 
(e.g., Alaska, Greenland and Canada’s Northwest Territories) and in 
some cases northern communities2 seem committed to encouraging min-
                                                     
1 See, generally, the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005); and Timo Koivurova, E. Carina H. Keskitalo and Nigel Bankes (eds.), Climate Govern-
ance in the Arctic, Springer, 2009 and in this context see especially the chapter by Natalia Lou-
kacheva “Climate Change Policy in the Arctic: The Cases of Greenland and Nunavut,” 327–350. 
2 See Ove Hansen and Mette Midtgard, “Going North: the New Petroleum Province in Norway” 
in Aslaug Mikelsen and Oluf Langille, (eds.), Arctic Oil and Gas: Sustainability at Risk, Routledge, 
2008, 200–239. 
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ing and especially oil and gas developments as a means of providing jobs 
and economic development in isolated areas.  
This chapter begins with a description of the resource endowment of 
the Arctic region and offers a selective chronology of some significant 
examples of non-renewable resource development projects in the Arctic 
states. This is followed by a discussion of the ownership of oil and gas 
and mineral resources within different states. The main part of the chapter 
then examines the oil and gas and mining regimes of a number of Arctic 
states and also discusses the resource leasing practises of the Inuvialuit 
people of the Mackenzie Delta in Canada. The chapter ends with some 
discussion of environmental issues and some brief conclusions. 
6.2 The Resource Endowment 
The circumpolar states of the Arctic contain significant deposits of oil 
and natural gas as well as mineral resources both onshore and offshore. A 
recent assessment by the United States Geological Service (USGS) 
(2009) notes that of the 6% of the earth’s surface encompassed by the 
area north of the Arctic Circle one third is above sea level and another 
third represents continental shelves covered by water no deeper than 500 
metres. Onshore areas have already been explored with more than 400 oil 
and gas fields discovered with 40 billion barrels of oil, 1136 trillion cubic 
feet of natural gas and 8 billion barrels of natural gas liquids. Most of this 
development has occurred in the West Siberian Basin of Russia and the 
North Slope of Alaska (Gauthier et al, 2009). There has been little ex-
ploratory drilling offshore and this, combined with large areas of sedi-
mentary rocks, leads the USGS to conclude that the Arctic remains one of 
the more prospective areas globally where we can expect to see signifi-
cant new discoveries. There may be as much as 30% of undiscovered gas 
(principally the Russian offshore) and 13% of the world’s undiscovered 
oil within this region. Interest in access to these resources is clearly grow-
ing not only within Europe and North America but also more globally.  
Oil and gas resources are particularly important for half of the Arctic 
states: Russia, Canada, Norway and the United States. Iceland, Sweden, 
Greenland and Finland have no domestic production of oil or natural gas 
and are entirely dependent on imports. Iceland (in the Jan Mayen area) 
and Greenland both hope that ongoing exploratory drilling will identify 
producible reserves. 
It is harder to obtain statistics and resource assessments that are segre-
gated for Arctic mineral production but the mining industry is important for 
all of the Arctic states3 Sweden comprises less than 0.1% of the earth’s 
total area and yet is responsible for 2% of global iron production (princi-
                                                     
3 This paragraph draws on a number of sources but particularly useful is the USGS, Minerals 
Yearbook, (2007 preliminary edition), available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/. 
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pally from Kiruna and Malmberget in the Norbotten district of Swedish 
Lapland). Sweden is also a significant producer of copper, lead and zinc. 
Canada is currently the third largest producer of diamonds with most of the 
mines located in the Northwest Territories: the Ekati, Diavik and Snap 
Lake mines. The three northern territories of Canada have also been sig-
nificant producers of gold, lead and zinc over the past 50 years. Norway is 
not a significant producer of hard rock minerals although industrial miner-
als from mining and quarrying are important. The mining industry is very 
significant in northern Russia especially in the Kola Peninsula (i.e., iron, 
copper, nickel, and apatite and nepheline as well as rare earth metals co-
lumbium and tantalum), the Komi Republic (i.e., energy minerals but also 
bauxite, titanium, gold and diamonds) and the Republic of Karelia (i.e., 
ferrous metals as well as iron, titanium, vanadium and diamonds). In 
Finland, the Suurikuusikko gold deposit is expected to become Europe’s 
leading gold mine and the Talvivaara nickel deposit is the largest nickel 
deposit in Western Europe. The Kevitsa mine is another important nickel 
deposit while the chrome mine east of Kemi in Lapland is one of the 
world’s largest chrome producing mines. The Red Dog lead-silver-zinc 
mine is a particularly important mine in Alaska. The mine is operated by 
Teck-Cominco Ltd. under an agreement with the NANA Corporation one 
of the Alaska regional native corporations created by the Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), 1971. Producing mines in Greenland 
include the Nalunaq gold mine. Lead-zinc production occurred at the Black 
Angel Mine from the 1970s to the 1990s and feasibility studies continue 
with respect to its possible re-opening. Iceland is not an important producer 
of minerals but in recent years it has used its abundant and cheap electricity 
generated from both hydro and geothermal to attract investment in mineral 
processing in the aluminium industry using bauxite imported from else-
where, principally Guinea and Western Australia. 
Historically Arctic resources have seemed far from market and physi-
cally hard to exploit, either because of the presence of ice making marine 
access difficult or impossible, or simply because of the absence of a 
transportation infrastructure (e.g., a pipeline or a road system). But the 
dramatic reductions in sea ice cover that have already occurred or are 
projected to occur will reduce exploration costs and make it easier to 
transport produced minerals to market. This has led to renewed interest in 
some world class mineral deposits that have been known for years but 
have previously been considered inaccessible or uneconomic. Examples 
include the Mary River iron ore deposit on Baffin Island, Nunavut (Can-
ada) as well as other significant discoveries in the highly mineralised area 
south of Coronation Gulf in the Kitikmeot region of Nunavut.4  
 
 
                                                     
4 For details see Nunavut, Mineral Exploration, Mining and Geoscience Overview, 2008. 
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Selected mining and oil and gas developments in Arctic states (organised 
chronologically) 
1890s iron mines at Kiruna and Malmberget (Sweden) connected by rail to ports 
at Narvik and Luleå; Yukon Gold Rush begins 1897.  
1920 Treaty concerning the Archipelago of Spitsbergen, and Protocol, Paris. 
Recognises Norwegian sovereignty over Spitsbergen and also creates a special 
open access mining regime for the Svalbard archipelago for parties to the Treaty. 
1942 – 1944 Canol Pipeline (Canada – United States). An emergency war 
measure, this pipeline carried oil from the Norman Wells oilfield in the Northwest 
Territories, Canada to a refinery in Whitehorse, Yukon from where refined prod-
uct could be supplied to the Alaska Highway and to U.S. forces in Alaska. The 
Norman Wells field continues to produce today and was connected to a pipeline to 
southern Canada in 1985. 
1969 Prudhoe Bay oil field discovery, Alaska, USA. Prudhoe Bay is the larg-
est oil field in North America. Oil is brought to market by way of the Trans 
Alaska Pipeline to Valdez on the south west coast of Alaska. Production peaked at 
about 2 million barrels a day in 1998. The current debate focuses on getting Prud-
hoe Bay gas to market. 
1971 Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, settled aboriginal title claims in 
Alaska and created a series of village and regional corporations to hold land and 
resource titles. 
1977 report of the Berger Inquiry on the proposed Mackenzie Valley Pipeline 
calling for a ten year moratorium on the construction of a natural gas pipeline 
from the Mackenzie Delta in Canada to southern markets. 
1984 Discovery well drilled in the Norwegian Snøhvit natural gas field (71 
degrees N), Southern Barents Sea. The development of Snøhvit was approved by 
the Storting in 2002 and commenced production in 2007. Gas from the field is 
piped to a liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility onshore at Melkøya. Carbon diox-
ide from the natural gas stream is re-injected into a saline formation in one of the 
first commercial scale carbon capture and storage projects in the world. 
1988 Discovery of the Shtokman natural gas field in the Russian Barents Sea 
(73 degrees N). Proposals to develop this major field have been reformulated from 
time to time and have been very controversial and subject to repeated delays. The 
current project (Gazprom, Total and Statoil) will see production commencing in 
2016 selling gas to Europe via pipeline or internationally through an LNG facility.  
1998 First diamond mine (the Ekati mine) opens in the Northwest Territories, 
Canada. 
2000 Discovery-well for the Goliat oil field, Barents Sea (Norway); the gov-
ernment approved the plan for development in 2009 and production is expected to 
begin in 2013. 
2009 First hydrocarbon licensing round for Iceland in the Dreki area. 
2009 Greenland takes control of oil and gas and mineral licensing from  
Denmark. 
 
This section has described the distribution of Arctic oil and gas and min-
eral resources and has revealed some of the challenges associated with 
developing those resources and bringing them to market. The balance of 
this chapter deals with some of the legal issues associated with those 
developments. The discussion focuses on the public law issues and thus 
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principally the relationship between the oil and gas and mining industries 
and the state. But readers interested in this area should also be aware that 
there is a large body of private law and standard form contracts such as 
operating and farmout agreements dealing with the legal relationships 
between the different actors in the industry. The two areas of law and 
practice however are not hermetically sealed especially in those Arctic 
jurisdictions (e.g., Russia and to some extent Norway and Greenland) 
where the government, either directly or through wholly owned corporate 
entities, acts as both owner and regulator of the resource and joint venture 
partner in the exploration and production process. 
 
Questions about Arctic resource endowments 
How does the Arctic compare with other areas of the world in terms of a resource 
endowment? 
How are resources distributed within the Arctic region? What are some of the 
principal challenges in terms of bringing Arctic resources to market? Is there a 
shared vision that Arctic resources should be brought to market?  
 
6.3 Ownership of Oil and Gas and Mineral Resources  
The question of who owns the oil and gas and mineral resources is clearly 
a crucial starting point in any legal system. An oil and gas operator will 
want to know from whom it must acquire an exploration or production 
interest: from the state (and in a federal system is that the federal entity or 
the sub-federal unit or is there a “two key” system as there was in Russia 
for a period)5 or from a private owner?  
A legal system may deal with the ownership of natural resources at a 
number of different levels. Some jurisdictions deal with the issue as part 
of the constitution.6 The constitution of the Russian Federation (RF) for 
example provides that: “Land and other natural resources may be in pri-
vate, state, municipal and other forms of ownership”. In other cases own-
ership may be addressed by statute. For example, s.1.1 of Norway’s Pe-
troleum Activities Act (1996) stipulates that “The Norwegian State has 
the proprietary right to subsea petroleum deposits and the exclusive right 
to resource management,”7 And finally, ownership may be addressed as 
                                                     
5 Elena Andreyeva and Valery Kryukov, “The Russian Model: Merging Profit and Sustainabil-
ity” in Mikkelsen and Langhelle (eds.), 240–287, at 252–254 and noting that while the two key 
principles seemed to be embedded in the 1993 Constitution and earlier versions of the subsoil law 
more recently, there has been a trend to centralisation and with that the loss of the two key ideas in 
later drafts of the law on the subsoil. 
6 For discussion of different ownership approaches see Yinka Omorogbe and Peter Oniemola, 
“Property Rights in Oil and Gas under Domanial Regimes” in Aileen McHarg et al (eds.), Property 
and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 115–131. 
7 See Ulf Hammer, “Models for State Ownership on the Norwegian Continental Shelf” in 
McHarg, ibid., at 159–166. 
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part of the general law with the result that the state’s claim of title to the 
resources is not a necessary result but is contingent upon the history of 
the acquisition of title and subsequent grants in relation to any particular 
lands. This would appear to be the case in most Arctic states.  
The ownership of offshore resources is frequently the subject of dis-
tinctive rules which typically recognise public ownership even where that 
jurisdiction contemplates the possibility of non-state ownership for terres-
trial areas. This is the case for example for Alaska and the U.S. offshore 
areas where the courts have consistently held that there are no private 
rights (including aboriginal title rights) in the outer continental shelf area 
beyond the three mile territorial sea (which accrues to the state).8 Simi-
larly, Sweden recognises that minerals and petroleum may be the subject 
of private ownership (subject to the terms of the Minerals Act, see discus-
sion below) but the Continental Shelf Act (1966) of Sweden provides 
(s.2) that “The right to explore the continental shelf and exploit its natural 
resources belongs to the State.” Iceland’s 2001 Act on Prospecting, Ex-
ploration and Production of Hydrocarbons similarly provides (Articles 1 
& 3) that the Icelandic state owns all hydrocarbons seawards from 115 
metres from the shore. 
 
Questions  
Who owns the oil and gas and mineral resources in each of the Arctic states? Is 
the position the same with respect to minerals? What counts as a mineral for these 
purposes? How are sand, gravel and coal dealt with? 
 
6.3.1 Where the state owns the resources what scheme has it put in place 
to dispose of those resources? 
Oil and gas and mineral exploration involves significant geological and 
financial risk. Even where the exploration is successful it may require 
significant time and investment to develop and produce the resource. 
Consequently, even where the state owns the resource, it typically finds a 
means to engage private capital and provide oil and gas and mining com-
panies with the rights to explore for and produce the resource in return for 
assuming the risk. What do these arrangements look like?  
This section describes the oil and gas disposition regime for two terri-
tories in Canada (Northwest Territories and Nunavut) and for Greenland. 
The following section describes the minerals regime for the same two 
territories and for Sweden. In analysing a disposition law or statute it is 
useful to have in mind a number of common questions. This chapter 
                                                     
8 Native Village of Eyak v Trawler Diane Marie Inc. 154 F 3d 1090 (9th Cir 1998) cert denied 
527 US 1003, and Nigel Bankes, “Aboriginal Title to Petroleum: Some Comparative Observations on 
the Law of Canada, Australia and the United States” (2004), 7 Yearbook of New Zealand Jurispru-
dence, 111–157.  
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adopts the following questions: (1) How does the state make the decision 
to dispose of oil and gas or mineral rights? What processes and proce-
dures lie behind that disposition decision? (2) What forms of disposition 
(or tenure) are available? Is there both an exploration tenure and a pro-
duction tenure? (3) How does the state decide between competing pro-
posals\applications? (4) How does an explorer move from exploration to 
production tenure? Are there any relinquishment9 provisions? (5) How 
does the government recover its share of economic rent from the exploita-
tion of the resource? Another question that will be of interest to the indus-
try is that of security of tenure. How are existing interests dealt with 
when the regime changes? Are those interests “grand-parented” and held 
under the old rules or will the new rules apply and if so to what extent? 
6.4 Oil and Gas Regimes: Northwest Territories (N.W.T.) 
and Nunavut 
There is currently oil and gas production in the southern part of the 
N.W.T. including oil production at Norman Wells and natural gas pro-
duction in the Fort Liard area which is connected to the extensive natural 
gas pipeline system in Alberta. This in turn is connected to large markets 
in eastern Canada and south into the United States. Additional discovered 
oil and natural gas resources further north in the Mackenzie Delta and the 
Beaufort Sea have not been developed because of the absence of a pipe-
line infrastructure and the difficulties of tanker traffic. Pipeline proposals 
to ship gas down the Mackenzie Valley have in the past been rejected 
pending the settlement of aboriginal claims in the territory (the interna-
tionally celebrated Berger Inquiry, 1977) but have since been revived. At 
the end of 2009 the Joint Review Panel concluded that the proposed 
Mackenzie Gas Pipeline (now supported by both producer groups in the 
Delta and a coalition of indigenous peoples including the Inuvialuit of the 
Delta area and the Gwich’in and Sahtu peoples of the Mackenzie Valley) 
will not likely cause significant adverse social and environmental impacts 
and would most probably make a positive contribution to “a sustainable 
northern future” (see Report 2009:13) subject to the implementation of a 
number of recommendations. Final approval of the pipeline awaits review 
by Canada’s National Energy Board. 
There is currently no production of oil in Nunavut although for a pe-
riod there was small amount of production from the Bent Horn field on 
Cameron Island (76 degrees N) from 1985 – 1996. This oil property pro-
duced throughout the year storing production in a bladder. The produc-
                                                     
9 “Relinquishment” refers to the process by which the explorer must revert back to government 
part of the lands held under licence at various points in the life of the exploration tenure. The purpose 
of relinquishment is to create an incentive to the explorer to identify the parts of the exploration block 
that it is most interested in retaining. 
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tion was then shipped out every summer on the MV Arctic, an ice-
strengthened tanker. There is no production of natural gas. There are sig-
nificant discovered reserves including the Drake and Hecla fields and 
there have been various proposals to bring these reserves to market in-
cluding the Arctic Pilot Project which would have seen the use of ice 
strengthened LNG carriers exiting Davis Strait but none of these pros-
pects have come to fruition. 
In Nunavut and Northwest Territories the state (in this case the federal 
government) disposes of oil and gas rights to oil and gas companies under 
the terms of the Canada Petroleum Resources Act (CPRA). The disposi-
tion system is driven in large part by industry interest meaning that the 
state decides which areas to open up for bidding on the basis of nomina-
tions received from the industry, typically in response to a “call for nomi-
nations.” The government is not obliged to open lands for bidding just 
because of a nomination.10 The government does not typically engage in 
an environmental assessment (EA) before opening up a new area of land 
to oil and gas activities. The formal reason for this is that EA legislation 
(e.g., the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act) is largely project or 
activity driven and since the government’s decision to grant an explora-
tion right does not itself involve a physical activity there is no need for an 
EA until the oil and gas company wants to run seismic tests or drill the 
first test well. But while there is no requirement for a formal EA, the 
terms of a modern land claim agreements will generally require the gov-
ernment to consult with the relevant land claim organisations prior to 
opening lands up for disposition (See, for example, the Nunavut Final 
Agreement, Article 27). In addition the Call for Nominations will identify 
at a broad geographical scale environmental concerns of which a poten-
tial nominator\bidder should be aware. For example, a December 2009 
call for nominations for the Beaufort Sea and Mackenzie Delta area 
warns interested parties that that the area covered includes potential polar 
bear habitat (listed as of "special concern" under Canada’s Species at Risk 
Act (SARA) and that additional mitigating measures may therefore be 
required at the activity stage. The same Call also referred to potential 
concerns associated with bowhead whales, grizzly bear and migratory 
bird habitat. It is evident that these notifications are not intended to pre-
clude nominations; rather they are more in the nature of a warning that an 
operator may face operational constraints in carrying out its exploration 
and possible future production activities.  
Once the government has decided to open the lands for potential de-
velopment it issues a Call for Bids. This call will identify the particular 
blocks of lands that are available for bidding. A recent (2008) bid in the 
Beaufort/Mackenzie area identified five different parcels varying in size 
                                                     
10 The various calls for nominations and bids, the bidding documents and the standard form li-
cences can all be found on the web page for Northern Oil and Gas, Department of Indian Affairs and 
Northern Development (DIAND), http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/nth/og/index-eng.asp – follow rights 
management, rights issuance. 
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between 40 000 and 200 000 hectares. The bidding documents carry for-
ward and make more specific some of the general environmental con-
cerns identified in the Call for Nominations indicating, for example, that 
work seasons may be restricted in order to reduce impacts on sensitive 
habitats or migration routes. The bidding documents for this round also 
notify bidders that the successful bidder will be bound by the terms of the 
Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA) (the land claims agreement between 
Canada and the Inuvialuit people of the Mackenzie Delta, 1984).  
One of the distinctive features of bidding arrangements under the CPRA 
is that the Act requires that the bid conditions list a single bidding variable 
that will be used as the sole criterion against which to identify the success-
ful bidder. The current practice is for the government to use a “work bid” 
as the variable and thus the exploration interest will be issued to the bidder 
proposing to spend the most money engaging in exploratory work (e.g., 
seismic programmes and exploratory wells) on the property secured by an 
irrevocable line of credit or similar security for 25% of the bid submitted. 
The exploration tenure issued out of the bidding round will typically be 
divided into two periods (e.g., a five year initial term and a four year sec-
ondary term) and the tenure holder will typically only be allowed to move 
from the first period to the second if it has drilled an exploratory well. All 
Calls for Bids on federal lands in the north require successful bidders to 
adhere to a statement of principles on Northern Benefits Requirements. The 
principles cover such matters as: industrial benefits, employment and train-
ing, consultation, compensation for damage to hunting and trapping inter-
ests, and an annual reporting requirement. The focus is on regional benefits 
(rather than aboriginal or Canadian ones) and operates on an “in-principle” 
level that is short on specifics. 
The CPRA provides for three forms of tenure, an exploration licence 
(EL), a significant discovery licence (SDL) and a production licence 
(PL). In order to move from one tenure form to the other the licensee 
must obtain, respectively, a declaration of significant discovery (DSD) 
and\or a declaration of commercial discovery (DCD) based in the first 
instance on the results of drilling operations, and in the second on the 
economic viability of the discovery. In the event that the EL holder fails 
to make a discovery the property reverts to the government at the end of 
the term of the EL as will any lands within the EL that are not covered by 
the DSD. There are no other relinquishment requirements during the term 
of the EL. Thus the DSD scheme is designed to allow the licensee to re-
tain the entire area of its discovery within the area of its EL.  
The SDL is effectively a holding tenure. It allows the licensee to re-
tain its discovery until it is able to prove that is has an economic project. 
This is crucial for the industry in the Arctic since in many cases discover-
ies cannot be brought to market because of the absence of a pipeline in-
frastructure and the difficulties associated with shipping oil or LNG given 
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historically prevalent ice conditions. This feature of the leasing regime is 
clearly designed for Arctic or frontier conditions.  
It is a significant feature of the CPRA that the rights holder has sub-
stantial procedural protections under the statute. For example, decisions 
about DSDs and DCDs are made by a regulatory tribunal (the National 
Energy Board – NEB) rather than the government Department that is 
responsible for granting the oil and gas interests. Furthermore, the NEB’s 
decisions with respect to a DSD may be appealed to the Federal Court. 
The forms of the three licences (EL, SDL and PL) are all standardised 
and thus there is no room for negotiation. There is also no opportunity 
under the CPRA for the government to hold an interest either directly or 
through a nominated state oil corporation. Indeed, Canada’s former state 
oil company, PetroCanada (founded 1975) was privatised in 1991 and in 
2009 became part of Suncor as a result of a merger between the two 
companies. 
The government recovers economic rent (i.e., the difference between 
the value of the resources and the costs of exploring for and extracting the 
resource including an allowance for the cost of capital) for oil and gas 
developments principally by means of a royalty on production although it 
is possible at some time that a portion of rents might also be recovered 
through bonus bids if the government were to move away from work bids 
as the single bidding variable. The royalty has two elements, a small 
gross royalty on production (the gross royalty starts at 1% for the first 18 
months of production rising by increments of 1% every 18 months to a 
maximum of 5%) which shifts over to a net profits royalty of 30% once 
“payout” is achieved (i.e., the licensee recovers all of its allowed costs in 
relation to that property out of its share of production). The royalty 
scheme is one that allows the licensee to reduce its risk during the first 
few years of production by allowing it to recover its sunk costs. The 
scheme is inherently sensitive to price in the sense that higher prices will 
allow payout to be achieved earlier and move the government into a 
profit sharing position. Low prices will defer both payout and the gov-
ernment’s net profits interest. 
6.5 Greenland 
Currently there is no oil and gas production in Greenland or on the 
Greenlandic shelf and only a small number of wells have been drilled to 
evaluate the resource potential. The Mineral Resources Act (MRA) of 
Greenland establishes the basic framework by which the industry can 
acquire both oil and gas and mining rights. The current Act came into 
force January 1, 2010 replacing the former Act of 1998. This section 
looks first at the former Act and then considers the current Act. 
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Both versions of the MRA establish parallel schemes for oil and gas 
and mining. The former Act contemplates two main forms of tenure: a 
prospecting licence (which is a non-exclusive licence to conduct prelimi-
nary exploration such as seismic), an exclusive exploration licence and an 
exploitation licence (these may be combined; current practice is to issue 
the exploration licence and then allow the licensee to convert to an ex-
ploitation licence on the terms stipulated in the licence). Section 8(2) 
provides that any exclusive licence may provide that a state oil company 
shall be entitled to participate in the licence “on terms to be defined.” 
Section 3 of the former Act contemplated that the governments of both 
Denmark and Greenland must agree before granting prospecting licences 
or exclusive licences. There are currently some 20 or so prospecting li-
cences in force and some 13 exclusive exploration and exploitation li-
cences still in force. 
Greenland offers exclusive exploration licences to industry through 
one of two means: (1) a series of regularly scheduled licensing rounds 
(2002, 2004 2006, and 2010), and (2) a so called open door procedure. 
The most recent licensing rounds took place in the Baffin Bay Area and 
the Greenland Sea Area (Northeast Greenland) (see Letter 2009). The 
next few paragraphs discuss the Baffin Bay licensing round.  
Fourteen blocks are included in the licensing round varying in size be-
tween 8,000 and 15,000 square kms. The bidding documents propose a two 
stage process. The first stage is the pre-qualification of a party who wishes to 
be the project operator.11 The aim of pre-qualification is to establish that the 
operator will be able to carry out activities in accordance with good interna-
tional practice in similar conditions, and that the overall group will have the 
necessary financial capability to carry out exploration and exploitation activi-
ties in the proposed block(s). Finally, pre-qualification will also establish that 
the health, safety and environmental (HSE) procedures of the applicant are in 
line with internationally recognised standards, (see: Baffin Bay, Greenlandic 
Sea Bidding Documents)12 Accordingly, prospective operators must submit 
information designed to respond to the above matters including previous 
experience in operating in similar physical conditions. 
The second stage is the actual bidding round with bids due May 1, 
2010. Bids from company groups must include an approved operator. At 
this time bids for specific blocks will be evaluated principally on the ap-
plicant’s technical capability, its financial capability and the manner in 
                                                     
11 This was perhaps an unusual prospecting licence. The current version of the “standard terms 
for prospecting licences” for hydrocarbons (March 2009) does not provide for either preferential 
bidding rights or any participation by NUNAOIL. 
12 Oil and gas companies frequently put together joint ventures as part of bidding for or acquiring 
oil and gas interests. They will typically hold these licences as co-owners with one of them appointed 
as the operator of the block. That party will be responsible for the actual conduct of operations under 
the terms of an operating agreement. The co-owners will ordinarily contribute to drilling and other 
operating costs on the basis of their co-ownership position and be entitled to a share of production 
along the same lines. The bidding documents include a link to a model joint operating agreement: 
http://www.bmp.gl/petroleum/licensing_round_2010.html.  
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which it proposes to explore and produce from the proposed blocks and 
in particular its HSE systems and the “quality and scope of the proposed 
work programme.” If two or more applicants are equally ranked on the 
basis of these criteria then the choice will be made on the grounds of “the 
applicant’s willingness and ability to contribute to the Greenland authori-
ties” continued development of a strategic environmental impact assess-
ment,” (see: Bidding Documents at note 12). The decision on a successful 
bidder will be a joint decision of the Danish and Greenland governments 
unless full decision-making competence has been transferred to 
Greenland by that time in which case the decision will be made by the 
Greenland government. 
The bidding documents include a model licence which provides the 
core terms of the legal arrangement between the parties. Licences will be 
granted for a ten year exploration period (with possible extensions) ex-
tended by a 30 year exploitation period (with possible extensions out to 
50 years). The exploration period in turn will be divided into sub-periods 
and movement from one sub-period to the next will be conditional upon 
completion of the work programme (e.g., seismic and drilling wells) for 
that particular sub-period. Furthermore the licensee will have to relin-
quish 30% of the block at the end of the first and second period. But per-
haps the most distinctive part of the licence is the NUNAOIL 12.5% car-
ried interest during the exploration phase of the licence. This interest 
becomes an ordinary working interest during the exploitation phase.13 
The licensee also commits to cooperate with NUNAOIL and to negotiate 
and conclude a separate cooperation agreement with a view to developing 
the “know-how and expertise of NUNAOIL.” NUNAOIL is the state oil 
corporation of Greenland. 
A licensee can move from the shorter term exploration licence to an 
exploitation licence if it makes a discovery and develops and files an 
appraisal programme and a feasibility study with the Bureau of Minerals 
and Petroleum. These studies should establish that the discovery is com-
mercially exploitable and that the licensee intends to exploit the deposit. 
The licensee is entitled to an exploitation licence that comprises (clause 
8.05) “the area in which commercially exploitable deposits have been 
demonstrated and delineated” based on seismic and drilling data. Once 
the exploitation licence has been issued the licensee must submit a devel-
opment plan accompanied by both an EIA plan and an abandonment plan. 
The licence provides for a three tier royalty scheme based on net pro-
duction (i.e., sales of production minus eligible investment and operating 
costs as from the time that the licensee requests an extension of the li-
cence for the purpose of exploitation). Where eligible costs exceed reve-
                                                     
13 In a carried interest situation the 12.5% of the costs and expenses that would normally be paid 
for by NUNAOIL are paid for by the other parties to the licence. Once NUNAOIL converts from a 
carried to a working interest it must pay its 12.5% share of costs and expenses. 
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nue no royalty is payable and costs can be carried forward from one year 
to the next.  
The open door procedure is not that much different from the regular 
rounds. The current example is provided by a new “Invitation to apply” 
issued in January 2010 under the terms of the new Act and inviting appli-
cations (on a continuing basis) for the offshore area in southwest 
Greenland and the Jameson Land area on the central east coast (Invitation 
2010). Licences will be granted for up to a ten year exploration period 
with licences divided into sub-periods with associated work obligation 
and relinquishment commitments. Pre-qualification and selection criteria 
and the criteria for choosing between competing applications are essen-
tially the same as for the regular licensing rounds. 
The new Mineral Resources Act of Greenland entered into force on 
January 1, 2010. Henceforward, all decisions in relation to both oil and 
gas and minerals will be made by the Greenland government alone rather 
than in conjunction with the Danish government. The transitional provi-
sion in the new Act provides that existing licences “remain valid” but 
“will be regulated” under the terms of the new Act. Similarly, existing 
procedures and standard licence terms that were in effect on January 1 
will continue to apply until changed pursuant to the new Act. This latter 
is presumably a reference to the current bidding round that is underway 
and seems to suggest that the existing rules will apply and will not be 
changed midstream. 
The new Act is much longer and more detailed than the old Act (98 sec-
tions instead of 34) and contains some new content. This includes a new 
Part on environmental protection which has discrete sections dealing with: 
environmental protection and the use of the best available technologies, 
climate protection, environmental liability (no fault and for a broad range 
of environmental damages including “pollution of or other negative im-
pact” on climate and nature) environmental impact assessment (no licence 
for the exploitation of hydrocarbons to be issued before an EIA com-
pleted), and social sustainability assessment (the responsibility of parlia-
ment to decide whether such an assessment should be required). While in 
some cases these new parts build on discrete sections of the old Act (e.g., 
s.31 of the old Act dealing with liability) and draw upon the content of the 
standard form licences (especially in relation to the criteria for choosing 
between competing applications) there is much new material here. 
That said the core elements of the regime remain the same. Thus the 
main forms of tenure continue: a non-exclusive prospecting licence and 
an exclusive exploration licence that can be converted to an exploitation 
licence and the maximum duration for this interest (50 years in total and 
no more than 16 years for an exploration interest). The provisions allow-
ing for state participation also continue (s.17(2)). But the Act adds a new 
form of tenure in the form of a subsoil licence (ss.39– 41) which can be 
issued for storage purposes or “purposes relating to prospecting, explora-
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tion or exploitation of a resource.” This form of tenure would clearly 
accommodate a natural gas storage project but might also accommodate a 
carbon capture and storage project. 
As the length of the new Act might suggest, it goes into considerably 
greater detail on a number of matters, for example in relation to the bid-
ding criteria for choosing the successful applicant and in describing the 
open-door procedure (s.23). The Act explicitly states that an applicant’s 
performance under previous licences in Greenland will be a relevant cri-
terion (s.24(5)) in selecting the successful bidder and the government 
reserves the right to appoint the operator for a successful bidding group. 
The Act also includes quite an unusual provision to the effect that an 
applicant for a licence must have and maintain a debt equity ratio no 
lower than 2:1; failing which it will be in breach of the Act. 
This new regime will undoubtedly be carefully scrutinised by existing 
and prospective operators who will be looking to see if it has expanded 
the discretionary powers of the government or made the terms and condi-
tions for operating in this frontier environment more onerous. Interna-
tional oil companies will perhaps take some comfort from the fact that the 
government (s.90) still appears to be open to using arbitration in order to 
settle disputes. This may be particularly important to an investor since 
Danish investment treaties were generally only concluded with develop-
ing countries and economies in transition and in many if not all cases they 
did not extend to Greenland. 
 
Questions regarding oil and gas regimes 
What are the principal differences between the CPRA regime and the Greenland 
regime? Is one regime more “investor friendly” than the other?  
How do the regimes described here compare with Norway’s offshore oil and 
gas regime as laid out in the Petroleum Activities Act http://www.npd.no/en/ 
Regulations/Acts/Petroleum-activities-act/ or Iceland’s regime http://www.os.is/ 
Apps/WebObjects/Orkustofnun.woa/1/swdocument/33715/kolvetnisl%C3%B6g. 
pdf?wosid=false ?  
You are the legal advisor to Arctic Resources Co (Arco) incorporated in the 
UK. Arco holds an exclusive exploration/exploitation licence granted under the 
terms of the old Greenland MRA. Arco wishes to know how the new Act will ap-
ply to its rights and entitlements under its licence. 
What are the implications of the EU’s Hydrocarbons Directive 94/22/EC for 
member states (and for states party to the EEA (European Economic Area) 
agreement (Iceland and Norway)) in the design of oil and gas leasing legislation? 
 
6.6 Mining Regimes 
This section discusses the mineral regimes for Nunavut, the N.W.T. and 
for Sweden. Sweden is taken to be reasonably representative of the min-
 Polar Law Textbook  115
ing regimes in operation in Norway and Finland. The questions devel-
oped above and applied in the context of oil and gas regimes are also 
relevant here. In addition, mining companies are also interested in the 
answer to at least two other questions. The first is the question of what 
land is open to mineral prospecting and ultimately to mining. The second 
relates to the ability of the miner to hold on to the property through the 
cyclical pricing of mineral commodities on world markets. In particular, 
the miner will want to know if the mine is able to maintain its tenure even 
if it is unable to produce at certain price points in the cycle. 
6.6.1 Mining Regulations in Nunavut and the N.W.T. 
There is significant exploration for and production of minerals in these 
two northern territories (see Bankes 2008). Most of this development 
occurs on government owned mineral lands but some occurs on lands 
where the mineral title is owned by indigenous peoples under the terms of 
a modern land claim agreement. The Northwest Territories and Nunavut 
Mining Regulations, (formerly known as the Canada Mining Regulations) 
apply to federally owned mineral rights in the Northwest Territories and 
Nunavut.14 They do not apply to mineral lands that are owned by persons 
other than the state such as aboriginal organisations (pursuant to the terms 
of a land claim agreement (see discussion below)). The Regulations apply 
to all hard rock minerals including precious and base metals, rare metals, 
uranium and diamonds. They do not apply to quarrying materials, coal or 
petroleum and natural gas which are covered by a separate disposition 
system based on regulations (see: Territorial Coal Regulations; Territorial 
Quarrying Regulations) or statute (see the CPRA discussed above). 
The Regulations continue what is generally known as a free entry sys-
tem.15 The Regulations provide that in order to engage in prospecting and 
mining activities a person must have “a licence to prospect” (s.8). Li-
cences are available for a nominal fee to individuals and to companies 
registered to do business in the Territories (s.7). The Regulations provide 
for two main forms of tenure, the mineral claim and the lease of a mineral 
claim. The mineral claim is a form of exploration tenure and is acquired 
through the process of physical staking of lands and subsequent recording 
of the claim in the mining recorder’s office (ss.13 et seq). Claims may be 
staked on any lands in the Territories (the mineral title to which is vested 
                                                     
14 For a good discussion of the previous version of the regulations see Barry Barton, “The Future 
of the Free Entry System for Mining in Canada’s North” in M.M. Ross and J.O. Saunders (eds.), 
Disposition of Natural Resources: Options and Issues for Northern Lands, (Calgary: Canadian Insti-
tute of Resources Law, 1997), 81–113. 
15 Barton, at 85 suggests that a free entry system has three main characteristics: (1) the right of 
entry on lands containing Crown minerals, (2) the right to acquire a claim, and (3) the right to a lease 
and subsequent production. I have offered a critique of mineral free entry systems in Nigel Bankes 
and Cheryl Sharvit, Aboriginal Title and Free Entry Mining Regimes in Northern Canada, Northern 
Minerals Program, Working Paper No. 2, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, 1998 and Bankes, 
“The Case for the Abolition of Free Entry Mining Regimes” (2004), 24(2) J. Land, Resources, & 
Envtl. Law, 317–322. 
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in the state) except those lands that have been specifically withdrawn.16 A 
claim is valid for a maximum of 10 years and is maintained in force by 
completing and recording representation work (i.e., work designed to 
prove up the claim ss. 38 et seq). After 10 years the claim holder must 
proceed to lease (ss.45 & 58) and the lease therefore serves as both a 
form of retention tenure and a production tenure. Leases are granted for a 
21 year term subject to renewal (s. 59). In addition to these two forms of 
tenure there is an ancillary form of right known as a permit to prospect 
(ss.29 et seq). Granted for a three year period, and subject to minimum 
expenditure requirements, the permit to prospect offers the permittee the 
exclusive right to stake and record claims during the period of the permit. 
The permit meets the needs of the large well-funded exploration company 
that is interested in engaging in regional level reconnaissance work. 
The Regulations offer considerable security of tenure insofar as the 
registered owner of a claim who is in compliance with the terms of the 
Regulations has the right to move to a lease with the right to produce the 
leased minerals, but this is subject to the proposal complying with all 
applicable environmental, land-use and water regulations. In practice, 
exploration operations require land use permits under the terms of the 
Territorial Land Use Regulations and a proposed mining operation will 
trigger the need for an environmental assessment and likely some form of 
water licence and surface leases for the physical facilities associated with 
the mine. In sum, there is no absolute right to produce. The Regulations 
provide for a net profits royalty on a sliding scale starting at 5% and ris-
ing to 14% on any net value in excess of $45 million. 
6.7 Sweden 
The rules governing the acquisition of mining rights in Sweden are found 
in the Minerals Act of 1991 and the Minerals Ordinance. The Act applies 
to a broad range of minerals, the concession minerals, (these are the tradi-
tional hard rock minerals, rare metal, alum, shale and clay, coal but also 
oil and gas) and it applies to concession minerals “situated on a person’s 
own land or on land belonging to another person.” In other words the 
Swedish legislation, as with the mining laws of Norway and Finland, 
provides a mechanism whereby a mining operator can obtain access to 
and exploit concession minerals even where they may form part of a pri-
vate estate. Access is provided because of the public interest in allowing 
the development of those resources. 
In the absence of the consent of the owner, access to concession min-
erals is obtained by means of an exploration permit and a concession. An 
                                                     
16 Lands may be withdrawn on a case by case basis by Order in Council but s.11 of the Regulations 
also contains some generic withdrawals including lands that are used as a cemetery but also (and very 
recently, as of 2008) “lands that are subject to a prohibition on prospecting or staking a claim under a 
land use plan that has been approved under federal legislation or under a land claim agreement.” 
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application for an exploration permit is made to the Chief Mining Inspec-
tor for a particular area and for particular concession minerals. The Min-
erals Ordinance (s.1) requires an applicant for a permit to identify the 
concession minerals to which application pertains. The applicant must 
also provide particulars as to all private owners who may be affected. A 
permit (Act s.2.2) “shall be granted if there is reason to assume that ex-
ploration of the area could lead to the discovery of a concession mineral.” 
A permit is granted for three years (Act, s.2.5) but may be extended for a 
further three year period if the permittee has carried out appropriate ex-
ploration work or has acceptable reasons for not doing so. The permit 
may be extended even further if “special” or “extraordinary” reasons 
exist (Act, s.2.7). Conditions may be attached to permits to protect the 
public interest and the permittee will need to provide security for any 
compensation payments to third parties (e.g., land owners) that may be 
payable. Exploration work should be carried out in accordance with a 
plan of operations filed with the owner of the land, with the Chief Mining 
Inspector and any persons whose reindeer grazing rights may be affected 
(Act, s.3.4). Parties may object to the proposed plan of operations in 
which case the matter falls to be determined by the Chief Mining Inspec-
tor. Operations shall be carried out in such a way as to cause the least 
possible damage to the environment and as to the property interests of 
others (Act s. 3.3) and may not be carried out in particular areas including 
certain protected areas. 
A mineral property cannot be exploited without a mineral concession 
and an application for a concession must be accompanied by an EIA pre-
pared in accordance with the Environmental Code. A concession must not 
be contrary to the terms of a detailed development plan or area regulation 
(Act s.4.2). In the event that there are competing applications for a con-
cession, preference will be given to an applicant holding an exploration 
permit, or, failing that, to a person who has carried out exploration work 
within the area in question (Act s.4.3). A concession is granted for a 25 
year term and may be extended for a ten year term if production is occur-
ring. If there is no production the concession may only be extended if the 
concession holder can show that preparatory work to engage in exploita-
tion is underway or if there is a significant exploration or metallurgical 
programme underway. 
The general rule is that the concession holder will be responsible for 
compensating all affected parties for any damages that they suffer as a 
result of exploitation activities and the holder may be required to expro-
priate the lands of owners who may be affected through a process of des-
ignating lands (Act, chapters 7, 9 and 10). In addition, and as a result of 
amendments introduced in 2005, a concession holder is now obliged to 
pay mineral compensation but at the rather low level of 0.2% of the gross 
value of production. Of that 0.2%, three quarters accrues to property 
owners within the concession area and one quarter accrues to the state 
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(Act, s.7.7). Mining operations are subject to the general corporate tax 
regime but there are no special mining taxes (see: GS of Sweden, Guide 
to Mineral Legislation and Regulations in Sweden, 2006:7). 
Both mineral exploration and exploitation activities are subject to the 
terms of the Environmental Code17 and while a permit is not normally 
required for exploration activities, oil and gas and mining exploitation 
activities are defined as “environmentally hazardous activities” and will 
therefore require a permit from the Environmental Court. A separate 
permit will be required for any water-related operations associated with 
the mining activity. 
 
Questions about the structure of mineral regimes 
What are some of the main differences between the minerals regime for Nunavut 
and the Northwest Territories and the regime applicable in Sweden? 
Are there significant differences between the minerals regime in Sweden and 
those in Norway, Finland and Greenland? 
The disposition rules seem to be quite different for oil and natural gas and for 
minerals. Why is this? But note that the Swedish system seems to apply to both 
minerals and oil and gas; why is this? Is it simply because the potential for hydro-
carbon discoveries onshore in Sweden is considered to be low? Would the regime 
work in relation to oil and gas? 
 
6.7.1 What happens where the resource is owned by a non – state party 
such as an indigenous people? 
Some Arctic states (e.g., Canada and the United States) recognise that 
indigenous people may have title to oil and gas and minerals. In both 
states this recognition has come about through the terms of modern land 
claim agreements (Canada) or legislation (in the U.S., ANCSA). In such a 
case the relevant indigenous owner will be able to decide how (if at all) 
the mineral resources are to be developed. While an aboriginal owner 
would be free to develop those resources the financial risk associated 
with such a venture makes this impractical. As a result indigenous owners 
have entered into a variety of leasing and joint venture arrangements 
which may be designed both to provide a fair economic return to the in-
digenous owners but also economic opportunities to participate in various 
ways (e.g., equity participation, carried interests, supply and services 
contracting opportunities etc).  
This section discusses the experience of the Inuvialuit. As part of the 
IFA the Inuvialuit were confirmed as owners of some 5 000 square miles 
of mineral lands including oil and gas rights. The Inuvialuit have devel-
                                                     
17 Sweden, Environmental Code and Gabriel Michanek, “The Law on Mining and Environmental 
Protection in Sweden. Any lessons for Finland?” in Koivurova and Stepien (eds.), 161–173. This 
paragraph relies heavily on Michanek. 
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oped a set of rules and procedures and standard forms for the different 
types of commercial interests that developers might require on Inuvialuit 
lands and have adopted a negotiated concession model for their oil and 
gas lands. Using that model the Inuvialuit have negotiated concession 
agreements with Imperial (the Tuktoyaktuk concession, October 1, 1986, 
amended October 1, 1993), with Shell (January 1992) and then in 2000 
with Chevron (two parcels), and Petro Canada and one other company 
(2000). While the details of these arrangements are not publicly available 
it is possible to give some idea of their terms based in part on publicly 
available bidding documents that include a model agreement. 
The older agreements provide for signing bonuses (for example, $1 
million in the case of the Imperial and Shell agreements), rental fees 
($100,000 per year for Shell and Imperial), a three tier royalty (a basic 
royalty of 5%, an additional royalty of 5% after first payout (i.e., first 
payout refers to recovery of all development and operating costs; second 
payout occurs after recovery of all exploration development and operat-
ing costs plus a return allowance), and, after second payout, an additional 
royalty that is the greater of the additional 5% royalty or a 25% NPI (net 
profits interest). Other bonuses include: a carried interest creating an op-
tion to participate (the Inuvialuit interest is financed by the lessee with 
the lessee recovering the loan from production), commitment wells (in 
default of drilling a significant penalty is payable), and rigorous relin-
quishment bonuses (for example in the case of the Shell concession, the 
company was obliged to relinquish 50% of the lands by the tenth anniver-
sary date and a further 30% of the original area by the 20th anniversary). 
The basic concession term was 30 years with renewal options for further 
10 year periods. 
Some of the features of the 2000 round included: the use of a cash bo-
nus bidding system based upon a prescribed work programme (the Inuvi-
aluit received a total of $75.5 million for the four parcels); a gross royalty 
system prescribing 5% for the first 4 years of production, 10% for years 5 
– 8, and 15% thereafter; work commitments on each parcel and an Inuvi-
aluit back-in interest. Interestingly, under the bidding documents the Inu-
vialuit may acquire a 25% working interest in each block upon the decla-
ration of a discovery with the Inuvialuit being responsible for their share 
of development and production costs accruing from the discovery date. 
The exploration phase of the agreements is divided into an initial ten 
year term with two five year extensions. Relinquishments continue to be 
required at the end of the initial term and each extension with the ability 
to retain proven acreage. Continuance beyond the initial term and exten-
sions depends upon commercial production or deemed production. Elec-
tion to proceed to a renewal term during the exploration phase constitutes 
a commitment to carry out the work or pay penalties in default. Given the 
need to secure a transportation system to get any discoveries to market, 
the agreements negotiated in 2000 condition continuance beyond the 
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exploration phases on actual production commencing within a number of 
years of the development of a transportation infrastructure for that par-
ticular product (i.e., oil or gas). The lessee’s operations are subject to 
Inuvialuit Land Administration (ILA) rules including amendments to 
those rules saving only some of the core rights of the lessee. 
 
Questions regarding resource operations on resource lands owned by indige-
nous people 
How do the arrangements described here compare with the government oil and 
gas leasing sections described previously? In negotiating these arrangements are 
the Inuvialuit acting as owners or as the government? Is there a difference? 
Nunavut Tunngavik Inc http://www.tunngavik.com/, the land claim organisa-
tion for the Inuit of Nunavut, has encouraged mining operations on Inuit owned 
mining lands. How do its mining policies compare with the leasing policies dis-
cussed above? 
 
6.8 The Oil and Gas and Mining Industry and the 
Environment 
The discussion to this point has focused on the question of how the oil 
and gas and mineral industries acquire rights to explore for and produce 
those resources. But that is clearly only part of the relevant law that gov-
erns these two industries. Resource companies are also interested in the 
overall fiscal and investment regime of the jurisdiction including the 
overall tax regime and both the investor and the public will be interested 
in the environmental regime that applies to these projects.  
Both industries pose environmental risks. In the case of the oil and gas 
industry the risks include the noise effects of seismic and drilling opera-
tions on marine mammals; disposal of drilling and other oilfield waste; 
the risk of blowouts and subsequent hydrocarbon contamination; hydro-
carbon contamination from leaks and seeps during production and from 
pipelines and associated facilities; disposal of produced water; gas emis-
sions during production and as part of processing; and habitat fragmenta-
tion as a result of seismic lines and access roads. In the case of the mining 
industry the environmental risks include those arising from acid mine 
drainage (where background rocks contain sulphides); tailings ponds and 
their potential breach; sedimentation as a result of milling and other dis-
turbance activities; chemicals used in mineral processing activities such 
as cyanide used in leaching; groundwater effects as a result of contamina-
tion or pumping to lower groundwater levels; fugitive dust emissions 
from mining activities; and reclamation activities. Uranium mining poses 
distinctive challenges because of the risks of radioactive contamination. 
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The infrastructure needs of both industries also pose environmental 
concerns especially where, as will often be the case in the Arctic, new 
projects will require new infrastructure. This will often take the form of 
large linear projects such as pipelines and roads, either winter roads in the 
form of ice roads or all season gravel roads. Where resource projects are 
close to tidewater, port developments and the risks of shipping in ice 
covered waters also pose environmental risks. 
It is therefore inevitable and appropriate that oil and gas and mining 
projects will be subject to significant scrutiny under generally applicable 
environmental legislation including environmental assessment legislation, 
water and air permitting rules for emissions, protected area legislation 
such as national parks legislation and Natura 2000 and reclamation and 
abandonment legislation. Furthermore, multiple projects in a similar area 
may require the management of cumulative effects and prompt regulators 
to establish appropriate thresholds to maintain biological diversity and 
healthy aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems. In most cases the relevant 
rules will not be Arctic specific but there have been some efforts to de-
velop Arctic specific rules. One example is the Arctic Council’s Arctic 
Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, 2009 developed by PAME the working 
group on the Protection of the Marine Environment. 
Much of this is beyond the scope of this paper but it is worth reflect-
ing on how different jurisdictions deal with the decision to open up new 
areas to resource activities. In general there is a significant distinction 
between oil and gas and mining activities. In the case of mining it almost 
seems to be a given that lands are always open for mining activities. This 
does not mean that government will always allow mining properties to go 
from exploration to production but typically governments do not open up 
new areas for mining; instead the lands are “open” and the acquisition of 
exploration rights is driven by the industry itself.  
In contrast to this, in the oil and gas area, government exercises much 
more control and generally decides when to put lands up for bidding. This 
provides the opportunity to identify regional scale environmental and 
social concerns before exploration commences and perhaps also the time 
to develop an integrated management plan. In some cases these issues 
may turn out to be so significant that a decision can be made not to open 
up the area for exploration at all. Not all jurisdictions however make the 
most of this opportunity.  
The United States has very formal rules for preparing an environ-
mental impact statement prior to any new leasing on the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf and Norway requires what is effectively a strategic environ-
mental assessment prior to a new bidding round. In one case the outcome 
of this process was to close areas round the Lofoten Islands, Bear Island 
and the Nordland area along the coast south west of Tromsø to oil and 
gas activities. Exploration continues in the south Barents Sea in part to 
provide economic and resource support for existing developments 
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(Snohvit and Galiat) that were originally discovered in an era before a 
more rigorous approach was adopted in relation to the pre-bid assessment 
of environmental risks. By contrast and as noted previously Canada’s 
approach is less systematic (for a discussion of different approaches see 
Annex D of the Arctic Offshore Oil and Gas Guidelines, 2009).  
 
Questions with respect to environmental issues 
How do different Arctic jurisdictions deal with the environmental effects of re-
source projects and the infrastructure requirements of such projects? 
How do national or sub-national environmental laws apply to oil and gas and 
mining operations in the different Arctic jurisdictions. 
 
6.9 Conclusions 
The Arctic area is richly endowed with oil and gas and mineral resources. 
These resources are becoming increasingly integrated into global trade 
but in many cases they remain isolated by ice and the lack of adequate 
infrastructure. We can however expect this to change over the coming 
decades with the warming Arctic, the loss of sea ice and additional in-
vestment in land-based and maritime infrastructure.  
While the Arctic may well be richly endowed with natural resources it 
is also under-explored in comparison with other parts of the world. In this 
context it is significant that two Arctic states Greenland and Iceland are 
now aggressively trying to identify oil and gas reserves within their juris-
dictions. It would be surprising if some of this exploration did not yield 
new discoveries which in turn will raise questions as to how to bring 
these discoveries safely to market. 
Increased resource development activity in the Arctic has the potential 
to increase conflict between indigenous peoples and both the state and the 
resource industry. This is particularly evident where the state has not 
settled aboriginal title claims or otherwise identified, delimited and titled 
indigenous lands. This has not been a focus of the present chapter but the 
issue is one that raises questions of both domestic law and international 
law (Bankes: 2009). 
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/mining/index.html.  
Finland: Geological Survey of Finland, 
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Norway: the Directorate of Mining, http:// 
www.bergvesenet.no/eng_index.php. 
Sweden: Geological Survey, http://www. 
sgu.se/sgu/eng/index.html. 
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Northwest Territories and Nunavut Min-
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sgu.se/dokument/service_sgu_publ/SGU
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http://www.gov.yk.ca/legislation/acts/q
umi.pdf.  
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ainc-inac.gc.ca/nth/og/index-eng.asp.  
Yukon, Energy, Mines and Resources, 
http://www.emr.gov.yk.ca/oilandgas/.  
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http://www.bmp.gl/administration/admini
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Iceland, Ministry of Industry, Energy and 
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Authority, http://www.nea.is/.  
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rate, http://www.npd.no/en/.  
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C-8.5.pdf. 
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gov.yk.ca/legislation/acts/oiga.pdf.  
Greenland, Mineral Resources Act (the 
former Act), http://www.bmp.gl/ 
administration/EB1_20ba_10nn_ 
Mineral-Resources-Act-sec.pdf.  
Iceland, An Act on Prospecting, Explora-
tion and Porduction of Hydrocarbons, 
2001 (as amended) 
http://www.os.is/Apps/WebObjects/Ork
ustof-
nun.woa/1/wa/dp?id=11943&wosid=Cy
JlR7PG9aaDPYb0TavGqg. 
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European Union, Directive 94/22/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 30 May 1994 on the 
conditions for granting and using 
authorizations for the prospection, 
exploration and production of 
hydrocarbons, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX
:31994L0022:EN:HTML.  
 
Inuvialuit 
Inuvialuit Land Administration, 
http://www.inuvialuitland.com/. 
 
7. Arctic Governance 
 
Natalia Loukacheva 
7.1 Introduction 
The term “Arctic Governance” has been used in political and interna-
tional relations discourse for some time though no precise legal definition 
of this term currently exists. As such, “Arctic Governance” is per se not a 
legal term or concept. Broadly speaking, “governance” can be understood 
as a process in which political power is exercised by different players 
with due consideration to the principles of legitimacy, accountability and 
transparency. The World Bank has outlined the concept of “good govern-
ance,” which is further addressed by growing scholarship on this subject. 
This scholarship suggests that adherence by modern governments and 
other actors to the principles of human rights, the rule of law and democ-
racy are crucial for the implementation of good governance practices.1 
These principles are relevant to the Arctic settings of governmental prac-
tices. Further, in the existing discourse, the term “governance” is often 
used in relation to, or interchangeably with, the term “government.” The 
question thus arises, are we dealing with “governance” in the Arctic, gov-
ernment(s), or both?  
There is no universally recognized definition of “Arctic Governance.” 
This developing and evolving concept has been given multiple interpreta-
tions by the various stakeholders interested in the subject. The legal dis-
course often links the concept of “governance” to the right to autonomy 
that is housed in the concept of self-determination. A number of elements 
pre-determined by the existing legal and political frameworks, socio-
economic and environmental predicaments and the activities of the vari-
ous actors involved in Northern matters help shape Arctic governance. 
This chapter is limited to a general discussion on the approaches to 
and challenges of the current Arctic governance framework. It looks at 
how different Arctic jurisdictions tackle the various issues associated 
with the implementation or application of the right to autonomy/self-
government or public governance arrangements drawing conclusions on 
the challenges of governance in the North. 
                                                     
1 On this subject see, for example, Hans Otto Sano and Gudmundur Alfredsson eds. With the 
collaboration of Robin Clapp. Human Rights and Good Governance: Building Bridges. The Raoul 
Wallenberg Institute Human Rights Library Vol. 9, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/ 
London/New York, 2002. 
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7.2 The Arctic Governance Framework  
The increasing importance of the Arctic in global affairs particularly in 
respect of environmental change; its shifting geo-political and strategic 
significance; varying internal and external policies regarding the region; 
and the growing number of actors desiring meaningful power in decision-
making processes affecting the circumpolar north; as well as access to, 
and influence over the re-distribution of, resources have each prompted 
further inquiries into the nature and the scope of governance in the Arctic.  
The various approaches used in the definition of “Arctic governance” 
each seek to determine the framework for governance in the Arctic but 
generally take into consideration the following: 
 
 The status and future of Arctic cooperation – as an important factor in 
the development of Arctic governance; 
 The role of existing and potential institutional complexes in 
addressing pan-Arctic and trans-national issues affecting both the 
region and the globe more generally; 
 The scope, interests and capacities of the actors involved in the 
coordination of the various agendas concerning the Arctic and the 
ability to meet the current and future challenges of Arctic governance; 
 The adequacy of existing legal and political (formal and informal) 
arrangements relevant to issues of Arctic governance, etc.  
 
The Arctic governance framework is complex. Many discrete factors 
influence its development which often requires innovative responses and 
approaches to governance. Such factors include: 
The emergence of the Arctic as a distinct region with increasing col-
laboration among the eight Arctic states, other states and non-governmental 
actors to enhance “Northern” values and interests within the circumpolar 
north and, indeed, globally; 
Geopolitical, social, economic, cultural, demographic, environmental, 
political and legal changes continuously re-shaping existing local, sub-
national and trans-regional governance systems, the scope of their juris-
dictional capacities, and Arctic governance arrangements; 
The particularities of the Arctic with respect to climate, geography, 
remoteness, underdeveloped infrastructure, low population density and 
expensive means of communication; 
Challenges faced in respect of social ills, unemployment, inadequate 
housing, limited economic development and high dependency on external 
transfers and welfare in many parts of the region;  
Shortcomings of human, economic and political capacity building in 
many Northern areas and aspirations on behalf of Northerners for greater 
partnerships, dialogue and a greater say in the dialogue with national and 
global communities;  
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The impact of globalization and global pressures (e.g., in respect of 
global warming and climate change) on the development of the region, 
the livelihoods of Northerners and indigenous residents, and on the gov-
ernance complex in the Arctic; 
Emerging environmental concerns and hazards in and beyond the re-
gion and the complex linkages between the fragile Arctic eco-biological 
and global systems (e.g., the ramifications of global environmental 
changes to the region, such as those in relation to Persistent Organic Pol-
lutants, or the impact of Arctic haze, etc.), that pose new demands on 
Northern governance frameworks;  
Existing and emerging legal and political disagreements regarding 
“sovereignty;” access to resources, and other claims and interests in the 
region expressed by several Arctic and non-Arctic stakeholders in an 
attempt to advance their role and influence in decision-making terms and 
in respect of the ongoing re-distribution of power. 
7.3 Arctic Cooperation, Institutional Complex and Actors  
The challenges facing the North transcend local, national or regional 
boundaries and thus require “sustainable” trans-national collaboration. The 
nature of this collaboration has undoubtedly however been “thickened” by 
the ongoing evolution of the institutional structures that have emerged over 
the last twenty years (e.g., the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council, the Northern Forum, etc.). This institutional complex has been 
further strengthened by multilateral cooperation arrangements and exten-
sive diplomacy between many Arctic and non-Arctic actors.  
The new institutional governance complex that has emerged in the 
Arctic during this period highlights, among other things, the increasing 
participation of indigenous peoples (e.g., in respect of their status as Per-
manent Participants in the Arctic Council). It also points to the growing 
international involvement of sub-national entities in addressing environ-
mental, cultural, educational, economic, health and other matters that do 
not breach traditional areas of jurisdiction claimed by states or interna-
tional organizations. The many multi-level governance participants in-
volved in issues of Arctic governance express their agendas within the 
context of different forms of collaboration and institutional structures in 
and beyond the Arctic rim. These activities indicate that the multilateral 
collaboration of well-organized actors, as opposed to unilateral action, is 
often beneficial in respect of enhancing Arctic diplomacy. Moreover, the 
giving of due consideration to the interests of Northerners, indigenous 
cultures and sub-national collectivities is of the utmost importance in the 
implementation of Arctic governance arrangements and initiatives.  
The growing body of scholarship on this subject has produced analy-
ses of the forms and structures of Arctic governance and the individual 
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utility of such arrangements. Furthermore, the initiatives and activities of 
institutions of Arctic ordering and their interaction with institutions of 
global ordering are also well-documented in the materials issued by the 
organizations involved. Interests that are specific to the Arctic materialize 
in various forms of cooperation. As Oran Young put it, those interests 
indicate, for example, international issues (such as, security, environ-
mental concerns and protection; sustainable communities); intergovern-
mental matters – that reflect on relations and the allocation of authority 
among central and all kinds of sub-national units of government; and 
inter-sectoral issues – e.g., the conflicting interests of many regional 
players.2 In a nutshell, the various forms of Arctic collaboration can be 
classified in the following ways though this list is not in itself exhaustive: 
Globally – Arctic actors are involved in cooperation via the United 
Nations (e.g., the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues); the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) e.g., Greenland; 
Regionally-European cooperation (e.g., the EU’s stance on Arctic pol-
icy and special relations with Arctic areas); Arctic cooperation (e.g., via 
the Arctic Council); Nordic cooperation (e.g., via the Nordic Council and 
the Nordic Council of Ministers); North Atlantic cooperation (e.g., 
Greenland and Iceland); cross-border cooperation among Arctic regions 
(e.g., Chukotka and Alaska; Nunavut and Greenland);  
Functionally – supranational cooperation (e.g., EU); inter-parliamentary 
cooperation (e.g., summits of parliamentarians of the Arctic region) inter-
governmental cooperation (e.g., the Nordic Council of Ministers); non-
governmental cooperation (e.g., the International Arctic Science Committee); 
indigenous cooperation – indigenous internationalism (e.g., the Inuit Cir-
cumpolar Council; the Saami Council, etc.);  
Sectoral – cooperation in defence and security matters (e.g., Arctic 
military environmental cooperation); cultural, linguistic and educational 
cooperation (e.g., University of the Arctic); fisheries, hunting and whal-
ing cooperation – (e.g., the North Atlantic Marine Mammals Commis-
sion, the International Whaling Commission); international trade coop-
eration with relevance to the Arctic – (e.g. NAFTA); environmental co-
operation – (e.g., via the Arctic Council); scientific cooperation (e.g., the 
International Arctic Science Committee), etc. 
Despite growing and often successful collaboration, innovation in 
governance arrangements, and the increasing strength of various regional 
networks in the Arctic and multilateral regimes, the institutional complex 
in the rim of Arctic governance is still characterized as nascent and re-
mains marked by fragmentation. The policies and interests of a number of 
actors attempting to bring their voices to bear on how circumpolar issues 
should unfold undoubtedly shape this complex. However, the growing 
number of multi-layered initiatives undertaken by those actors at gov-
                                                     
2 Oran R. Young, The Arctic Council: Making a New Era in International Relations. A Twentieth 
Century Fund Report, 1996:1–81, 35–49. 
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ernmental and non-governmental, inter-governmental, sub-national, sub-
regional and supra-national level within and beyond the circumpolar area, 
challenge the efficacy of this institutional complex. Furthermore, the 
shortage of resources or coherence in respect of existing institutions, 
overlapping agendas, as well as competing individual or ambitious politi-
cal groups’ interests, present challenges to the functionality of Arctic 
governance and the strengthening of the role of the Arctic globally.  
Moreover, the primarily informal nature of many Arctic institutions 
(e.g., their functionality and grounding in different declarations or reports 
–“soft law” approach), defines this institutional complex. Ambiguity 
remains however in categorizing developing Arctic structures in conven-
tional institutional terms. Indeed, the legal capacity of such structures is 
often limited to non-legally binding arrangements and a consultative 
mandate. On the one hand, the current web of soft-law declarations and 
informal arrangements within the institutional collaboration of various 
Northern forums (e.g., the Nordic Council, the Nordic Council of Minis-
ters, the Arctic Council, the University of the Arctic, etc.), indicate that 
these measures often prove to be adequate in meeting existing challenges.  
Despite the limitations of its consultative mandate however, the activi-
ties of NGOs such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council, which represents the 
Inuit of Alaska (USA), four regions in Canada, Chukotka (the Russian 
Federation), and Greenland (Denmark), also point to the efficiency of 
informal strategies in advancing pan-Arctic diplomacy and the rights of 
indigenous peoples. On the other hand, legal frameworks or hard law 
instruments, either existing or currently under development, can be high-
lighted which are relevant to particular issues of governance in the Arctic. 
For example, (the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; the 
Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears; the Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity; the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species; Human Rights instruments, etc.). Indeed, within existing legal 
frameworks, it is possible to identify several such areas. For example, one 
can explore:  
Arctic marine governance which may include the legal regime for Arc-
tic shipping, Arctic fisheries or Arctic living marine resources governance; 
Arctic resource governance embracing Arctic energy governance or Arctic 
wildlife governance; governance of the High Seas; Arctic environmental 
governance; climate governance in the Arctic; sustainable development 
governance in the Arctic; and indigenous governance in the Arctic, etc. 
However, there is ongoing debate over the benefits of soft-law and hard-
law instruments in the region, which currently does not have a legally-
binding Arctic treaty. Scenarios dealing with the pros and cons of such a 
treaty raise questions about the need for a new legal regime in the Arctic; 
the necessity for new or innovative forms of governance in the Arctic and 
the need for a re-evaluation of existing institutional and governance ar-
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rangements. The question of the need for such a treaty, in respect of the 
governance of the Arctic, remains however highly contested.  
Currently, the possibility of such a treaty is unlikely because of the nu-
merous legal, economic and political limitations surrounding this issue and 
continuing disagreement among many interested parties on the necessity, 
possible content and scope of such arrangements. Furthermore, the likeli-
hood that such a treaty would fully address or indeed resolve the challenges 
of Arctic governance or enhance its efficiency is not promising. 
Over time, the tasks, structures and needs of Arctic governance have 
changed as have the form and scope of the regional and transnational 
cooperation efforts which affect the circumpolar north. Generally speak-
ing however a number of measures enhancing Arctic governance have 
been put in place. For example, the Arctic was accorded greater impor-
tance in global affairs, especially in connection with the significance of 
the region as a marker for ongoing global environmental changes. Con-
cerned activists and NGOs, including indigenous actors, have raised the 
level of public awareness in respect of the negative and often destructive 
impacts of Southern and global developments and actions on Arctic eco-
systems, livelihoods and the health of Arctic peoples. Further, under the 
auspices of various Arctic bodies (i.e., the Arctic Council), several com-
prehensive studies and reports have been produced (e.g., the Arctic Hu-
man Development Report (2004); the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment 
(2004); Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report; Arctic Off-
shore oil and gas guidelines (2009), etc. Despite ongoing criticism how-
ever existing institutional structures, particularly the Arctic Council, un-
doubtedly now have a greater prominence in the international and re-
gional discourse on the North. 
Due, however, to the evolving nature of the current Arctic governance 
framework many new issues have emerged onto the agenda. Several con-
crete suggestions have already been made to address these issues. For 
example, in relation to improving the effectiveness of Arctic governance 
in meeting emerging issues one authority suggests the need for, “a tripar-
tite “governance complex” for the Arctic involving distinct efforts to 
stabilize jurisdictional claims and boundaries issues.” An enhanced role 
for the Arctic Council, and better integration of the contribution of a col-
lection of issue-specific regulatory regimes.3 In addressing issues of Arc-
tic governance and the idea of the “Arctic Treaty,” representatives of 
indigenous peoples propose the so-called “co-management model” as 
their contribution to “peaceful international regional governance.” As an 
Inuk leader and former chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council, Mrs. 
Sheila Watt-Cloutier, notes, “[…] recognizing the importance of the Arc-
tic for the whole of the planet, and the historical stewardship of indige-
nous peoples of the Arctic ecosystem, consider an Arctic Treaty that 
                                                     
3 Oran R. Young, Whither the Arctic? Conflict or Cooperation in the Circumpolar North. Polar 
Record 45 (232) 2009:73–82, 77. 
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charges circumpolar indigenous peoples with the stewardship, through 
co-management, of the Arctic for the continued benefit of humankind. 
These proposed international co-management boards, on which the in-
digenous peoples of the Arctic would be guaranteed majority representa-
tion, would integrate traditional and scientific knowledge to ensure sound 
and peaceful management of the Arctic’s natural resources”.4  
Suggestions in respect of meeting the challenges or finding more ef-
fective solutions to governance in the Arctic are numerous. Indeed, we 
can already witness the development of several differing approaches to 
cooperation and governance within the region including multilateral and 
bi-lateral, approaches, an “all-government” inclusive approach (i.e., in-
cluding the involvement of all governmental levels dealing with Arctic 
matters), an holistic approach and the inclusion of the Human Rights 
angle/ capacity-building to all governance initiatives or strategies, etc. To 
some extent, moreover, the objectives, functions, the scope, structures, 
jurisdictional capabilities, forms of collaboration and institutional tasks in 
addressing issues of Arctic governance depend on the actors involved.  
The number of actors engaged in Arctic governance matters and initia-
tives is substantial ranging from the eight Arctic states, sub-national Arc-
tic entities and various institutions of Arctic and global ordering to in-
digenous peoples and their organizations, NGOs, NPOs, environmental 
advocacy groups, private and public business corporations and multina-
tional companies, investors, developers, as well as concerned Northern-
ers, politicians, academics, scientists and others with specific interest in 
the region. Moreover a number of non-Arctic states such as China, Ger-
many, Japan, etc., and supranational entities such as the EU has recently 
also expressed clear interests in becoming more fully involved in how 
Arctic issues should develop and who should have a say in decision-
making processes. 
Furthermore, non-state actors such as sub-national Arctic entities, or 
indigenous organizations, given the increasing legal capacity of indige-
nous peoples in international law, are now making claims for direct and 
independent representation in international forums or membership in 
international organizations and greater involvement in decision-making 
that affects the North. These trends affect the nature of cooperation in the 
region posing new challenges and presenting new opportunities for exist-
ing Arctic governance frameworks. In this light the need to find an equi-
table balance between these competing interests when addressing the 
many issues posed by stakeholders interested in Arctic affairs is of the 
utmost importance.  
This then raises the question, who governs the Arctic at the interna-
tional, regional, national and local levels? Or indeed who should govern 
the Arctic? Is the Arctic governance framework limited to the eight Arc-
tic States? On specific issues it is limited to the Arctic states with direct 
                                                     
4 Sheila Watt-Cloutier, “A Principled Path,” in F. Abele et al eds. 2009:69–76, 74. 
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access to the Arctic Ocean (e.g., the controversial practice of the Ilulissat 
Declaration, 2008). Do, however, other stakeholders including non-Arctic 
states, the EU, or other non-state entities have a legitimate role to play in 
the system of Arctic governance? There is no easy answer to this com-
plex question. The Arctic states have traditionally had the decisive say in 
international and regional diplomacy related to the circumpolar north. 
With the changing geo-political significance of the Arctic in global and 
regional affairs, the emergence of climatic changes presenting both chal-
lenges and opportunities to Northerners and others, accelerating external 
pressures and a global focus on currently untapped resources in the area, 
many new actors are actively seeking recognition of their status and a 
stake in various developments affecting the region. As such, different 
regimes and arrangements shaping the Arctic governance framework at 
various levels are undoubtedly emerging.  
Clearly, tasks and solutions relating to matters of Arctic governance 
will vary depending on the stakeholders involved, their jurisdictional 
capabilities (defined by the nature of their legal personality), and their 
agendas to deal with different levels of governance in the region. Cur-
rently, the ongoing re-evaluation of the existing arrangements that define 
the framework of Arctic governance and the search for innovative ap-
proaches and forms of governance is a work in progress. How do some of 
those forms develop within the Arctic jurisdictions? To answer this ques-
tion, a general legal framework in respect of the right to autonomy needs 
to be explored.  
7.4 The Right to Autonomy 
This section begins by looking at the general framework of the right to 
autonomy, self-determination, and self-governance. It continues by ex-
ploring indigenous peoples’ right to autonomy. In this chapter the notion 
of autonomy as being equivalent to self-government in the framework of 
an internal right to self-determination is employed. The primary focus 
here is the collective right to autonomy highlighting the territorial con-
cept of autonomy. This concept is applied to autonomous entities with 
constitutional powers transferred from unitary or federal state authorities 
to the institutions of regional public or territorial governance although no 
account is taken of the municipal or local levels of government. 
In legal and political theory the concept of autonomy is rather com-
plex suffering from confusion and ambiguity. Autonomy is a vague con-
cept often afforded different interpretations by scholars, representatives 
of minorities, indigenous peoples and others. The term “autonomy” origi-
nates from the Greek “auto” meaning “self” and “nomos” meaning “rule 
of law.” It has many synonyms in modern scholarship and is used in rela-
tion to: self-determination, self-government, self-rule, self-reliance, 
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home-rule, self-legislation, self-administration, self-management, and 
independence (external self-determination). The term “autonomy” is used 
in constitutional and international law discourse but there is no legal clar-
ity or static legal definition of it. Arguably, the lack of a precise legal 
definition makes the concept more amenable to the aspirations of differ-
ent groups (i.e., minorities and indigenous peoples), depending on each 
case. Although in law, autonomy is often housed within the concept of 
self-determination, one can best understand its content and scope in the 
context of a particular situation. 
Analysis of extensive materials and legal scholarship on autonomy 
suggests the following approaches to its understanding:  
 
 autonomy as means of protecting human rights 
 autonomy as a form of conflict resolution 
 autonomy as a synonym of decentralization (the principle of 
subsidiarity) 
 autonomy as a form of democratization (the right of effective political 
participation) 
 autonomy and federalism 
 autonomy as means to assert the rights etc., of minorities’ and 
indigenous peoples’. 
 
In international law, the concept of autonomy is evolving. However, 
among scholars treating autonomy as a principle of international law is 
not unanimous. An analysis of various sources of international law (e.g., 
conventions, customs, treaties, and the practices of international organiza-
tions, doctrines and documents) reveals that insufficient grounds exist for 
the recognition of autonomy as a principle of international law. Discourse 
on this matter is centred on the evaluation of autonomy as a principle of 
customary international law; autonomy as a distinctive right of minori-
ties; and as the principle of self-determination of peoples. There is no 
consensus among authorities on this subject. The definition of autonomy 
and its linkage to peoples’ right to self-determination or minorities’ rights 
to self-determination suffers from ambiguity. Even the division of the 
right to external self-determination (e.g., secession) and internal self-
determination (e.g., territorial and non-territorial self-governance), does 
not solve this ambiguity. In some cases, autonomy can serve as a mode of 
conflict resolution. Without having a strong status in international law the 
practice of modern autonomous arrangements does however make the 
right to autonomy more feasible.  
The right to autonomy is a part of the concept of the right to self-
determination which is broader than just self-governance (e.g., the former 
can include external self-determination). Although autonomy can be con-
ceptualized within the right to self-determination, because of recognition 
of the latter in international law, the language of self-determination might 
 Polar Law Textbook 134 
be more palatable for different groups’ claims compared to those of 
autonomy. 
Arguably, the right to autonomy can be seen as the realization of the 
principle of internal self-determination (e.g., self-governance) if the fol-
lowing conditions are in place: 
 
 ethnic, cultural and linguistic distinctiveness;  
 voluntary and strongly expressed will of the group/population to 
achieve autonomy; 
 the existence of historical and geographical conditions relevant to 
each particular case; 
 the availability of a legislative body that is elected by the group; and 
an executive body formed with respect to the principles of democratic 
participation and representation; 
 the presence of a financial base and grounds for economic 
sustainability; 
 the availability of knowledge and human capacity to manage the new 
entity’s own affairs and control its own destiny, etc. 
 
International human rights law offers us a number of options in looking at 
the right to autonomy. One option is to view the right to autonomy within 
the framework of peoples’ right to self-determination (e.g., common Ar-
ticle 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights of 1966. Another possibility is enshrined in Article 27 of the 
ICCPR. It deals with the rights of persons belonging to ethnic, linguistic 
and religious minorities to enjoy their culture by means of effective par-
ticipation in democratic institutions and power-sharing. The right to 
autonomy extends to culture (the ability of the minority group to sustain 
its culture, religion and language). It may extend to maintaining the live-
lihood of indigenous peoples, including their economic structures and 
land rights (Human Rights Committee, General Comment 23 (50)). De-
spite these possibilities, international human rights instruments do not 
clearly indicate the right to autonomy. There is evolving recognition of 
this right in the practice and procedures of international bodies, in the 
international documents and the main sources of international law.  
Is the right to autonomy the domain of constitutional jurisprudence? 
Do existing constitutional autonomous arrangements reduce ambiguities 
surrounding the concept and the right to autonomy in international law?  
Most constitutions do not guarantee the right to autonomy as a consti-
tutional right. Typically, national constitutions do not regulate the right to 
autonomy or the scope of autonomous units’ jurisdiction and its institu-
tions. Analysis of the sources of constitutional law in several states shows 
however that there is some recognition of the right to autonomy. 
Autonomous arrangements can be regulated by:  
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 Constitution (Åland Islands-Finland) 
 Constitutional custom (Faroe Islands-Denmark) 
 Partial recognition in the constitution (Saami’s cultural autonomy in 
Finland) 
 Ordinary legislation (Faroe Islands-Denmark) 
 Constitutional laws (federal law of the Russian Federation on 
national-cultural autonomy, 1996); Act of Greenland’s self-
government (2009) 
 Constitution or Charter of the autonomous entity/region (Italy) 
 Organic law (Corsica/France) 
 Treaty between Indigenous Peoples and the state 
 Special agreement between the national state and sub-national entity 
 
To summarize, the right to autonomy is mainly regulated by means of 
constitutional law (e.g., the modes of entrenchment and regulation of 
autonomous regimes at the level of domestic law). However, within the 
discourses of international and national law ongoing developments point 
to the importance of indigenous peoples’ right to autonomy and its reali-
zation within the Arctic states.  
7.5 Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Autonomy  
Over the last century, the scope and the interpretation of indigenous peo-
ples’ rights have evolved in the course of international human rights law, 
within constitutional jurisprudence and indigenous law discourse. His-
torically, demands for indigenous autonomy through self-determination 
and revitalized new legal status and perception (e.g., claims that indige-
nous peoples are subjects of international law), have been raised as a 
reaction against former colonial policies of assimilation, discrimination 
and integration. The result is that more and more indigenous groups are 
now pressing for some form of self-governance as a way of taking control 
of their lives and lands and as a means to preserve their livelihoods, val-
ues, and culture. However, the question remains, how does international 
law regulate the right to indigenous autonomy?  
International documents suggestive of a right to autonomy for minori-
ties are relevant to indigenous peoples. They also show that the right of 
indigenous peoples to autonomy presents a stronger case than that for 
minorities and that the emerging right of indigenous autonomy is based 
on the outgrowth of the right to self-determination. 
For example, The Nuuk Conclusions and Recommendations on In-
digenous Autonomy and Self-government that were adopted by the U.N. 
Meeting of Experts in Nuuk (Greenland) in 1991 outlined some elements 
of indigenous autonomy. Those elements include:  
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The inherent and fundamental right to autonomy and self-government 
is as an integral part of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination; 
Realization of this right should not constitute a threat to the territorial 
integrity of the state; 
The self-government/self-management/self-administration of indige-
nous peoples makes up an element of their political autonomy;  
Autonomy is seen as a measure for achieving equality and respect for 
human rights; a vehicle for ensuring sustainable development; political 
participation in public affairs and decision-making processes within the 
scope of a given jurisdiction;  
Autonomy is essential for indigenous peoples’ further development, in-
ternational cooperation and legal arrangements, and contributes to different 
forms of development within the state. Although the Nuuk recommenda-
tions are not binding on any state they did elaborate on the importance and 
the crucial elements of indigenous peoples’ autonomy.  
After long debate, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of In-
digenous Peoples (2007) included provisions for a right to autonomy. 
Accordingly, Article 3 of the declaration repeats the wording of common 
Article 1 of the two human rights covenants of 1966 and reads that: 
Indigenous Peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.  
Article 4 of the Declaration, which should be read in conjunction with 
Article 3, states that:  
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, 
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their 
internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their 
autonomous functions. 
As with many other international law documents in this area the decla-
ration considers autonomy to be an integral part of the right to self-
determination – usually implying its internal form – the exercise of the 
right to self-government within the boundaries of the respective sovereign 
state in question. There are of course numerous ongoing debates in re-
spect of the right of autonomy or self-government for indigenous peoples 
in international law. Moreover, the nature of the claims of indigenous 
peoples made under international law vary (e.g., historic sovereignty 
claims; non-discrimination claims; minority claims; self-determination 
claims, special claims as indigenous peoples – e.g., cultural claims, etc). 
Importantly, claims for self-government constitute just one aspect of the 
broad array of issues and international law norms that can be raised under 
the umbrella of the right to self-determination for indigenous peoples. 
Those norms may cover areas of social welfare and economic develop-
ment rights, human rights, land and resource access rights or the cultural 
rights of indigenous peoples. Thus, the right to self-determination covers 
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a wide array of situations and encompasses a much broader context than 
merely the right to self-government by indigenous peoples.  
In relation to indigenous peoples’ right to autonomy and self-
determination, ongoing discourse on the differences experienced in the 
application of this right for minorities, peoples and indigenous groups, can 
be summarized along the following lines: 
 
 Indigenous peoples have a right to internal self-determination and 
internal autonomy as an integral part of this right;  
 In some cases, indigenous peoples as peoples, can be the beneficiaries 
of external elements of self-determination (e.g., the case of 
Greenland); about the interpretation of those elements also see Art.19 
in the Draft Nordic Saami Convention; 
 Indigenous peoples have a right to self-determination without artificial 
division on external and internal aspects (e.g., they may be able to 
choose between internal self-governance and independence); 
 Usually, indigenous autonomy is interpreted by scholars as a group 
right which allows an indigenous collectivity to exercise control over 
a certain territory; however, in some cases, urban indigenous peoples 
may be eligible for the exercise of non-territorial and personal 
autonomy; 
 In some cases, indigenous peoples may use the minority rights regime 
to advance their claims to autonomy (Loukacheva 2005). 
 
It should be emphasized, however, that in the specific case of indigenous 
peoples, in contrast to that of minorities, self-determination is not inter-
preted as secession. Indigenous peoples see self-determination as a new 
partnership between the former colonial power and the indigenous collec-
tivity, which is then assumed to exercise a variety of political and legal 
options. Such options potentially include various models of indigenous 
self-governance, self-administration, public governance or other forms of 
empowerment over the lands and lives of the people concerned. These 
various options can however be best evaluated on a case by case basis. 
There is then no need for a special form or type of indigenous autonomy as 
long as existing models of autonomous arrangements are feasible for in-
digenous peoples’ forms of self-governance and accommodate their special 
needs and concerns.  
Legal and political theory has developed two major approaches to the 
classification of autonomous arrangements – territorial and non-territorial. 
Territorial autonomy may take a political, organic, ethnically-based, ad-
ministrative or cultural form. Non-territorial forms of autonomy may be 
cultural, personal, or corporate. The choice between territorial and non-
territorial principles of autonomous organizations will depend on the size, 
geographical location, concentration, cultural or ethnic distinctiveness, 
linguistic integrity, territorial delineation and the will for autonomy of the 
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group in question. Analyzing the linkages between the principles of territo-
riality and ethnicity various classifications for such autonomous arrange-
ments have already been proposed. In practise, however, hybrid forms exist 
which may incorporate both principles. Namely, where ethnicity does not 
play major role because of the de facto majority of the indigenous group, or 
where ethnicity matters but is not linked to the indigenous peoples’ domi-
cile within a designated territory. Thus, scholars identify forms of indige-
nous peoples’ autonomy as regional self-government, ethno-political self-
government, land claims, regional autonomies within the state, and 
autonomous arrangements based on contemporary indigenous political 
institutions (e.g., Saami parliaments), etc.  
It is debatable whether land claims can be seen as a form of indige-
nous autonomy as they often exclude matters of indigenous self-
governance and mainly target economic development or land and re-
source development and ownership rights. All other types of autonomous 
arrangements for indigenous peoples can also be said to be common in 
respect of minorities. Forms of territorial and non-territorial autonomy 
may vary from case to case. Compared to minorities’ claims for auton-
omy, for indigenous peoples, land rights, usage and ownership of renew-
able and non-renewable resources and a spiritual connection to their 
lands, usually have vital significance in their quest for self-government. 
This special connection is explained not just by the existence of a spiri-
tual bond with the land and with wildlife but also by the need to preserve 
traditional livelihoods, subsistence activities, indigenous knowledge and 
peoples’ oral history and memory, distinct indigenous cultures and cus-
tomary rituals and practises. Furthermore, indigenous peoples’ autonomy 
may differ from minority autonomy on the basis of historical grounds and 
the view of self-government as being an inherent right (e.g., indigenous 
peoples governed their lands prior to colonization and settlement by out-
siders). 
For example, concerning the right to autonomy, in some Arctic juris-
dictions (e.g., in Canada), it has been suggested by the representatives of 
indigenous peoples and further affirmed by the Federal government that 
indigenous peoples have the inherent right to self-government. For in-
stance, the national Inuit organization – Inuit Tapirisat of Canada – has 
elaborated that the right to self-government includes the following ele-
ments: 
 
 it is a pre-existing and fundamental human right and therefore not 
subject to extinguishment (inherent); 
 the inherent right of self-government exists independent of any self-
government agreement (non-contingent); 
 governments established by aboriginal peoples in exercise of the 
inherent right constitute an order of government with constitutional 
status (aboriginal peoples’ governments are one of the three orders of 
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government in Canada that are sovereign within their spheres of 
jurisdiction); 
 the consent of aboriginal peoples is necessary in defining the 
relationship between aboriginal peoples’ governments and federal and 
provincial governments (consent requirement);  
 the inherent right of self-government does not prescribe any particular 
form of government and therefore encompasses ethnic and non-ethnic 
forms of government (Inuit are not restricted to traditional forms of 
government or from joining with others in the exercise of their 
inherent right of self-government) (Rosemary Kuptana).5 
 
These elements point then to the need for the development of a partner-
ship or indeed a special relationship between indigenous collectivities and 
the various levels of government, especially, with the Federal govern-
ment. Within the Arctic states the way in which the right to autonomy 
comes to be expressed in each jurisdiction has been impacted by the na-
ture of the relationship between indigenous forms of social organization 
and authority and opposing political and legal regimes introduced by the 
former colonial powers or their modern inheritors. 
Differences in perceptions on issues such as governance, legal settings 
and the livelihoods of indigenous and other groups, require that approaches 
be undertaken to the development of the issue of indigenous peoples’ 
autonomy which pay due attention to indigenous knowledge, customary 
law, culture and values. Quite often Western or non-indigenous patterns of 
governance pre-determine the legal and political frameworks for indige-
nous self-governance. In most Arctic jurisdictions the reconciliation of 
indigenous forms of governance with imposed Western patterns is a work 
in progress. There is also the ongoing challenge of bridging the gap be-
tween Southern and Northern visions of governance. Thus, by using mainly 
Canadian examples, the next section explores some of the major issues 
faced by Northerners and their governmental structures.  
7.6 Challenges of Northern Governance  
At the national level, the struggle for greater political and legal autonomy 
in the North led to different approaches to governance by the Arctic states 
and the introduction by some of various models of governance for sub-
national Northern entities. The differences in these models and ap-
proaches are rooted in divergent historic relationships, paths of coloniza-
tion and of the re-conciliation of former colonizers with formerly-
colonized (e.g., indigenous peoples or original settlers); the existence of 
differing stages of constitutional and political development within the 
                                                     
5 Rosemary Kuptana, The Inherent right to self-government: Its nature and source, (1992), 
quoted from N. Loukacheva, 2007:36–37.  
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respective states and their legal systems; and varying socio-economic and 
other pre-conditions required for the introduction of autonomy.  
Models of sub-national governance arrangements in the Arctic juris-
dictions are now quite numerous. For example, the so-called form of pub-
lic government obtained special state support in Canada’s Arctic. Thus, 
all three Canadian territories have these models in place (for details, see 
Abele et al, 2009). The practices and institutional structures of public 
government have undoubtedly been altered through the negotiation of 
indigenous self-government and land claim agreements which have pro-
duced various governance solutions across the Canadian Arctic. The terri-
tories of Yukon, Nunavut and N.W.T. and several provinces with Arctic 
areas (e.g., Northern Quebec or the province of Newfoundland and Lab-
rador), have comprehensive land claims agreements that are concluded by 
indigenous peoples with the Federal government of Canada and with the 
respective provincial/territorial governments.  
In some cases, (e.g., the Inuvialuit, Sahtu and Gwich’in in the 
N.W.T.), are negotiating indigenous self-government agreements in addi-
tion to existing land claims deals. In other cases, self-government provi-
sions are already included in land claims agreements (e.g., the Yukon 
land claims and the Tlicho agreement in the N.W.T.). Moreover, in some 
areas where indigenous peoples are the majority of the population (e.g., 
Nunavut in Canada’s Eastern and Central Arctic), structures of public 
governance, despite being public, because of strong indigenous represen-
tation are seen by some authorities as de facto indigenous governance. 
The institutions of public government work closely with the powerful 
Inuit land claims organization – Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., which repre-
sents Inuit beneficiaries – some 85% of Nunavut’s population. Regardless 
of the system of public government and the land claims agreement in 
place however, the Inuit of Nunavut have also reserved their right to ne-
gotiate a separate self-government agreement in the future, if for exam-
ple, demographic change does not favour the Inuit.  
An extensive and growing body of scholarship on the model variations 
of public government, indigenous self-government and land claim ar-
rangements has sought to further elaborate on the often quite different 
cases emerging from Northern Canada, Alaska, Greenland, the Russian 
North, and the Saami areas in Norway, Finland and Sweden. This section 
is limited, however, to the outlining of some general matters and the chal-
lenges that can be seen to be at the heart of governance discourse in 
Northern Canada. These challenges are seen as both relevant for and 
similar to the experiences emerging from other parts of the Arctic. How-
ever, it is not possible to generalize on these issues across the circumpolar 
region. As such, a detailed analysis of each case study would be required 
to evaluate each particular example. 
Numerous reports, documents and commentators on the situation in 
the Canadian Arctic point to the existence of several interconnected mat-
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ters which are often seen to be at the core of the discourse on governance 
in the North. The pillars of governance debate centres on a number of 
questions but can be loosely summarized into the following major, 
though non-exclusive, categories. 
7.6.1 Institutional capacity and political development in the North: 
Matters of efficacy, quality, innovation, legitimacy, workability, evolu-
tion and the facilitation of the existing and emerging governance struc-
tures and challenges associated with the implementation of modern po-
litical and legal arrangements, transparency and the liability of govern-
mental institutions; interaction, cooperation and partnership among 
different levels of governmental authority, including indigenous govern-
ments, land claims bodies and organizations. The scope of political in-
volvement, influence, decision-making powers and the efficacy of de-
mocratic political participation of Northerners in different levels of local, 
national and trans-national politics.  
7.6.2 Northern economic development, fiscal autonomy and sustainability  
Questions relating to the patterns of Northern economies, the infrastruc-
ture and fiscal arrangements that define the nature of governmental eco-
nomic policies and financial mechanisms, the challenges of sustainability 
and resource development, relationships and jurisdictional capabilities of 
Northerners, indigenous stakeholders and federal, provincial or territorial 
authorities on matters of and prospects for sustainable fiscal, resource and 
economic development. 
7.6.3 Human capacity, community wellness and social stability 
This area covers matters such as the addressing of social ills (e.g., addic-
tions, abuse, poor housing and health conditions, high rates of suicide, 
unemployment, tuberculosis and sexually-transmitted diseases, poverty 
and welfare dependency) that are present in many Northern communities. 
Issues of education, the availability and adequacy of educational facilities 
(e.g., high rates of school drop-outs) closely linked to the needs of human 
capacity building and the raising of the new generation of Northerners 
capable of competently filling the workforce shortages in both the public 
and private sectors seen across the North. It also implies the raising of a 
new cohort of Northern leaders among indigenous and non-indigenous 
Northerners who are able to embrace local values, are familiar with tradi-
tional knowledge and who can best represent the interests of their com-
munities at national, regional and international fora.  
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7.6.4 Jurisdictional capability and the legal scope of governance and 
land-claims arrangements in the North  
The legal frameworks currently in place in the North defining various gov-
ernance, land and resource management structures and regulating all areas 
of development, social, economic, human, political capital and environ-
mental issues are often limited. Northerners and others as such often ques-
tion the adequacy, efficiency and legitimacy of such regulations and/or 
legislative and legal arrangements as often they do not fully take into con-
sideration the specifics of Northern conditions. Indeed, they are usually 
limited to the principles of national legal systems and constitutional devel-
opment. Existing constitutional principles and the policies of national gov-
ernments regarding the North often pre-determine the scope of jurisdic-
tional competence of Northern governments or land-claims bodies. On 
occasion this presents limitations to the realization and implementation of 
such arrangements and creates further dependence and reliance on the fis-
cal and other support mechanisms of central government.  
All these areas are interconnected and many external and internal fac-
tors influence them. For example, globalization and environmental 
change, including global warming and climate change impact governance 
strategies, economic activities and the fiscal autonomy of Northerners. 
They also question the adaptive and mitigation capacities of Northern 
communities and the resilience of their governmental institutions in the 
face of such challenges as well as their ability to seize the opportunities 
that are presented by such changes.  
The nature of intergovernmental cooperation and the success of the 
partnership among the various stakeholders involved in governance is-
sues (e.g., federal/territorial/provincial/aboriginal governments and land 
claims organizations) can incrementally aid the further development of 
current and future systems in respect of public and indigenous govern-
ments. For example, due to their territorial legal status, the jurisdictional 
capacities of Yukon, the N.W.T. and Nunavut, particularly in respect of 
the ownership of natural resources and the management on Crown lands 
and offshore areas, are limited. In the hope of increasing economic sus-
tainability and fiscal independence from federal transfers and grants, all 
three territories initiated resource devolution negotiations with Ottawa. 
As a result, in 2001 the territorial government of Yukon signed its devo-
lution agreement with the government of Canada which in 2003 led to the 
transfer of the management of and control over Crown lands and natural 
resources to the territory; Nunavut and N.W.T. are in the process of nego-
tiating their own natural resource devolution agreements. The negotiation 
of land claims agreements and self-governance agreements with Northern 
indigenous peoples in Canada is thus another example of ongoing consti-
tutional development and of a new partnership in this area. 
In all cases, the matter of fiscal autonomy and liability is the core chal-
lenge. Despite the existing legal and political frameworks in place Northern 
 Polar Law Textbook  143
governments and indigenous and land claims organizations continue to be 
challenged by the problems surrounding the non-implementation of land 
claims agreements or governance arrangements due to the shortage of fi-
nancial resources, budgetary deficits and a high level of dependency on 
external transfers and subsidies, mainly from the federal government.  
Modern treaties (or comprehensive land claims agreements) are not 
adhered to for many reasons that are well-discussed in the growing litera-
ture on this subject. For example, in some cases, the narrow scope of the 
land claim and its inadequate focus on economic rights and development 
explain the non-implementation of the agreement. There are also con-
cerns about non-efficacy, non-commitment and the reluctance of federal 
government institutions to implement and monitor these treaties. In addi-
tion, questions are often also raised about the capability of indigenous 
governments and land claim organizations to fulfil their duties and re-
sponsibilities in respect of land claims. Moreover, the argument that land 
claims are living treaties and are not concluded with the goal of finality 
suggests that the federal government should not treat the signing of these 
agreements as final. The implementation of these treaties in practice, and 
possible adaptation to changing realities not foreseen or addressed in land 
claims, may require further modifications and involvement on behalf of 
all parties.  
Fiscal flexibility and self-reliance remain key to attaining sustainable 
development and to the legitimacy of governance arrangements in the 
North more generally. The major legal challenge is how to reconcile the 
idea of autonomous jurisdiction and self-sustainability with financial 
dependency on the national authorities. The challenge is that quite often 
existing legal and governance arrangements suggest that Northerners, 
indigenous self-governing or land claims organizations take control over 
their own affairs but in de facto terms the economic or fiscal settings 
often do not allow for self-sufficient development and administration of 
the suggested areas of jurisdiction. One objective of such land clams and 
self-governance arrangements is to increase economic sustainability and 
the responsibility and ability of such actors to manage their affairs within 
the scope of their jurisdiction.  
In practice, this is often impossible to implement because of the lack of 
appropriate economic, human, or financial infrastructure in place and the 
particularities of Northern geography, climate and other specific conditions 
– e.g., the high cost of doing business and delivering services or the expen-
sive nature of all means of communication in the Arctic. For example, in 
all three Canadian Northern territories the government plays a major role in 
their economic and political development. The government sector is a ma-
jor employer and has a decisive role in the development of economic pro-
jects and initiatives. Government expenditures and services moreover form 
an indispensible part of territorial economies.  
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Furthermore, existing arrangements on the taxation of economic ac-
tivities and Territorial Formula Financing (TFF) do not provide for incen-
tives or sufficient capacity to generate own-source revenues. Public reve-
nues from private sector taxation and businesses are insignificant. High 
expectations are often raised in respect of the potential for revenues from 
royalties and the development and exploitation of non-renewable re-
sources though in reality, replacing transfer dependency with resource-
revenue dependency does not solve the matter of sustainability in the 
long-run. As such, resource devolution agreements are not the panacea 
for financial autonomy they are often perceived to be. 
At the same time, any prospects for sustainable economic develop-
ment and the implementation of governance arrangements and modern 
treaties are not feasible without prosperous, healthy and vibrant commu-
nities. Thus, the building of social wellness, human capital and capacity 
remain at the top of the political agenda for Northerners, their govern-
ments and indigenous organizations.  
7.7 Conclusion  
We are dealing here with multi-level governance in the Arctic and multi-
lateral diplomacy and cooperation. Quite often, the implementation of 
various arrangements in the Arctic, especially those that are related to 
land and resource-management, require strong engagement and compli-
ance on behalf of local players, e.g. sub-national governments, indige-
nous organizations, hunters’ and municipal councils, etc. Their participa-
tion is often important as a means of sustaining traditional indigenous 
cultures. Furthermore, without the inclusion of Northerners and their 
governments in decision-making processes at the national and interna-
tional levels that affect their homelands, the legitimacy of any ad hoc 
actions or solutions that are not rooted in the knowledge of local circum-
stances can often be hampered by their non-compliance and non-
enforcement by local actors. Importantly, sub-national or sub-regional 
initiatives that deal with various aspects of governance constitute parts of 
the broader system of Arctic governance. Thus, their role is vital not just 
within each Arctic state but also within the circumpolar region. Because 
of growing global and regional interconnectedness and the importance of 
developments in the Arctic for external actors, the activities of Northern-
ers, their governments and organizations are crucial for the further posi-
tive evolution of Arctic governance.  
Northerners should have greater input and the decisive say on the 
various agendas and strategies that concern the Arctic and in the work of 
various multi-layered structures of governance in the North. One of the 
enduring challenges for Arctic governance is undoubtedly however the 
need to strike a balance between Northerners’/Arctic indigenous groups’ 
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aspirations for greater partnership and voice in the re-distribution of 
power in high-level regional, international, and national forums, and the 
perceptions and jurisdiction of the respective states, Southerners and the 
other regional and global actors involved on how Arctic issues should 
unfold. As outlined above, the multiplicity of issues that underpin the 
implementation and the realization of governance arrangements at the 
sub-national level indicate that Northerners are primarily dealing with the 
most immediate local matters that are crucial for their livelihood. At the 
same time, because of global environmental changes, the impacts of in-
creasing shipping, tourism, military activities and resource development, 
new demands are emerging on Northern governments to meet these chal-
lenges and have a stronger voice in national and international arenas 
when their homelands are concerned.  
The growing complexity of governance arrangements/models at dif-
ferent levels (sub-national, national, regional or global) raises the ques-
tion of their integration with each other and the coordination of the inter-
ests of the many stakeholders involved in issues of Arctic governance. 
This will remain a challenge for Arctic governance for many years to 
come. At each level one can observe existing, evolving or emerging 
structures and institutions of Arctic governance that are represented by 
actors with often diverse interests and agendas. In the meantime, we see 
increasing cooperation and interconnectedness among these actors on 
issues of common concern. Thus, despite differences in governance mod-
els, interests, and in the legal, economic or political realities of the Arctic, 
governance starts with peoples’ ability to make a difference through par-
ticipation in the power-sharing and decision-making processes that affect 
their lands and lives.  
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Questions: 
1. What is Arctic governance and what are the inter-relations between 
its different levels? 
2. What are the main challenges for the realization and the 
implementation of autonomous/governance arrangements in the 
Circumpolar North? 
3. What are the emerging issues in Arctic Governance? 
 
8. Human Rights and Indigenous 
Rights 
 
Gudmundur Alfredsson 
8.1 Introduction  
Indigenous persons and indigenous peoples are, of course, entitled to all 
human rights, on an equal footing with everyone else, and they have 
equal recourse to all of the international human rights monitoring institu-
tions and procedures. In addition, the rights of indigenous peoples are 
specifically addressed in separate international human rights instruments 
and by separate international monitoring bodies. International human 
rights standards relevant to the Arctic are to be found in a series of trea-
ties that have been ratified by the respective States, in declarations 
adopted by vote in intergovernmental organisations, and in case-law 
stemming from monitoring bodies set up by these same organisations. 
The key instruments have been adopted under the auspices of the United 
Nations (UN), International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Council of 
Europe (CoE), the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe 
(OSCE), and the Organization of American States (OAS). The two or-
ganisations that have paid most attention to the rights and needs of in-
digenous peoples, in terms of both standard-setting and monitoring, are 
the UN and the ILO. The human rights performance of States is subject to 
monitoring under a variety of procedures. Some are treaty-based, involv-
ing examination of State reports and quasi-judicial complaints procedures 
while others are based on the UN Charter and declarations rather than 
treaty commitments, involving special investigative procedures and the 
universal periodic review of the performance of all States under the UN 
Human Rights Council. As treaties are binding upon their ratification by 
States conventions are the preferred instruments and, for the same reason, 
whenever possible, decisions from treaty bodies are preferable to recom-
mendations from the extra-conventional procedures. The special meas-
ures and special rights put in place for indigenous peoples are intended to 
overcome discrimination against these groups, and individuals belonging 
to them and to place them on an equal footing with others. These meas-
ures seek to protect, inter alia, cultural ways of life like traditional eco-
nomic activities, the property and management rights relating to land and 
natural resources, environmental conditions, and self-governance. Inter-
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national human rights law can make a positive difference. As public 
awareness, official knowledge of human rights and multi-layered moni-
toring by several intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) slowly improves, so does State performance. The Arctic coun-
tries should of course be subject to this type of scrutiny; as democracies 
they ought to be sensitive to the commentary of these organisations. Ob-
viously, this chapter does not provide a comprehensive picture of all the 
standards and monitoring instances, but an attempt is made, with empha-
sis on the United Nations, to raise issues and provide sources of particular 
relevance to the Arctic.  
8.2 Human Rights  
8.2.1 Human Rights as Law  
The promotion and protection of human rights is one of the main pur-
poses of most global and regional organisations. The legal mandates to 
this effect are clear, see for example Article 1 of the UN Charter, and the 
moral and political mandates are equally clear. Practically all religions, 
philosophical schools and ideologies refer to justice, fairness and benefits 
for the people, even if different labels are attached to their teachings. The 
mandates also rest on popular support; it is the experience of this author 
that, given the necessary information and a choice, everyone accepts 
these rights and freedoms for themselves. 
The human rights instruments come under the rules of public interna-
tional law. There are two main types of instrument: treaties and declara-
tions. Treaty-based standards are binding under international law upon 
the States that have ratified them. Treaties are also called conventions, 
charters, covenants, protocols, agreements, etc., but the test is whether the 
texts concerned have been formally accepted by States (acts of ratifica-
tion or accession, often preceded by signature), thus committing them to 
comply with their contents. Some of the human rights treaties enjoy wide 
acceptance. For complaints procedures under the treaties, when available, 
a check will have to be made as to whether the country in question had 
accepted their use.  
For the interpretation of human rights treaties and the meaning of sig-
natures, ratifications, accessions, reservations and so on reference should 
be made to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (or applicable 
customary law). As to interpretation, the main tools will be the text of the 
treaty, its drafting history, the intent of the parties and subsequent devel-
opments. All of these considerations play a role in human rights, not least 
subsequent developments because of case-law and the decisions of the 
treaty monitoring bodies.  
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While reservations to human rights treaties are often controversial 
they are tolerated because it is better to see a State ratify a treaty with 
exceptions to certain clauses rather than not accept it at all. Still, there are 
limitations as to the extent of reservations allowed; they should not go 
against the object and purpose of the treaty concerned. In other instances, 
the treaties themselves exclude reservations in whole or in part.  
In addition to treaties, in line with article 38 of the Statute of the In-
ternational Court of Justice (ICJ), human rights standards can be based on 
international custom and general principles, but these sources are infre-
quently invoked in human rights practice as it is difficult to determine 
their existence with certainty, except when courts have spoken out. Stan-
dards based on international custom and general principles, if established, 
carry the advantage that they are binding on all States.  
Standards set forth in declarations, codes of conduct, standard mini-
mum rules, basic principles, model rules, etc., are not subject to signature 
or ratification; States adopt them by vote in international fora (such as the 
General Assembly, the International Labour Conference, etc.). Much of 
the time, the adoption is by consensus following a lengthy drafting proc-
ess. Technically they constitute recommendations to Member States. 
They are sometimes referred to as “soft” law rather than the hard law of 
treaties and custom.  
The consensus method of adoption, which is also used in regard to 
treaties, helps explain the phrase “minimum standards” as the negotiation 
process often leads to the adoption of the lowest common denominators 
to which all States can agree. States may of course follow higher stan-
dards in national law; if on the other hand, national law and practices fall 
below the international minimum standards, the States concerned may 
become the subject of criticism by international monitoring bodies.  
Declaration texts, in whole or in part, may emerge as international 
customary law. This argument is frequently made with regard to equal 
rights, non-discrimination in law and in fact, and the prohibition of geno-
cide, slavery and torture. This argument is useful when dealing with 
countries which have not accepted the relevant treaties and whose general 
behaviour and particular performance in respect of the issue in hand may 
leave much to be desired. 
8.2.2 The Instruments  
In addition to establishing a human rights mandate the UN Charter also 
sets forth substantive rules. The preamble refers to the equal rights of 
men and women, the dignity and worth of the human person, and the 
equality of nations large and small. Operative articles prescribe non-
distinction in the enjoyment of all human rights on the grounds of race, 
sex, language or religion (articles 1 and 55) as well as self-determination 
and decolonisation (article 1 and chapters XI-XIII).  
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Six important instruments constitute the International Bill of Human 
Rights. They are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its 
two optional protocols concerning individual complaints and the abolition 
of the death penalty, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) with one protocol on the submission of 
complaints.  
As a non-treaty adopted by vote in the General Assembly in 1948 the 
question has arisen as to whether most or even all of the UDHR articles 
constitute international customary law. The Declaration has repeatedly 
been quoted in other instruments, national legislation and judgements of 
the ICJ and national courts. The UDHR has also seen active use for moni-
toring efforts under international resolution-based procedures which in 
itself is a good indication of the legal expectations attached to the text. 
On the other hand, UN membership was still very limited in 1948, the 
UDHR was not adopted by consensus, and its provisions are still being 
violated by many States. The question remains then whether State prac-
tice is consistent enough to amount to consent leading to the creation of 
custom.  
There are, in addition, hundreds of other global and regional human 
rights instruments, both treaties and declarations in existence with equal 
rights and non-discrimination, the administration of justice, and labour 
standards among the most common topics.  
8.2.3 The Contents  
Human rights instruments cover a very broad scope. This wide range may 
come as a surprise to many, but human rights have implications for most 
aspects of our daily lives, including the equal rights of men and women, 
the prohibition of racial, ethnic and religious discrimination, food, health, 
the home, shelter, child labour, education, culture, a fair trial, the treat-
ment of prisoners and detainees, capital punishment, the freedoms of 
expression and association, academic freedom, political and economic 
participation, democracy and elections, trade unions and strikes, and the 
functions of civil society organisations and NGOs.  
Furthermore, human rights in general and indigenous rights in particu-
lar may extend to climate change, pollution and other environment issues, 
whaling, other wildlife protection issues, property rights and land owner-
ship, as well as the demarcation of indigenous lands, security considera-
tions, and so on. All of these issues and many more have human rights 
aspects although they are not always so treated by the authorities and in 
the media.  
References are sometimes made in the academic literature to the first 
(civil and political rights), second (economic, social and cultural rights) 
and third (solidarity rights relating to development, environment, peace, 
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etc.) generations of human rights. These references may correctly reflect 
the chronology of adoption, with the first generation drawing on the 
longest history. Official UN policy, however, holds all human rights to be 
of equal value, indivisible, interrelated and interdependent. It is now po-
litically correct, so to say, to refer in alphabetical order to civil, cultural, 
economic, political, social and solidarity rights. 
Perhaps because of the chronological differences civil and political 
rights are formulated in a strong and straightforward language style. They 
are absolute, immediate and justiciable. You shall enjoy or you are enti-
tled to this or that right. Limitations are specifically enumerated, like 
public order, the welfare of society and the rights of others. There should 
be no delay in implementation with reference to available resources. And 
the detailed language lends itself to adjudication. Application should be 
objective and impartial, and independent courts should resolve conflicts.  
Economic, social and cultural rights are formulated in a general and 
often imprecise way, and States are obliged to realize these rights step by 
step in a progressive manner depending on available resources, as flows 
from article 2 of the ICESCR. At the same time, many economic, social 
and cultural rights can already be seen as justiciable. This is also true, for 
example, for equal enjoyment, non-discrimination, many labour stan-
dards, the right to cultural identity, and the right to primary school educa-
tion. It is likely also that the Committee on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights in handling eventual complaints under a new protocol to the 
ICESCR will further this type of development.  
Solidarity rights, or the so-called third generation rights, are still 
evolving as reflected in policy-oriented and controversial texts, which are 
often less than clear for the purposes of law, certainly not justiciable at 
the present time and not yet subjected to international monitoring. A 1974 
Declaration on the Right to Peace and a 1986 Declaration on the Right to 
Development also fall into this category. That the rights supposedly rest 
with peoples rather than individuals and/or groups however remains a 
problem. If a Government is to represent the people, as some supporters 
want, then Governments will sit on both sides of the table as guarantors 
and beneficiaries.  
Several instruments cut across the so-called generation divide, as for 
example the conventions on the rights of the child, migrant workers and 
persons with disabilities. The freedom of association is addressed in both 
Covenants. Equality before the law in article 26 of the ICCPR has by 
case-law of the Human Rights Committee been extended to economic, 
social and cultural rights legislation. The right to property is looked upon 
by some as a civil right and by others as an economic or social right; to 
still others it may be a political phenomenon. All points of view may be 
right depending on the context.  
 Polar Law Textbook 152 
8.2.4 Individual and Group Rights  
The emphasis in most of these human rights instruments is on individual 
rights. The individual holds the rights and should have access to national 
implementation and international monitoring. Most human rights texts 
demonstrate this individualistic approach which borders on ideology for 
some Governments. All of that is all fine and well, and much of the time 
this approach corresponds to actual needs, but it is not the whole story. 
Historical evidence and current news demonstrate that equal enjoyment 
and non-discrimination for minority and indigenous groups will not be 
achieved solely means of individual rights. 
In addition, several international human rights instruments provide for 
group rights or special measures to the benefit of groups. These include 
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICEAFRD), the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Ra-
cial Prejudice and ILO Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries. In these instances, relating for 
example to physical existence, identity, culture, education and land rights, 
it is groups such as minorities and indigenous peoples that are entitled to 
protection in line with their actual needs and circumstances.  
Other instruments, such as article 27 of the ICCPR which addresses it-
self to persons belonging to a group and their enjoyment of rights in 
community with other members of the group, also contain elements of 
group rights. As to monitoring, article 14 of ICEAFRD and special pro-
cedures foresee complaints from not only individuals but also from 
groups. International fora and the conduct of dialogues between groups 
and Governments, as in the context of minorities and indigenous peoples, 
also recognise the need for, and the inevitability of, group representation.  
8.2.5 Equal Rights, Non-Discrimination and Special Measures  
The equal rights rule applies across the board to all the categories of 
rights and freedoms. It means equal opportunities for enjoying the rights 
and equal treatment by the authorities relating to that enjoyment in law 
and in fact. Article 1 of the UDHR reads that “all human beings are born 
free and equal in dignity and rights.” Article 2 of UDHR, articles 2 of 
both International Covenants and many other international instruments 
prohibit discrimination based on several grounds. Article 1 of the UN 
Charter on non-distinction in the enjoyment of all human rights on the 
grounds of race, sex, language or religion has already been quoted. These 
rules underline the UN emphasis on, for example, the elimination of dis-
crimination against women, the eradication of racism and racial discrimi-
nation and respect for the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples. 
Women and men are entitled to the equal enjoyment of all human 
rights. Discrimination based on sex and gender is prohibited. Special 
measures are allowed to correct discriminatory practices. Women are in a 
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unique position amongst disadvantaged members of society inasmuch as 
they make up half of the electorate. Women should be encouraged to use 
existing procedures applicable to equal enjoyment and non-discrimination 
clauses, including optional protocols to the ICCPR and to the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.  
Equal enjoyment of human rights and freedoms for all and the prohi-
bition of discrimination based on race, colour, descent or national or eth-
nic origin are fundamental rules of international human rights law. The 
ICEAFRD has been ratified by over 160 States. Only a handful of States 
however has authorized the treaty monitoring body CERD to receive and 
consider complaints from individuals and groups concerning possible 
violations. Better knowledge of this and other procedures would un-
doubtedly lead to the more frequent submission of complaints. States 
which have not yet done so should be encouraged, or actively embar-
rassed, to accept the relevant procedures.  
The rules on equal enjoyment, non-distinction, special measures, dig-
nity and tolerance apply beyond race and sex to all other individuals and 
groups facing problems of discrimination. Assistance and protection must 
thus focus on disabled persons, HIV-infected persons and other vulner-
able persons and groups in order to empower them in the improvement 
and conduct of their own lives on equal footing with everyone else. 
The elimination of racial discrimination has received particular atten-
tion in international standard-setting with discrimination grounded in race 
clearly prohibited. The leading instrument is the ICEAFRD. Another 
significant text is the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice 
which in article 1 states that “(A)ll individuals and groups have the right 
to be different, to consider themselves as different and to be regarded as 
such.”  
8.2.6 Minority Rights  
Persons belonging to minorities and the minority groups are of course enti-
tled to equal enjoyment and non-discrimination, as described above. 
Among the relevant instruments are the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights 
of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Linguistic and Religious Mi-
norities, the ICPR (in particular article 27), the ICESCR, the ICEAFRD 
(race is defined in article 1 to encompass national and ethnic origins) and 
the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education. 
These instruments allow for special measures (also called preferential 
treatment, positive discrimination or affirmative action) to be put in place 
for the benefit of victims of discriminatory patterns. Such provisions in-
clude, for example, article 2(2), of the ICEAFRD where it notes that 
States encountering patterns of discrimination in the economic, social, 
political and other fields shall take special and concrete measures to guar-
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antee equal enjoyment of all human rights for both individuals and 
groups.  
The purpose of these measures is not the creation of privileges or spe-
cial status but the achievement of equal enjoyment in law and in fact. 
Governments have a choice in terms of the measures they adopt but the 
goal is clear. The measures may result in temporary setbacks for those 
who have benefitted from earlier discriminatory practices. The arrange-
ments may also have to be semi-permanent, for example with respect to 
minority schools and land rights which are necessary for maintaining 
identities and cultures. It is difficult to ensure equal enjoyment of politi-
cal rights for minority groups, but some degree of self-government over 
local affairs, guaranteed representation at the national level and access to 
regional and global fora are necessary (see below on self-governance).  
Notwithstanding these standards, discriminatory practices and other 
violations of minority rights are common phenomena while the monitor-
ing of respect for minority rights still lags behind the standard-setting. 
One of the few bright spots, relating to article 27 of the ICCPR is the 
case-law of the Human Rights Committee (see, for example, the Kitok, 
Länsman and Lubicon Lake Band cases from Sweden, Finland and Can-
ada, respectively) and General Comment No. 23. 
The rule of law must apply to minorities, including equal rights, non-
discrimination and preferential treatment, just like any other human rights 
beneficiaries. The rights must be applied on a universal and non-selective 
basis. Ethnic aspirations may pose threats to the national unity and territo-
rial integrity of States, and Governments tend to be preoccupied with this 
aspect. Such assumptions should be replaced with appreciation for the 
benefits of tolerance, pluralism and participation. Minorities should be seen 
as partners rather than adversaries, and they should not have to see violence 
as a useful tool for gaining attention or solving their problems. 
Positive national experiences teach us that the recognition of and re-
spect for minority rights are viable alternatives to oppression or neglect 
and that preventive measures are a lot less expensive than post-disaster 
solutions. A study on constructive national arrangements written by UN 
Special Rapporteur Asbjörn Eide led to the establishment of a Working 
Group on Minorities (1995–2006) for the examination of peaceful and 
constructive solutions to situations involving minorities, in particular with 
regard to the practical application of the 1992 Declaration and the con-
duct of dialogue between Governments and groups. 
Today, a recently established minority rights forum and an Independ-
ent Expert on Minority Issues under the UN Human Rights Council may 
lend themselves to such dialogues, and CERD and the Advisory Commit-
tee under the CoE Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities have also emphasised prevention and undertaken field visits. 
So far this is mostly just talk; the organisations concerned do not have the 
necessary political support and financial resources to effectively carry out 
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such mandates. The only success story is the OSCE High Commissioner 
on National Minorities who seeks to prevent violent ethnic conflicts by 
bringing Governments and groups together in the search for peaceful 
solutions. 
The whole idea of minority rights, as pursued by the international or-
ganisations, is about keeping the groups happy within States. Together, 
international law and minority rights place an emphasis on national unity 
and territorial integrity on the one hand and the promotion and protection 
of minority existence and identities on the other. The realisation of mi-
nority rights is intended to benefit all parties: States in terms of political 
and social stability and economic prosperity; the groups in terms of the 
preservation of their identities and the improvement of the quality of life 
for individual members; and the international community in terms of the 
maintenance of peace and stability which after all is the main reason for 
its organisational existence. 
8.2.7 Civil and Political Rights  
Civil and political rights encompass a wide range of rights and freedoms. 
The main instruments are the UDHR, the ICCPR and a series of other 
texts with more specific contents. Other important sources include gen-
eral comments and the case-law of the Human Rights Committee, other 
treaty bodies and special procedures.  
Civil and political rights cover the right to life, the prohibition of 
genocide, the liberty and security of the person, the prohibition of torture 
and other cruel and inhumane treatment or punishment, fair trial, other 
criminal justice aspects, the freedoms of expression (extends to political 
speech, the media and the internet), assembly (including political meet-
ings) and association (extends to political parties), elections, and access 
to public service.  
A democratic State is about the right of citizens to vote and run for of-
fice in elections. The UDHR and the ICCPR require periodic and genuine 
elections with universal and equal suffrage, but elections are not enough. 
Democracy is a process, and respect for human rights is a continuing 
function. In addition to the freedoms of opinion, speech, assembly and 
association, equality of all persons before the law and before the courts, 
the separation of powers, the independence and impartiality of the judici-
ary, and free and equal participation in political, economic and social life 
are likewise necessary in a democracy. General education, human rights 
education and civil society organisations serve a crucial role in shaping, 
manifesting and asserting the will of the people. Furthermore, there are 
close links between human rights and good governance, accountability, 
transparency and non-corruption. 
Majority rule is not necessarily friendly to minorities, not least to vul-
nerable groups with insufficient voting strength to make a difference in 
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elections. Respect for diverse identities and cultures requires affirmative 
legislation; a decision-making process is truly democratic when all mem-
bers of society have not only the formal right but also the factual possibil-
ity of effective influence. The test is about actual influence, power-
sharing and delegation of power.  
8.2.8 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
The rules concerning equal enjoyment and non-discrimination apply 
across the board to all economic, social and cultural rights. Extreme pov-
erty, social exclusion, a lack of education and corruption obviously affect 
the enjoyment of all human rights. Minorities and indigenous peoples 
need respect for economic, social and cultural rights no less than for civil 
and political rights. The world community has accepted that all human 
rights are indivisible and interdependent, as observed above. Economic, 
social and cultural rights should not however continue in second place 
simply because the Soviet Union and her allies expressed a preference for 
them in order to avoid compliance with civil and political rights. 
Economic, social and cultural rights cover, among other things, the 
rights to an adequate standard of living, family, housing, food, water, 
health, culture, education, work and social security. Article 2 of the 
ICESCR spells out the step-by-step or progressive realisation of these 
rights. Some economic, social and cultural rights may be costly, but others 
like equal rights can be seen as being “free of charge’; it is not about creat-
ing a bigger cake but rather how the cake is divided. Moreover, the rich 
countries of the north should not be able to hide behind the step-by-step 
approach for the realisation of rights that require financial expenditures. 
The enforcement methods for economic, social and cultural rights 
should be based on the rule of law. Several treaty – and Charter-based 
monitoring procedures are seized with economic, social and cultural 
rights, and a new Optional Protocol to the ICESCR will allow for the 
right of petition. The same approach should obviously prevail at the na-
tional level.  
8.2.9 Solidarity Rights  
Lively debates continue about a number of questions relating to the fur-
ther evolution of solidarity rights, namely, the right to development and 
the right to peace. As far as the Arctic is concerned perhaps a proposed 
right to a clean environment could be of interest here. Many human 
rights, including the rights to life, food, water and health and the free-
doms of information and expression already clearly affect the safeguard-
ing of the environment. With the mainstreaming of human rights, now as 
official UN policy, it should be easier to enter human rights considera-
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tions into the elaboration of international standards relating to the envi-
ronment and climate change.  
8.3 Indigenous Rights 
The rights of indigenous peoples have gained much in recognition and 
content over the last twenty five years, but even when States endorse the 
applicable instruments, the results may be less impressive than expected. 
National implementation comes about slowly while international moni-
toring of State compliance with the instruments is still fragmented, rela-
tively weak and generally ineffective.  
8.3.1 Contents and Monitoring 
Two indigenous-specific instruments have been adopted: the ILO Con-
vention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Coun-
tries (ILO Convention No. 169, from 1989) and the 2007 UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In addition, indigenous peoples, 
most of whom find themselves in minority situations, are able to benefit 
from minority rights standards. ILO Convention No. 169 now has 20 
ratifications. Compared with many other human rights treaties, however, 
this is a very low number. In the Arctic region only Denmark and Nor-
way have ratified it; after Denmark’s recognition of the Greenlanders as 
“a people” with the right to independence as an option, however, that 
ratification has much reduced relevance. As to the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, when the draft was before the UN Human 
Rights Council in 2006, Canada and the Russian Federation cast the two 
negative votes. After a delay and some watering down of the self-
determination language, the General Assembly adopted the Declaration 
by resolution 61/295 of 13 September 2007. Canada and the United 
States voted against while the Russian Federation abstained. These re-
sponses, as well as the explanations in respect of the votes of some of the 
Arctic States, to the new declaration can thus be viewed as rather disap-
pointing. ILO Convention No. 169 and the UN Declaration are of obvious 
relevance to the Arctic States and their indigenous peoples. Their provi-
sions deal with the rights of indigenous peoples to decide their own pri-
orities affecting, inter alia, dignity, ways of life, indigenous property 
rights to traditionally occupied land and participatory rights concerning 
the exploration and exploitation of natural resources. Furthermore, the 
Human Rights Committee, in case-law under article 27 of the ICCPR, as 
noted previously, has come to similar conclusions concerning the right to 
traditional economic activities and land rights when these are essential to 
maintaining indigenous cultures. 
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A Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, currently 
Professor Jim Anaya, serves under the UN Human Rights Council as 
does the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2008–) 
that succeeded the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (1982–
2006). A UN Permanent Forum for Indigenous Issues was also estab-
lished in 2001 under ECOSOC. These vehicles each present significant 
opportunities for indigenous interventions.  
8.4 Draft Nordic Sami Convention 
Many aspects of the draft Nordic Sami convention that addresses the 
status and rights of the Sami in three Nordic countries (Finland, Norway 
and Sweden) are progressive and highly praiseworthy, not least in terms 
of increased roles for the Sami, the strengthening of their institutions and 
enhanced self-governance in matters relating to political, economic and 
cultural affairs, as well as for the overall idea of adopting a treaty with the 
indigenous peoples as consenting partners. The draft has not, however, 
been adopted and the debate with wide-ranging opinions expressed on 
both sides continues. On the one hand it is argued that the text does not 
go far enough; for example, article 34 of the draft convention that deals 
with land rights, providing for both individual and group rights, looks like 
it may fall below the standard set in article 14 of ILO Convention No. 
169 that extends land rights to groups only so as to prevent the splitting 
up of indigenous lands which in turn would harm the peoples’ pursuit of 
identity and culture. On the other hand, certain provisions in the draft 
convention have given rise to questions similar to those that caused the 
delay in the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples. These questions, primarily but not exclusively concerning self-
determination, have undoubtedly played a role in blocking the adoption 
of the draft convention. The thrust of draft article 3 and subsequent arti-
cles is on internal self-determination, but references to international law 
as well as the language used in the explanatory notes seem to leave the 
door open to varying interpretations thus creating a measure of uncer-
tainty. It is unfortunate in such cases when the lines between external and 
internal self-determination are left blurred. 
8.5 Right of Self-Determination 
Through the exercise of the right of external self-determination, “peo-
ples” are able to determine their international juridical status. Internal 
self-determination concerns the autonomy of groups within State borders. 
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8.5.1 External Self-Determination 
The right of self-determination is set forth in a series of international 
instruments such as the UN Charter, the two International Covenants on 
Human Rights, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colo-
nial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 
14 December 1960, see also resolution 1541 (XV) of 15 December 1960), 
and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 25/2625 of 
24 October 1970). The right of decolonization is also confirmed in the 
consistent practice of States and international organisations, not least in 
decisions and opinions by the International Court of Justice in the Na-
mibia, Western Sahara and East Timor cases.  
As a matter of law, building on these and other texts and State prac-
tice, peoples under overseas colonial rule, or occupation by force after 
1945 (when such use of force was outlawed), are entitled to the right of 
external self-determination. This determination may result in independ-
ence, free association, or integration with another country. It may also be 
achieved by agreement of the parties, as in the break-up of federal States 
as occurred with Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. The choice be-
longs to the peoples and popular support for the outcome as expressed in 
referendums or otherwise is, of course, essential. 
Hitherto in international law the notion of “peoples” in the context of 
self-determination means the populations of distinct territories, as evi-
denced by State practice and in provisions in the UN Charter on non-self-
governing territories (rather than non-self-governing peoples) and in the 
title of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples. The reference is to a territory that is overseas or 
geographically separate from the controlling power, irrespective of the 
composition of the population. It is this overseas element that has facili-
tated the emergence of the decolonization rule in international law, as 
States do not as a result have to fear changes in metropolitan borders. 
8.5.2 Greenland 
Current developments in Greenland constitute a striking example of what 
human rights arguments can accomplish. In 2004, a joint Danish-
Greenlandic Self-Governance Commission was established with the 
mandate to make proposals for the legal status of Greenland under both 
international and Danish law. The Commission was made up of senior 
parliamentarians as well as officials and lawyers, with equal numbers 
from both sides. In summer 2008 it completed its work with the submis-
sion of a legislative bill and a detailed commentary thereto. In a Novem-
ber 2008 referendum on the self-governance package with almost 72% of 
the electorate participating, 75.5% of Greenlanders voted yes, while 
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23.5% said no. The bill was adopted by the Danish Parliament and en-
tered into force in June 2009. Some of the new arrangements granted 
additional powers to the Self-Rule Government, including the judiciary, 
police, prison administration and enhanced capacity in the handling of 
foreign affairs. The Greenlandic language became the official language. 
Greenlanders are the owners of all natural resources on their land and in 
the surrounding sea areas. The Self-Rule Government will receive the 
income garnered from the exploitation of natural resources after, how-
ever, offsetting Danish Government subsidies. The new law importantly 
recognises that the Greenlanders as a people have the right to self-
determination and that a decision on independence will be taken by a 
referendum in Greenland only, that independence will not require a 
change in the Danish Constitution, and that an agreement on succession 
matters should be concluded with Denmark. This recognition constitutes 
a major step away from the previous policy of the Danish Government of 
looking at and classifying the Greenlanders as an indigenous people 
within Denmark. This recognition of the Greenlanders as a people with 
the right to external self-determination is welcome and timely. After 
WWII, Denmark had listed Greenland as a non-self-governing territory 
under Chapter XI of the UN Charter and submitted annual reports on the 
situation there until the General Assembly (in resolution 849 (IX) of 22 
November 1954) took note of the integration of Greenland into Denmark 
through an amendment to the Danish Constitution. The integration proc-
ess was, however, seriously flawed and entirely one-sided. From the lack 
of time and options offered to the Greenlanders to the consultation of a 
municipal body that was not fully representative and had no mandate or 
authority to take constitutional decisions on behalf of the Greenlanders, 
the integration could not withstand human rights scrutiny. Furthermore, 
in Danish reports to the UN about the colonial situation in Greenland 
during the period 1946–54, some of the information submitted was seri-
ously misleading if not completely inaccurate. 
Reference to this broader decolonisation discourse undoubtedly 
helped in shaping the Greenlandic arguments for the bilateral Self-
Governance Commission and played a significant role in the results of its 
work. In other words, a new State may be created in the Arctic in the 
years to come. Listening to the current debate in Greenland, that decision 
would seem for the time being to depend on the local economy growing 
to the extent that it could substitute for the Danish State’s annual budget 
contribution to the Self-Rule Government. It will be interesting in the 
years ahead to follow the debate and to see what decision the Greenlandic 
people eventually will take. 
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8.5.3 Internal Self-Determination  
As an overseas territory entitled to decolonisation, under public interna-
tional law the situation pertaining to Greenland is viewed fundamentally 
differently from those of indigenous and minority groups who live within 
the metropolitan boundaries of States. In line with current international 
practice, for example, the Supreme Court of Canada has found that Que-
bec does not meet the threshold of colonial or other criteria pertinent to 
the right of external self-determination with a similar finding likely be 
applied to indigenous groups within Canada. On the other hand, as a mat-
ter of justice, why should indigenous peoples be denied what others enjoy 
when we are talking about peoples or nations with their own identities, 
territories, and political institutions who previously exercised internal and 
external control until they were reduced to dependency? Why should they 
not be subject to decolonisation as well as overseas peoples and coun-
tries? These “why-not” questions are especially pertinent because the 
concepts and principles originally employed to justify dependency status, 
such as terra nullius and discovery, have now been discredited.  
In the chapter on self-governance in the 1999 Lund Recommendations 
on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life, 
drafted under the auspices of the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities (HCNM), the term self-determination is not employed at all. 
In its place the notion of self-governance is deployed and it is generally 
understood that this terminological choice was very much intentional. 
Self-government is about effective, meaningful and democratic political 
participation by indigenous peoples and minorities, with the groups run-
ning many of their own local affairs but without interrupting the sover-
eignty and territorial integrity of a State. As to the management of land 
and the exploration and exploitation of natural resources, the human 
rights instruments clearly foresee input by the indigenous peoples, as 
groups, requiring some sort of representative and autonomous institu-
tions. Nevertheless, the term self-determination, with the prefix “internal” 
added, invites resistance by Governments which fear separatism and even 
violent conflict relating to secession by groups within their metropolitan 
borders. This reaction is demonstrated by careful drafting, as in article 
1.3, of ILO Convention No. 169 which notes that the “use of the term 
peoples in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implica-
tions as regards the rights which may attach to the term under interna-
tional law.” As a qualification on the right of self-determination in its 
article 3, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in arti-
cle 44 specifies that it is not intended to interrupt the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of Member States. Indeed, if we are talking about self-
government for groups within State borders, it might be more productive 
in terms of obtaining Government approval, to rely on the terms of self-
government or autonomy.  
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8.6 International Monitoring  
The development of international human rights standards is well ad-
vanced and they have now been widely accepted by States. The priority 
task now is the realisation of these rights, that is to say, making sure that 
States follow the rules of the game. Compared to the issue of standards, 
however, monitoring procedures remain in their infancy. The procedures 
used and the corresponding institutions implementing them are of quite 
recent historical lineage being for the most part only 20–30 years old.  
The primary responsibility for implementation of these international 
standards rests with States. They should do so by way of constitutional 
law, legislation, administrative measures, human rights education and 
information. If these standards are violated States are obliged to provide 
effective remedies. Individuals and groups should be able to claim the 
rights to which they are entitled and seek enforcement. To that end, inde-
pendent courts, prosecutors and national human rights institutions are 
necessary. This responsibility extends equally to countries with civil and 
common law systems and to federal and unitary States.  
Governments are more often than not hesitant if not even reluctant 
partners when it comes to implementing the standards to which they have 
agreed. On other occasions human rights are conveniently and often se-
lectively used to push foreign policy interests. It is official UN policy, 
however, that human rights issues are a matter of international concern. 
States are thus not able to hide their performance behind references to 
sovereignty, domestic jurisdiction or internal affairs.  
Global and regional organisations have set up a number of monitoring 
procedures and protection mechanisms to check and double-check that 
States live up to the human rights commitments they make. The monitor-
ing procedures can be divided into two parts as will be illustrated below: 
those set up under human rights treaties and thus applicable only to rati-
fying States and those set up by resolutions with universal reach.  
Responses from UN procedures are sometimes slow in coming for a 
variety of reasons, including politics, the lack of financial resources and 
bureaucracy. Some of the procedures described below therefore authorise 
the taking of urgent action, making it possible for them to rapidly respond 
to emergency requests.  
8.6.1 Treaty-Based Monitoring Procedures  
The major UN human rights treaties, which require regular submission of 
reports by ratifying States and the corresponding treaty bodies are: 
 
 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - the Human 
Rights Committee (CCPR),  
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 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights - 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
 the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women - the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW),  
 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination - the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD),  
 the Convention on the Rights of the Child - the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC),  
 the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment - the Committee Against Torture 
(CAT),  
 the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families - the Committee on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families (CMW), and 
 the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities - the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). 
 
The main method available to the treaty bodies is the examination of 
State reports. In the reports, State Parties describe their performance 
which is carefully scrutinised in order to make sure that the States live up 
to the commitments undertaken; recommendations are issued in case of 
discrepancies. Governments are however likely to inflate their own per-
formance. To counter this the monitoring bodies usually have other 
sources of information for example in the form of shadow reports issued 
by NGOs.  
Several treaty bodies are empowered to receive complaints concerning 
alleged human rights violations provided of course that the State involved 
has both ratified the treaty concerned and accepted the particular proce-
dure. Some of them can receive complaints from individuals and others 
from both individuals and groups. Important case-law is emerging espe-
cially with regard to the hundreds of cases decided by the Human Rights 
Committee under the ICCPR.   
In addition to considering State reports and complaints the treaty bod-
ies can also adopt general comments or recommendations building on 
their own case-law and experience gathered in the examination of State 
reports. Dozens of such comments have been adopted often serving to 
highlight or even supplement many treaty provisions.  
8.6.2 Charter-Based Monitoring Procedures 
Given the existence of the wide ranging measures already implemented 
by the UN in respect of standard-setting and monitoring activities, human 
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rights issues can be seen to be high on the agenda of many UN institu-
tions, including principal organs like the General Assembly. The highest 
level body devoted solely to human rights issues is the Human Rights 
Council (which replaced the Commission on Human Rights in 2006). It is 
composed of 47 States with many other States, specialised agencies, 
IGOs and NGOs attending its sessions as observers. The meetings take 
place in Geneva several times each year. 
The Council’s agenda covers a wide range of UN human rights activi-
ties: policy-making, research and studies, standard-setting, monitoring, 
technical cooperation, other promotional activities, and so on. The Coun-
cil appoints the special procedures’ mandate holders with fact-finding and 
investigative mandates. An Advisory Committee of experts serves under 
the Council.  
The Charter-based or extra-conventional procedures are applicable to 
all countries irrespective of treaty ratifications. The substantive basis of 
these procedures rests to a large extent on the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, but other texts may also be used. The procedures are ad-
ministered by the UN Human Rights Council with diplomats rather than 
independent experts calling the shots. As a result, the outcome may be 
tainted by political considerations, with practitioners well advised to use 
the treaty-based procedures whenever they are available.  
The special procedures rest on resolution mandates and concern either 
thematic or country-oriented issues. Among the themes are the rights of 
indigenous peoples, minority rights, racism, and religious intolerance, for 
a total of about 40 mandates. The process of choosing themes and espe-
cially countries for scrutiny is therefore somewhat political as with other 
decisions taken by the Council. Large and influential States have thus 
been able to escape scrutiny by relying on their economic and political 
strength and lobbying weight.  
Special procedures can be used by independent experts entitled Spe-
cial Rapporteurs, Special Representatives, Independent Experts or work-
ing groups all of whom report to the Council. Their mandates require 
cooperation on the part of Governments as far as country visits are con-
cerned. Most Governments now allow such visits to take place because 
denial is, in political terms, more costly than granting access. 
The human rights performance of States is regularly considered by the 
Human Rights Council through the Universal Periodic Review. In four-
year cycles States submit reports which are then matched with other in-
formation such as that emanating from NGOs. Procedures are applicable 
to all countries but once again Council politics clearly influence out-
comes. The submission of complaints to the Council by individuals, 
groups and NGOs is also possible under a resolution procedure for identi-
fying patterns of gross or systematic violations of human rights rather 
than individual problems.  
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The UN Secretary-General, the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
and other top-level officials are able to undertake good offices actions 
through direct contact with Governments, on an informal and humanitar-
ian basis, in matters that are not suited to handling under other proce-
dures. Action can be taken within days or even sometimes hours of re-
ceiving a request. Unlike the other procedures, good offices are carried 
out through so-called “quiet diplomacy” in the belief that Heads of State 
and Governments or foreign ministers are more likely to cooperate if they 
do not suffer embarrassment in the process.  
8.6.3 Promotional Activities 
Human rights education constitutes a legal obligation for all States and 
should take place at all school levels, in formal and non-formal settings, 
with the preparation of relevant curricula and teaching materials. Knowl-
edge of human rights represents a vital factor in enabling people to claim 
the rights guaranteed to them in the international instruments and to have 
their rights respected by others, including public officials.  
Promotional efforts focus on cooperation and collaboration. Technical 
cooperation can include advice in the drafting of constitutional or legisla-
tive bills; review of legislation in light of applicable standards; support of 
infrastructures and independent national institutions; prevention and resolu-
tion of conflicts; curriculum development and human rights centred educa-
tion; the dissemination of human rights information; and the translation of 
instruments and other materials into national and local languages.  
Technical cooperation to the benefit of minorities and indigenous 
peoples can also contribute to conflict prevention. Standards must be 
disseminated to the groups and translated into their languages. Traditional 
customs and alternative methods of conflict resolution outside the court 
room should also be recognised, as long as access to judicial review is 
available. Human rights education is especially relevant to this category 
of rights as denials of justice and fairness are often based on ignorance 
and prejudice. 
8.6.4 Other International Instances  
Articles 62 and 68 of the UN Charter assign human rights functions to 
ECOSOC which examines reports from the Commission on the Status of 
Women, the Commission on Crime Prevention, the Commission on Sus-
tainable Development, and other functional commissions. ECOSOC is 
also responsible for awarding consultative status to NGOs, including the 
granting of consultative status.  
The ICJ cannot hear cases brought by individuals, groups or peoples; 
it is therefore not a human rights court as is the case within the CoE or 
OAS. Human rights issues, however, can appear before ICJ by way of 
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contentious cases between States or in advisory opinions requested by 
UN organs.  
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (established by Gen-
eral Assembly resolution 48/141 of 1993) and her Office do the paper-
work associated with the monitoring procedures described above and 
service meetings of the Council and the treaty bodies by preparing the 
documentation, drafting meeting reports and carrying out any action 
called for, including research and technical cooperation. Her dialogue and 
“good offices” functions have already been highlighted. Headquartered in 
Geneva the Secretary-General nominates a candidate for High Commis-
sioner with the nomination being subject to GA approval.  
The ILO, UNESCO, the World Bank and other specialised agencies of 
the UN are active in setting human rights standards and supervising their 
implementation by means which are often similar to those employed by 
the UN human rights programme, that is State reports, complaints proce-
dures, fact-finding and technical cooperation. The ILO has adopted hun-
dreds of conventions and recommendations relating to labour standards. 
UNESCO has adopted instruments like the Convention against Discrimi-
nation in Education and the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice. 
The World Bank has in place policy directives for women, children, in-
digenous and tribal peoples and NGOs, while the Bank’s Inspection Panel 
entertains complaints.  
8.6.5 Regional Organisations  
Regional organisations like the CoE, OAS and OSCE have passed sig-
nificant human rights instruments, both conventions and recommenda-
tions, and put in place monitoring procedures and expert advice. Their 
work is in some instances more far-reaching than that offered by the UN 
system itself. The CoE and OAS each have human rights courts which 
can hear individual cases and pass judgements binding upon States under 
international law. Under the CoE there is a treaty body for consideration 
of State reports under the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities. Reference has already been made to standard-setting 
by the OSCE and their High Commissioner on National Minorities. 
8.6.6 Non-Governmental Organisations  
The ability of intergovernmental organisations to address difficult issues 
and to carry out monitoring activities is, to a large extent, dependent upon 
input from non-governmental organisations. NGOs like Amnesty Interna-
tional, Human Rights Watch and the Minority Rights Group submit much 
of the information available on human rights violations and country situa-
tions, they contribute good ideas to the standard-setting processes, they 
provide technical assistance and training, they promote human rights 
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awareness, and they carry out monitoring activities of their own such as 
the letter-writing campaigns of Amnesty International. For good govern-
ance, Transparency International is a key NGO. The crucial and multiple 
roles of NGOs enjoy international recognition, even when governments 
grumble about the information collected and submitted. Article 71 of the 
UN Charter mandates ECOSOC to grant consultative status to NGOs 
which allows them to participate in a wide range of UN meetings, includ-
ing many of the human rights gatherings. Several other UN agencies and 
regional organisations maintain their own NGO lists. 
8.7 Concluding Words  
The Arctic countries are democratic but their polar areas remain, to vary-
ing degrees, subject to remote control from faraway capitals. The areas 
concerned are very large while the populations living there are often 
small, and much of the time they are under-represented or not represented 
at all in the metropolitan capital, parliament and the civil service. The 
results may be seen in terms of the discriminatory practices which in-
digenous peoples, minorities and other local communities on the national 
periphery are often faced with in terms of equal access to, and equal op-
portunity in, the enjoyment of public services and in terms of participa-
tion in political, economic and cultural affairs, the fair sharing of national 
wealth drawn from their lands, and the maintenance of their own cultures 
and ways of life. 
The human rights picture now drawn invites many questions. A com-
parative approach reveals major human rights differences in the Arctic 
States, for example in the scope of self-governance or autonomous ar-
rangements, with some of them generous and others more restrictive. 
Similar differences exist as to the active protection of identities and cul-
tures, the rights to lands and natural resources, and in the provision of 
health and social services. Further reading: Miguel Alfonso Martinez, 
Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission, “Study on Treaties, Agree-
ments and other Constructive Arrangements between States and Indige-
nous Populations” in UN document E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20. 
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with Canada, see André Légaré, “Can-
ada's Experiment with Aboriginal Self-
Determination in Nunavut: From Vision 
to Illusion,” pp. 335–367. 
 
Websites:  
For answers to the questions and assign-
ments set above readers are encouraged 
to consult the websites of various inter-
governmental and non-governmental 
organisations.  
For the United Nations go to HYPERLINK 
“http://www.un.org” “www.un.org” and 
HYPERLINK “http://www.ohchr.org” 
“www.ohchr.org.” The latter site belongs 
to the UN High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights and there you will find all the 
instruments, general comments, ratifica-
tion lists and the relevant meeting and 
monitoring reports. For explanations of 
the vote on the Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, see Official Re-
cords of the General Assembly, in UN 
document A/61/PV.107 of 13 September 
2007 at HYPERLINK “http://www.un. 
org” “www.un.org.” The Permanent Fo-
rum has its own website at HYPERLINK 
“http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/” 
“www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/.” For 
the texts of judgements and opinions of 
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the International Court of Justice, go to 
HYPERLINK “http://www.icj-cij.org” 
“www.icj-cij.org.”  
The instruments and monitoring reports of 
the International Labour Organization, 
including ILO Convention No. 169, ap-
pear at HYPERLINK “http://www.ilo. 
org” “www.ilo.org.” See also HYPER-
LINK “http://www.unesco.org” 
“www.unesco.org” and HYPERLINK 
“http://www.worldbank.org” 
“www.worldbank.org.” 
For the instruments and monitoring ac-
tivities of the CoE, including the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, see HY-
PERLINK “http://www.coe.int” 
“www.coe.int,” and for the websites of 
the Inter-American Commission and 
Court of Human Rights, see HYPER-
LINK “http://www.oas.org” “www. 
oas.org.” On the OSCE website  
HYPERLINK “http://www.osce.org” 
“www.osce.org” you will find the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities 
and the Lund Recommendations. 
NGO websites are an essential part of your 
reading. See Amnesty International at 
HYPERLINK “http://www.amnesty. 
org” “www.amnesty.org,” Human 
Rights Watch at HYPERLINK “http:// 
www.hrw.org” “www.hrw.org,” the In-
ternational Work Group for Indigenous 
Affairs at HYPERLINK “http://www. 
iwgia.org” “www.iwgia.org,” the Minor-
ity Rights Group at HYPERLINK 
“http://www.minorityrights.org” “www. 
minorityrights.org” and Transparency 
International at HYPERLINK “http:// 
www.transparency.org” “www. 
transparency.org.” 
For an English translation of the draft 
Nordic Sami convention, see HYPER-
LINK “http://www.saamicouncil.net/ 
?newsid=2223&deptid=2192&language
id=4&news=1” “www.saamicouncil.net/ 
?newsid=2223&deptid=2192&language
id=4&news=1”  
For the case Reference re Secession of 
Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, go to 
HYPERLINK “http://csc.lexum. 
umontreal.ca/en1998/1998rcs2-217/ 
1998rcs2-217.html” “http://csc.lexum. 
umontreal.ca en1998/1998rcs2-217/ 
1998rcs2-217.html.” 
Research and academic websites often 
contain much useful information. The 
Netherlands Institute of Human Rights 
and the University of Minnesota Human 
Rights Library maintain excellent data-
bases at “sim.law.uu.nl/SIM/Dochome. 
nsf?Open” and “www1.umn.edu/ 
humanrts/index.html,” respectively. Ad-
ditional information can be found at 
HYPERLINK “http://www.bayefsky. 
com” “www.bayefsky.com.” See also, 
for example, the sites of the Resource 
Centre for Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
at “www.galdu.org/web/?giella1=” and 
of Researching Indigenous Peoples’ 
Rights under International Law at “intel-
ligent-internet.info/law/ipr2.html.” 
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Questions: 
1. Has your country ratified the human rights treaties mentioned above? 
With any reservations? Read your country’s State reports for treaties 
ratified and concluding observations made by the treaty bodies and 
compare these with the reality as you know it. Has your country 
accepted the complaints procedures under the treaties? If so, have 
complaints been submitted and what are the cases about?  
2. For other instruments, such as the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, did your country vote in favour when they were 
adopted? Did your country explain its vote upon adoption? Read your 
country’s UPR report. Has your country issued standing or specific 
invitations to any of the special procedures for inspection visits? 
Have any of them visited your State or otherwise commented upon 
domestic problems?  
3. Are you satisfied with the human rights situation in your country? 
What are the main problems, if any? Do you find that the reports 
submitted by your State to international organisations tell the full 
story? How do you go about lobbying Governments for change?  
 
 
 
 
9. Greenland’s Self-Government 
 
Mininnguaq Kleist 
9.1 Introduction 
On June 21, 2009 Self-Government became a reality in Greenland. This 
was the outcome of a thorough process of deliberation, negotiation and 
debate which produced recommendations that led to a popular referen-
dum in Greenland, in November 2008, which ultimately saw the en-
dorsement of Self-Government. 
The process leading to the introduction of Self-Government had taken 
approximately a decade – formally beginning in 1999 with the establish-
ment of the Greenland Self-Government Commission, which in 2003 
issued its report. The work of a second commission, the Greenland-
Danish Self-Government Commission1 (2004–08) led to another report in 
2008 which contained a new draft Act on Greenland Self-Government. 
On June 21, 2009 the Act on Greenland Self-Government replaced the 
Home Rule Act (HRA) of 1978 and via this new Self-Government Act 
Self-Government was formally introduced. 
In 2009 the introduction of Self-Government was celebrated with the 
holding of ceremonial festivities in the capital, Nuuk, where heads of 
state, royalty, ambassadors, parliamentarians, and other representatives 
from several countries were in attendance. Symbolically these festivities 
signified the beginning of a new era – the Self-Government period. A 
new form of rule had emerged to replace the traditional Home Rule (HR) 
system which had been in place for 30 years. 
This chapter will look at both the contents and context of the Act on 
Greenland Self-Government. Before dealing directly with the substance of 
Self-Government in Greenland however it is important to know something 
about Greenland’s history, the Home Rule system, and some of the specific 
societal issues pertaining to the current socio-economic and political situa-
tion. This background knowledge is necessary to better understand the 
development of the move towards Self-Government in Greenland. 
                                                     
1 In the text whenever the Greenland Self-Government Commission and the Greenland-Danish 
Self-Government Commission are not given their full titles, the first will be denominated “the GSG 
Commission,” and the latter “the GDSG Commission” where it is deemed appropriate for the pur-
poses of clarity.  
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9.2 The History of Greenland – a Short Version 
This section is limited to an analysis of events in Greenland’s history 
which are deemed relevant to the broader purposes of this chapter. The 
main stages of Greenland’s historical development include the following 
highlights:  
More than 4,000 years ago – the first peoples arrive. Some of these 
peoples were the ancestors of the Inuit. Through history Greenland has 
been inhabited by different Inuit peoples and cultures. Greenland’s Inuit 
people are descended from the people who came to Greenland at the be-
ginning of the first millennium AD. 
The Norse first came to Greenland just before the dawn of the first 
millennium AD, and promptly disappeared again after approximately 500 
years. The Norse could thus be said to be the first European colonizers.  
1721 – Modern colonization begins with the Norwegian-Danish mis-
sionary Hans Egede, who went to re-Christianize the Norse in Greenland, 
but found “only” the Inuit – whom he Christianized. Hans Egede trav-
elled on behalf of the Danish Crown. Greenland thus effectively becomes 
a Danish colony. 
Until the middle of the 19th century Greenland is administered by the 
Danish Government without the inclusion of local Greenlandic councils.  
By the middle of the 19th century the first local councils are being es-
tablished in various districts across the country. These councils consisted 
of Danish civil servants (colonial managers, priests, doctors, etc) and 
some of the debt-free skilled hunters. These councils had very limited 
competences and dealt mostly with social assistance and the maintenance 
of law and order. 
In 1911 these councils were replaced by municipal councils (focussing 
on social assistance, basic education help for the sick, and law and order) 
and two provincial councils (subsequently merged into one provincial 
council). The members of the municipal councils were elected by the 
population – including Danish civil servants who had served in 
Greenland for at least two years (voting rights were very limited – e.g., 
women did not obtain the right to vote until 1948). The provincial coun-
cil2 debated common matters and questions – including questions posed 
by the Danish Government. The members of the provincial council(s) 
were chosen from among the members of the municipal councils.3 
From 1945 to 1954 Greenland was on the UN-list of non-self-
governing territories in accordance with the stipulation of UN-Charter 
chapter XI (see Alfredsson 2004). 
                                                     
2 The top Danish civil servants in Greenland would automatically be the chairman of the provin-
cial councils. This did not change until 1967 whence the chairman would be elected from among the 
members of the provincial council. 
3 There were also a number of other councils in existence designed specifically to deal with loans 
for house building, guns, tools, and different kinds of social help, etc. 
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By 1953–54 Greenland is no longer officially a colony becoming in-
stead an integral part of Denmark through the new Danish Constitution of 
1953. Greenland also gets representation in the Danish Parliament – the 
Folketing – with two seats. 
In 1972–73 Greenland becomes a member of the EEC together with 
the rest of Denmark, even though the vast majority of people in 
Greenland vote against this in the 1972 referendum. By the beginning of 
the 1980s however a new referendum is arranged in Greenland and a 
“no” vote is returned. In 1985 Greenland finally leaves the EEC and at-
tains the status of an OCT (Overseas Countries and Territories) to the 
EEC – now EU. 
Greenlanders did not however feel that the change in status from col-
ony to integral part of Denmark was sufficient when it came to respecting 
their wish to be treated on an equal basis with the Danes or to be seen to 
be an active part of the development process occurring in Greenland. 
Greenlanders thus often felt like spectators in respect of the developments 
happening around them. In this light, the beginning of the 1970s saw the 
creation, in Greenland, of an internal Greenlandic Home Rule committee 
– this is something both the Danish and Greenlandic side agreed upon, 
namely, that Greenland had to clearly formulate its wishes before starting 
work in a joint Greenlandic-Danish Home Rule Commission. In 1975 the 
Committee makes its recommendations on what Home Rule should con-
tain (seen from a Greenlandic perspective) and these subsequently serve 
as the basis for further negotiations between Greenland and Denmark.4  
In 1975 the joint Danish-Greenlandic HR Commission is established. 
It completes its work in 1978. The result is the Home Rule Act and sys-
tem, which the Folketing accepted and the Greenlandic people subse-
quently endorsed through a referendum, in 1979.  
9.3 The Home Rule Act of 1979 
When the HRA entered into force on May 1, 1979, Greenland and its 
population was recognized as being “unique” in the context of the Danish 
Realm and not just as another part of the territory of Denmark proper. 
The HR system is the precursor to the Greenland Self-Government 
system. Home Rule was based on the HRA and with this Act the first 
Greenlandic Parliament and the first Greenlandic Government were es-
tablished. These bodies assumed legislative and the executive power in 
the fields of responsibility/areas of competence which they gradually took 
over. In the beginning these areas were few in number, but by the late 
1990s almost all 17 major areas listed in the appendix to the HRA had 
been taken over. Among others these included: education, the health sys-
                                                     
4 The earlier Home Rule process with its committee and commission should not be confused 
with the later Self-Government process and its commissions.  
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tem, social affairs, housing, infrastructure, the economy, taxation, fisher-
ies, hunting and agriculture, the labour market, commerce and industry, 
the environment, the municipalities, culture, the church, etc. 
The authorities in Greenland did not however initially attain compe-
tence in respect of the exploitation of potential mineral resources through 
the recommendations of the HR Commission of 1975–78 though they did 
subsequently gain an increasing role in this area also. By the late 1990s 
competence in respect of mineral resources were more or less split be-
tween Denmark and Greenland through the Mineral Resources Act of 
1998. 
The Home Rule system was essentially a process where Greenland, 
initially at least, attained limited competences and authority over its own 
affairs. Over time, up to 2009, this system was however to evolve into a 
much more comprehensive package of responsibilities and competences. 
In addition to this brief historical “interlude” in order to gain a better 
understanding of the development of Greenland it is also important to 
highlight some of the most important societal and economic aspects of 
Greenlandic life. 
9.4 The Societal and Economic Development of 
Greenland 
Understanding Greenland’s former colonial past is essential to under-
standing its modern development. As with many other former colonies 
Greenland’s society is currently facing numerous social problems (e.g., 
alcoholism, high rates of suicide, etc.). These problems have deep roots in 
the changes that were imposed by the former colonizers in practically all 
areas of life. The same changes that buttressed colonial control looked at 
from an indigenous perspective, basically sought also to impose a new 
religion, a new political system, alien norms, hierarchies and ways of life 
etc., on the indigenous people of Greenland.  
The trauma of colonization and its consequences will take generations 
to remedy because generations of peoples lives have been blighted by its 
stigma and its impacts. The work of trained people who know about 
Greenlandic culture has been and still is needed to help remedy some of 
these problems but providing enough of these educated people has also 
been a problem in itself. 
In the latter years of the Home Rule era more debate occurred and a 
greater focus was placed on these areas resulting in a slow but positive 
trend towards change. For example, the level of alcohol consumption has 
gradually fallen by half and is now comparable to levels in the Nordic 
countries. 
Another pressing issue is the generally low educational level of 
Greenlanders compared to those in the developed and industrialized coun-
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tries. The Greenlandic people do not have a centuries-long tradition of 
western-style educational provision and historically have not had a large 
number of educational institutions. During the Home Rule years major 
efforts were however made on further developing this area, efforts which 
have only further intensified in the last decade. This latter effort is finally 
now showing positive results but still more needs to be done. Denmark 
deserves credit for its continuing assistance in this area (e.g., Danish educa-
tional institutions are free and open to all Greenlandic students). 
The lack of sufficient numbers of trained and educated people in re-
spect of the numerous areas of society in need of attention has of course 
had profound consequences. Perhaps the first of which is that many of the 
trained professionals necessary for these positions have to be “imported” 
into Greenland. Some stay permanently while others stay only for a few 
years. When they arrive they need time to learn about Greenland’s unique 
society so that they can work and function efficiently. When they leave 
however they take away all their precious expertise with them, and new 
people have to be trained up again and again. This still affects the func-
tionality of different areas of life in Greenland. More and more 
Greenlanders are however now finishing their own educational studies 
and this will undoubtedly see a slow improvement in the situation. 
Greenland will never however become self-sufficient in all areas needing 
trained and highly educated people – the population is simply too small. 
That being said, there is still a lot that can be done in Greenland when it 
comes to education. 
Greenland is a big country with a small population of approximately 
56 000 spread all over the country but mainly along the West Coast. Cli-
mate and geography pose challenging obstacles to infrastructure and eco-
nomic development. This means that in Greenland the harsh environment 
remains a major factor in the quest to further develop Greenland’s public 
and private sectors. On the one hand, ongoing climate change is creating 
new opportunities in agriculture across Southern Greenland, as well as in 
tourism and minerals (see below) while on the other hand, it also makes it 
harder for hunters and fishermen to sustain their traditional lifestyles in 
Northern Greenland. 
Greenland’s economic development is further affected by a number of 
additional factors. For example, Greenland receives a major share of its 
income from the substantial annual Danish block grant and from its 
shrimp and fish exports. Greenland also has partnership and fishing 
agreements with the EU, which also generate some income. Tourism is 
growing but currently forms only a small part of the overall size of the 
economy.  
Greenland has a vast mineral wealth potential with numerous miner-
als, precious gems and metals such as gold and olivine currently being 
mined. In addition, zink and lead will in the near future also be mined. 
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Prospects also exist for the future mining of iron, molybdenum, rubies 
and diamonds among other things. 
There is strong data available suggesting that Greenland has a huge 
potential in respect of deposits of oil and gas. The potential benefits ema-
nating from their exploitation may make Greenland economically self-
sustaining but of course this remains, as yet, conjectural.  
The hydropower potentials of Greenland are also impressive and 
might even attract foreign companies relying on energy-intensive proce-
dures in the production of their products. This could create more jobs, as 
with the mining industry, thus helping Greenland to further diversify its 
economy. 
An opening up of the Northwest Passage to shipping navigation will 
make the shipping routes, at least between Europe and Asia, much 
shorter. It is hoped that this could also create positive economic opportu-
nities for Greenland.  
Greenland’s geo-political importance (e.g., the location of the U.S. 
Thule Air Base with its potent radar in the far North of Greenland and the 
significant military interests attached to it) makes Greenland valuable for 
Denmark both in a NATO context but also for the USA.  
Despite the promising economic possibilities outlined above 
Greenland, as of 2010, still has a small and non-self-sustaining economy. 
A number of major challenges and obstacles have to be overcome in or-
der to create a stronger society – mainly in the social and educational 
areas and in respect of the economy. At the same time however it is pos-
sible to discern the emergence of many new opportunities, to track posi-
tive tendencies and to witness positive developments as far as Greenland 
is concerned. It is undoubtedly the case that Greenland’s current indus-
trial and economic potential is very impressive. 
9.5 The Introduction of Self-Government 
As noted previously, from 1999 to 2002 Greenland had its own internal 
Greenland Self-Government Commission – established by the Home 
Rule Government. The Commission members were Greenlandic parlia-
mentarians, civil servants, academic scholars, etc. The GSG Commission 
issued its report in 2003 containing recommendations for the path of 
Greenland’s future societal development. The GSG Commission was 
initially established because it had become clear, from a Greenlandic 
perspective, that the Home Rule system needed either to be updated or 
replaced. It was felt by many in Greenland that the HR framework had 
become too narrow as developments in Greenland had proceeded much 
faster than anyone could have imagined. Greenlanders naturally therefore 
wanted to gain more authority and control over their own affairs. Since 
Greenland was, and still is, part of the Kingdom of Denmark these 
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changes needed to be negotiated with Denmark with both Danish consti-
tutional law and also international law in mind.  
But it was also clear that if Greenland was to strengthen itself inter-
nally and become more economically self-sustaining then a lot of work 
had to be done within the country. It was also crucial that this work had 
to be done by Greenlanders themselves as they had to define the entire 
process and take over responsibility for further steps in the development 
of their own society. And so the GSG Commission came up with a broad 
set of recommendations addressing various existing and emerging issues 
pertaining to the further development of Greenlandic society. 
For example, one of the most visible and concrete recommendations 
concerned the public administrative organisation. It was suggested that 
the number of municipalities (and thus their administrations) be reduced 
from 18 units to a smaller number in order to rationalize the public sector. 
On January 1, 2009 this materialised into the creation of 4 large new mu-
nicipal units.  
As indicated previously, another set of recommendations contained 
some of the GSG Commission’s recommendations on the development of 
the future Greenland-Denmark relationship seen from a Greenlandic per-
spective. These recommendations focused on the legal and financial ar-
rangements applicable within the context of the ongoing relationship 
between the two countries.  
The GSG Commission was of the opinion that the Greenlandic people 
are “a people” according to international law with a right to self-
determination. The GSG Commission further recommended that the rela-
tionship between Greenland and Denmark should evolve into something 
more like a partnership, and that the Home Rule Act of 1978 should be 
replaced with a more modern piece of legislation.  
During its work the Greenland Self-Government Commission held 
several conferences and town hall meetings in order to both inform the 
populace of its work and to foster public debate. With the GSG Commis-
sion’s report and recommendations Greenlanders expressed their posi-
tion; they had done their preparatory work and prepared for their negotia-
tions with Denmark.  
9.6 The Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission 
On June 21, 2004 Greenland’s Premier Hans Enoksen and the Danish 
Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen signed the mandate and frame-
work of the Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission. 
The mandate, or kommissorium, specified the scope of the GDSG 
Commission’s mandate and outlined the framework of the Commisson’s 
work – focusing in particular on highlighting the areas in which recom-
mendations were required (see below).  
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It was also stated here that the members of the GDSG Commission 
would be parliamentarians from both Denmark and Greenland – 8 mem-
bers from each country – representing all the parties in the two parlia-
ments. This was required in order to strengthen the democratic mandate 
of the GDSG Commission’s work. The parliamentarians would be the 
actual members but in addition there would also be a swarm of ministe-
rial civil servants and academic scholars, working as advisors and ex-
perts, participating in the ongoing work from both sides. 
The Greenland-Danish Self-Government Commission began its work 
in September 2004.  
Naturally the members all took part in the GDSG Commission’s gen-
eral work and in its internal debates though this work was further divided 
into three working groups with the commission members being divided 
into these groups: 
 
 The Working group on mineral resources (including oil and gas) 
 The Working group on economy and industrial development 
 The Working group on constitutional and international law 
 
These working groups were tasked with drawing up concrete proposals to 
be recommended and presented to the rest of the GDSG Commission. 
The Commission as a whole was then tasked with deciding on whether to 
adopt the proposals or ask the working group in question to rework their 
submission. This was an ongoing process. 
The terms of reference section of the mandate stated: 
The Commission shall, on the basis of Greenland’s present constitutional position 
and in accordance with the right of self-determination of the people of Greenland 
under international law, deliberate and make proposals for how the Greenland au-
thorities can assume further powers, where this is constitutionally possible. The 
Commission shall draw up proposals for a new arrangement which also takes into 
consideration the fields of responsibilities that have already been assumed by the 
Greenland authorities under the Greenland Home Rule Act. 
The Commission shall base its work on the principle that there must be accor-
dance between rights and obligations. The Commission shall deliberate and make 
proposals for a new arrangement concerning the economic situation between 
Greenland and Denmark. 
The Danish Government and the Greenland Landsstyre Greenland Govern-
ment are in agreement that it is for the people of Greenland to decide whether 
Greenland wishes independence, and that the new arrangement shall imply no 
change to that. Where relevant, independence will have to be implemented 
through the conclusion of an agreement to this effect under the rules laid down in 
section 19 of the Danish Constitution. The Commission’s proposals for a new ar-
rangement shall contain a provision on Greenland’s access to independence in ac-
cordance with this (official translation 2008:4). 
 
The working groups were each tasked with forming proposals for their 
particular subject areas. On April 17th, 2008 The Greenland-Danish Self-
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Government Commission held its final meeting. Its recommendations had 
been written into the Commission’s report and put into the Draft Act on 
Greenland Self-Government. In May 2008, in Nuuk, the chairmanship of 
the GDSG Commission officially handed over the Report on Greenland 
Self-Government to the Greenland Premier and the Danish Prime Minis-
ter. In June, also in Nuuk, the members of the GDSG Commission pub-
licly presented the Report. This was broadcast live across Greenland on 
both radio and TV. 
After the summer of that year a period of open and public debate be-
gan where further presentations on the possible Self-Government system 
were made. From South to North and East to West, an extended “meet the 
public tour” was completed covering the new recommendations from the 
GDSG Commission. Where possible all of the political parties present in 
Greenland’s parliament were represented in these discussions. Most par-
ties were in favour of Self-Government, but one party was against its 
contents – the Democrats. Some of the public meetings were broadcast 
live nationally either on radio or TV. Numerous meetings for students 
were arranged, TV- and radio debate programmes aired, printed material 
distributed to every household, informational advertisements in newspa-
pers, material put on the internet to be downloaded, etc.  
On the 25th of November 2008 a popular referendum took place on 
whether or not the Draft Act on Greenland Self-Government should re-
place the Home Rule Act. The result was 75.54% in favour of the intro-
duction of Self-Government, and 23.57% against. 71.96% showed up to 
cast their vote. That is a high number in Greenland. 
As a consequence of the referendum result on the 28th of November 
2008 the Greenland Parliament asked the Greenland Government to con-
tact the Danish Government and ask them to present the Bill on 
Greenland Self-Government for the Danish Parliament – the Folketing.  
The Bill on Greenland Self-Government is now an act of the Danish 
Folketing – the Act on Greenland Self-Government of 2009. In what 
follows we will now comment on the main sections of this Act – an Act 
which is evolutionary and historic to Greenlanders.  
9.7 The Act on Greenland Self-Government of 2009 
The Act contains 29 sections, excluding the preamble. In appendixes, the 
Act has two lists (see below) including in total 33 fields of responsibility 
(jurisdiction/competences) that can be taken over by Greenland from the 
Danish state one by one. When taken over, the legislative and executive 
power, the financing and the administration over the field in question will 
become Greenland’s responsibility.  
With Self-Government in place, Greenland will be responsible for the 
financing of the specific field when it takes over that area of competence 
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in question. This is viewed under the principle that there should be accor-
dance between rights and obligations mentioned in the mandate for the 
GDSG Commission. In comparison to this under the Home Rule system, 
the taking over of new fields of responsibility normally meant an increase 
in the Danish block grant in order for Greenland to be able to finance the 
new areas of competence.  
The Act has more than 100 pages of written explanatory notes. They 
function as a guide on how to interpret and understand the sections and 
provisions laid down in the Act. The explanatory notes also go into 
deeper detail.  
We will now look at the main provisions of the Act comparing some 
of its elements with those of the previous Home Rule system.  
9.7.1 The Preamble 
The preamble states: 
Recognising that the people of Greenland is a people pursuant to international law 
with the right of self-determination, the Act is based on a wish to foster equality and 
mutual respect in the partnership between Denmark and Greenland. Accordingly, 
the Act is based on an agreement between Naalakkersuisut Greenland Government 
and the Danish Government as equal partners. 
 
The preamble is an integral part of the Act and its contents serve as the 
fundamental guiding principles for the interpretation of this document. 
There are two main elements in the preamble.  
 
1. Recognition of Greenlanders as a people according to international 
law with the right of self-determination  
2. The Act is based on a wish to foster equality in an agreement based 
on mutual respect between the Greenland Government and the 
Danish Government as equal partners. 
9.7.2 Recognition as a people according to international law with the 
right of self-determination 
What does this mean? The explanatory notes to the Self-Government Act 
focus on international law where a mention of the Charter of the United 
Nations, Article 1, subsection 2 can be found – it reads: 
To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace; 
 
This is a very broad provision. The GDSG Commission has chosen not to 
go into detail on what a recognized people with a right to self-determi-
nation would mean. This is because the two sides of the GDSG Commis-
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sion could not agree upon the extension of this right. There was a clash 
between the interpretation of the extension of the Danish state’s right 
through the Constitution and the extension of the Greenlandic peoples’ 
rights through international law.  
But who consitute the people of Greenland? First, I will not try to an-
swer this question in a national, ethnic or cultural sense here. That would 
make the question far too complex given the space constraints of this 
chapter. Instead I will address the question in a legal sense, though even 
here limits will have to be observed. I will focus on the right to vote and 
to run for public office, because in that way you can be said to have the 
right to partake in the formal ruling of the country and its people. I will 
use those rights in order to indicate who is part of the Greenlandic people, 
because rights can be used as an indicative factor (though not the only 
factor) in telling who is de facto part of this group of people. Especially 
in this case where it is a people with a right to self-determination. For 
example, it is stated that it is for the Greenlandic people to decide 
whether or not Greenland becomes independent. This will happen among 
other things through a referendum. And the individuals who are allowed 
to vote are legally part of the people.  
In a legal sense the individuals who constitute the Greenlandic people 
are those who have been recognized as a people in its own right. They 
are, for example: the residents of Greenland who are 18 years of age and 
above, they have the right to partake in elections, to vote or run for office 
in Greenland. Through their democratic participation they can partake in 
the ruling of the country. To be able to vote, one has to be a Danish citi-
zen and to have lived in Greenland for at least 6 months prior to the de-
mocratic election or referendum. When one terminates one’s permanent 
domicile in Greenland and moves away from Greenland one looses that 
right. It can however be regained by moving back into residence in 
Greenland. Greenlandic students who go to Denmark and study also have 
the right to vote in Greenland, even though they might study and live in 
Denmark for several years. Those under eighteen years of age are of 
course also part of the people as indeed are others who, all other things 
being equal, have the right to vote in Greenland, but for one reason or 
another do not vote. They are also part of the Greenlandic people. The 
above is a highly simplified answer to the question posed but it will suf-
fice for our purposes. Greenlanders are thus Danish citizens and have 
Danish passports even after Self-Government has been introduced. The 
right to vote in Greenland is not attached to ethnicity. 
Thus, ethnic Danes and Faroese who have lived, and still live, in 
Greenland for more than 6 months will also be part of “the Greenlandic 
people” – in a legal sense and as long as the provisions remain as they are 
now. Remember we are not talking about culture and ethnicity here. A 
French person, or a person of any other nationality, will not be part of the 
Greenlandic people, even though he or she might have lived in Greenland 
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for years, until she/he opts for Danish citizenship first and obtains it. So 
Danish citizenship is also for the time being at least a prerequisite for 
being part of the Greenlandic people in a legal sense.  
But the right to vote and run for public office in Greenland may 
change, if the Inatsisartut – The Parliament of Greenland, should so de-
cide. And if this happens who constitutes the people of Greenland will 
also change in a legal sense. The Inatsisartut can change the legislation 
on who has the right to vote in Greenland, because that piece of legisla-
tion is an internal Greenlandic matter and not part of the Self-
Government Act. If a change in the right to vote should occur it would 
probably not be based on ethnicity, but rather on how long you have had 
your permanent residence in Greenland, before you obtain the right to 
vote in Greenland. 
These examples show that the recognition of the Greenlandic people 
does not only extend to the indigenous people of Greenland, but also to 
people of other ethnic origin, primarily Danes living in Greenland. This is 
very much in line with the Government of Greenland being a public gov-
ernment, and not a purely indigenous government. But as the vast majority 
of the population of Greenland is part of the indigenous group (approxi-
mately 88%) this is reflected in the makeup of the governing cabinet.  
Under the HRA the Greenlanders were, in the Danish wording, called 
“et særligt folkesamfund” – which roughly translates as “a unique peo-
ple’s society”. This Danish predicate has no clear definition and is not 
used under international law and thus has no direct rights attached to it 
according to international law. As mentioned above, the term “people” is 
linked to the right to self-determination. The right to self-determination is 
a right and value, which Greenland along the way most likely will strive 
to get closer to and perfect – both internally and externally. But other real 
life factors also play a role, such as the human capacities and abilities of 
the population, the educational and economic situation, other countries’ 
interests, political-, geopolitical and military interests, etc. These factors 
pose interesting and serious challenges to Greenland some of which may 
even destabilise Greenlandic society, if one is not mindful and sensitive 
towards them.  
Greenland’s right to internal self-determination is limited by the fields 
of responsibilities which Greenlanders have not yet assumed. Denmark 
retains formal powers over those fields. But Denmark will not rule or 
change anything major within those areas without reference to the 
Greenlandic authorities first. At the same time Greenland cannot by itself 
realize any policies in those areas in which Greenland has not yet as-
sumed authority. But Greenland can ask to get legislation changed within 
an area not taken over yet, and if Denmark agrees the Danish Folketing 
will change the legislation. 
When Greenland assumes a new field of responsibility Greenland as-
sumes the executive power, the power to legislate, and the responsibility to 
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finance and administer that particular area. In so doing Greenland will 
gradually strengthen its own right to internal self-determination. Greenland 
will also strengthen its external self-determination when it takes over a 
field of jurisdiction. We will return to this issue later. Now we will exam-
ine the second element of the preamble – equality. 
9.7.3 The Greenlandic and Danish Governments as Equal Partners 
As shown above, the equality-aspect of the relationship between the 
Greenland Government and the Danish Government is explicitly men-
tioned in the preamble to the Act. It is further underlined with reference 
to the specific use of the constructs “mutual respect” and “partnership” in 
the document. 
One of the main reasons to underline this was the desire to show that 
both the Self-Government system and The Act on Greenland Self-
Government are products of the cooperation between the two countries 
agreed upon after fruitful and constructive negotiation. This is not to say 
that the negotiations were straightforward or that few differences between 
the two sides emerged within the GDSG Commission but rather to under-
line the constructive nature of the process which led to the production of 
the end product. This could not have been realized without the existence of 
a certain level of mutual respect or partnership. It is also the result of the 
1999–2002 Greenland Self-Government Commission’s recommendation to 
evolve the relationship between the two countries into a partnership.  
The preamble also highlights the values that are important in the in-
terpretation of the rest of the Act. Where, for instance, doubts arise in 
respect of the outcome of decisions neither Denmark nor Greenland 
should try to dictate a decision involving both countries but should rather 
function on the basis of the preservation of mutual respect. 
Fundamentally it also means, that even though Denmark is the 
stronger of the two partners (Denmark retains various sovereign powers 
and responsibilities whilst also continuing to finance much of 
Greenland’s public sector budget through the annual block grant, and also 
retains the competences to interpret and amend the constitution), it is not 
allowed to unilaterally repeal the Act on Greenland Self-Government 
without Greenland’s acquiescence, even though it is an Act of the Danish 
Folketing because, from an international law perspective, this would not 
be in accordance with the principles of equality and mutual respect or 
with the Greenlandic people’s right to self-determination mentioned in 
the preamble. It is then these values and ideals that should be kept in 
mind when interpreting the Act on Greenland Self-Government. 
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9.8 The Main Provisions within the Act 
Chapter 1 – The Self-Government Authorities and the Courts 
In this provision the tripartite division of power is guaranteed. Legislative 
power lies with Inatsisartut (the Greenland Parliament) while executive 
power lies with Naalakkersuisut (the Greenland Government). Judicial 
power lies with the courts of law. The first two mentioned are already 
part of the Self-Government authorities. Judicial power is still under the 
Danish judicial system (in 2010) but these “Greenland courts” are physi-
cally situated in Greenland.  
Greenland will explicitly be able to take over authority for the court 
system in Greenland under the Self-Government provisions, though con-
trol over the Supreme Court will remain with Denmark. Cases that in-
volve fundamental questions and principles of law can be dealt with in 
the future Greenlandic court system and individual cases can be taken all 
the way up to the Supreme Court of Denmark. As long as Greenland is 
not an independent state it will not be able to assume responsibility for 
the Supreme Court but can under Self-Government assume such respon-
sibilities over the rest of the judicial system within Greenland. The as-
sumption of responsibility for the judicial system in Greenland will repre-
sent a major milestone in the Self-Government process. Much however 
still remains to be done in order for this to occur. 
Particular note should be made here of the fact that for the first time 
Greenlandic words are used in a piece of Danish legislation, namely, 
“Naalakkersuisut” (Government) and “Inatsisartut” (Parliament).  
Chapter 2 – The Self-Government Authorities’ Assumption of Fields of 
Responsibility 
The Act has two lists in its appendix. List I contains five fields of respon-
sibility and List II a further twenty eight. Areas of responsibility from the 
first list can be assumed whenever Greenland decides it is ready while 
areas from the second can only be assumed at fixed points in time to be 
subsequently agreed upon between Greenland and Denmark. These nego-
tiations concern the practical elements that need to be coordinated before 
Greenland can assume responsibility in the fields concerned. In addition, 
where there are areas that are not explicitly mentioned in these lists and 
which exclusively concern and involve Greenland, then Greenland will 
also be able to assume responsibility for them.  
Greenland begins financing a particular field of responsibility when it 
assumes responsibility for that area. This is new compared to the previous 
Home Rule system and means that Greenland will gradually assume more 
and more financial responsibility for its own affairs. It also means that 
Greenland will have to slowly generate more income in order to take over 
the financing of these areas.  
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One cannot foresee when Greenland will be ready to assume responsi-
bility for any given area. Given Greenland’s developing situation and the 
issues identified previously in respect of the economy and the availability 
of qualified manpower, the setting of fixed timeframes in advance in 
respect of when the assumption of responsibilities should take place 
would be unfortunate and have a counterproductive effect. 
In addition to the already mentioned judicial system, the police and 
the prison and probation service other major areas where responsibility 
can be assumed by the Greenland Government include the mineral re-
source area, aviation, ship registration and the maritime issues area, the 
immigration and border control, etc. 
In the explanatory notes to the Act one will also find a small number 
of areas highlighted for which the Greenlandic authorities will not be able 
to assume responsibility under the Self-Government status. These are the 
constitution, foreign affairs, defence and security policy, the Supreme 
Court, nationality (citizenship), the currency and monetary policy. These 
areas are viewed by Denmark as constituting the last areas of competence 
which define the state of Denmark, and therefore, these cannot be taken 
over by Greenland until Greenland opts for full independence.  
Greenland has already assumed responsibility for the mineral resource 
area (including all of Greenland’s possible inshore and offshore oil and 
gas resources) as of January 1st 2010. Control of the mineral resource 
area is one that Greenland has politically fought for since the 1970s. Not 
surprisingly Denmark has long been unwilling to give up this area. 
Within the context of the latest Self-Government Commission’s work 
however the time was finally adjudged to be right for Denmark to consent 
to Greenland’s full jurisdiction in this area. Thus, within this competence 
Greenland will be able to issue exploration and exploitation licenses on 
whatever mineral, gas or oil deposits there may be. Greenland has, more-
over, assumed executive and legislative power in this area – including 
financing and administration. Cooperation between Greenland and Den-
mark in the research field in this general area will however still take 
place.  
Chapter 3 – Economic Relations between the Greenland Self-Government 
Authorities and the Danish Government  
This is a key chapter of the act – as it involves the economy, the block 
grant, the financing of the various fields of responsibility and potential 
revenues in respect of minerals, oil and gas resources. In practice these 
provisions were some of the toughest to negotiate. They took the longest 
time to negotiate primarily because the stakes are high when one consid-
ers the potential mineral, oil and gas resources in and around Greenland. 
It was however also something of a challenge to properly address the 
GDSG Commission’s stated goal, namely, to put in place a set of provi-
sions which would strengthen Greenland’s development towards eco-
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nomic self-sustainability. This meant that Greenland would have to as-
sume more economic responsibility and become less dependent on the 
Danish block grant while at the same time becoming economically 
stronger.  
In what follows only the focal points of these provisions are outlined in 
detail. Throughout this chapter of the Act the Danish block grant for 
Greenland is explicitly mentioned in numerical terms: i.e., 3,439,6 million 
Danish Kroner in 2009 (i.e., 3,4 billion DKK). This chapter of the Act also 
explains how the grant should be adjusted from year to year following the 
general price and wage index, and how it will be paid. This mentioning of 
the amount is new compared to the provisions under the Home Rule sys-
tem, where the block grant was re-negotiated every 2 or 3 years. In 2009 
the Danish block grant was around 55–60% of Greenland’s Finance Act’s 
incomes. 
The provisions of the Act further deal with how the financing is to be 
maintained both through and after the various fields of responsibility are 
assumed by the Greenlandic authorities, including the assets already con-
tained within those fields – Greenland also takes over these. 
The explanatory notes to the Act mention that in respect of the areas 
of responsibility still retained by Denmark it is obliged to maintain a 
comparable standard to those seen in Denmark except where it can justi-
fiably be claimed that “specific Greenlandic conditions” can be said to 
apply that may prevent this. This is also a new provision as compared to 
the Home Rule Agreement. The provisions of Chapter 3 of the Act also 
state to whom the revenues from mineral resource activities shall fall. 
Greenland will now receive the revenues.  
If however Greenland begins to generate substantial revenues from its 
mineral activities then it cannot also continue to recieve a substantial 
block grant from Denmark. A specific legal mechanism has thus been 
created wherein Denmark deducts an amount from the block grant corre-
sponding to the equivalent of 50% of the annual revenues from mineral 
activities, after Greenland has taken the first 75 million Danish Kroner of 
these revenues (the first 75 million Danish Kroner does not have any 
consequences for the block grant). This 50% amount will be deducted 
from the block grant, and it can go up or down from year to year, follow-
ing the amount of revenue raised from the mineral-based activities.  
Example: 
Revenues from mineral resource activities in 20XX: 275 million Danish 
Kroner 
Greenland gets the whole amount. But Denmark will deduct an 
amount from the block grant. The actual amount can be deduced by 
means of the following mechanism: 
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 Greenland’s revenues from mineral resource activities in year 20XX: 
275 million DKK 
 The first 75 million DKK raised has no consequence for the block 
grant 
 The rest of the revenues that year is 200 million DKK  
 Denmark can deduct 50% of the 200 million DKK from the block 
grant 
(The block grant the following year will be 3,439,6 million DKK 
minus 100 million DKK. (The block grant of course has to be adjusted 
according to the general price and wage index. The amount used in the 
example is the 2009–figure)). 
 Greenland’s mineral resource activity revenues and block grant 
income that following year will then be 275 million DKK plus 3,339,6 
million DKK 
 
Conclusion: Greenland’s income will have risen, and Denmark will have 
saved funds.  
This mechanism benefits both countries economically but more im-
portantly it strengthens Greenland’s push towards economic self-
sustainability. If revenues from mineral resource activities become so 
substantial that they bring the annual block grant down to zero then the 
block grant will not rise again. At that point negotiations between 
Greenland and Denmark will have to reconvene on the subject of their 
future economic relationship. This point is highlighted in the provisions. 
We can speculate and perhaps also anticipate that in this situation this 
new set of negotiations will also involve a fundamental reassessment of 
the political relationship. As long as revenues from mineral activities 
remain small or non-existent however the block grant will continue in 
place.  
The revenues that fall under the above mechanism will be revenues 
from company taxes from mineral/oil companies and royalties on the 
quantities of resources brought up. Revenues stemming from publicly 
owned companies involved in mineral resource activities also fall under 
the above mechanism. Taxation on personal wages does not however fall 
under the mechanism, and will be Greenland’s to collect and disburse.  
As of 2010 Greenland has no revenues that fall under the definition 
used above in respect of mineral resource activities. Nevertheless, 
Inatsisartut – The Greenland Parliament – has already drawn up the nec-
essary legislation to establish a foundation where potential future reve-
nues stemming from mineral resource activities will be deposited much 
like the oil fund of Norway. This has been done because the prospects for 
future revenues already look promising. Moreover, if revenues start flow-
ing in substantial amounts it is a prudent measure to avoid an overheating 
of the economy. When creating a mineral and oil foundation Greenland 
will also set potential funds aside for the future. As indicated above the 
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revenues going to this foundation will be those stemming from both in-
shore and offshore resources. 
Chapter 4 – Foreign Affairs 
In the Act this Chapter is quite detailed, but here we will only focus on 
the main principles. 
As previously noted Greenland will not be able to assume responsibil-
ity for foreign affairs under the new Self-Government status. This does 
not however exclude Greenland from having a foreign “policy” on mat-
ters and interests that affect it. The Government of Greenland has a De-
partment of Foreign Affairs to safeguard the interests of Greenland. But 
as Greenland is not yet a state, even though Self-Government has been 
introduced, it cannot operate fully as a state on the international scene. 
On foreign affairs Greenland has been given some competences 
mainly in areas which it has assumed – e.g., in respect of fisheries where 
Greenland can enter into agreements with the EU or bilaterally with other 
states for that matter. But because Greenland is not an independent state it 
exercises only limited jurisdiction in the area of foreign affairs. For ex-
ample, Greenland cannot become a member, in its own name, of some 
international organisations in which only states can become members. In 
these cases, Denmark will be the member of the international organisa-
tion and speak on behalf of the whole kingdom. However, Denmark will 
hear the views of, and coordinate with, Greenland on statements – espe-
cially when it is relevant to Greenland. In some cases a Greenlandic rep-
resentative speaks for the whole kingdom.  
That being said, Greenland can negotiate and enter into agreements un-
der international law on matters which exclusively concern it and which 
relate to fields of responsibility already assumed by the Greenland Self-
Government. Agreements can be made with other states and international 
organisations and cooperation with these upheld. For example bilateral 
fisheries agreements with Norway and Iceland; and, Greenland cooperates 
and has entered into a partnership agreement with the EU without being a 
member of the EU – here only states can become members. 
The Greenland Government shall inform the Danish Government 
when such negotiations and agreements are under consideration. And if 
they are of substantial importance to the Realm, these matters have to be 
negotiated with the Danish Government before any decision is taken. 
Greenland can become a member of international organisations in its 
own name, when membership is allowed to entities other than states in 
the international organisation in question. It has to be ensured too that if 
Greenland becomes a member of the particular international organisation 
this will not conflict with its agreed constitutional status. 
To become member of different international organisations would be a 
way to strengthen Greenland’s international profile under the context of 
its Self-Government status, but might also be a path for Greenland to 
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follow in order to become part of international multilateral negotiations. 
Of course these organisations would have to allow entities other than 
states to obtain membership. These could e.g., be international organisa-
tions under the UN (not the UN itself, because here only states can be-
come members). 
In the Nordic Ministerial Council Greenland is not an independent 
member. But within the context of Nordic cooperation the Danish King-
dom’s three parts (Denmark, Faroe Islands and Greenland) operate as 
three individual entities. 
Where Denmark holds membership in other international organisa-
tions or enters into agreements under international law on behalf of the 
Kingdom of Denmark, Denmark has to hear Greenland first on whether 
or not the agreement shall apply to Greenland – especially when such 
issues are of particular interest to Greenland. If the Danish Government 
deems it necessary to enter into agreements without the Greenland Gov-
ernment’s consent the agreement shall, to the widest possible extent, have 
no effect for Greenland. Nevertheless Greenland is subject to obligations 
that arise from agreements under international law and which are at any 
time binding on the Realm. This would for example be the case with re-
gards to human rights conventions. 
One can add to the above information that the Kingdom of Denmark is 
defined by the Danish state as a unitary state with only one (Danish) con-
stitution. The constitution is interpreted to place the constitutional re-
sponsibility and powers in international affairs in the hands of the Danish 
authorities. This includes security policy (Greenland does not have an 
army, but among other things, Denmark patrols Greenland’s waters with 
its naval ships. As noted previously the US also has a military base in 
Greenland). Therefore Greenland will not be able to assume responsibil-
ity in this area until it becomes independent and forms its own state. 
Being a unitary state (in a perfect world) would entail that this unitary 
state only had “one face” facing outward. This is one part of the reason-
ing behind Greenland having limited competences in respect of foreign 
affairs. In terms of membership of the EU, however, Denmark proper is a 
member while both Greenland and the Faroe Islands are not. This does 
not exactly fit well with the notion of a unitary state. Indeed it is exactly 
this difference in the relationship with the EU that will probably pose 
significant challenges in the future when the EU will likely speak and 
negotiate ever more on the international scene on behalf of its member 
states. In these cases one may suspect that there will not be much consid-
eration given to the views and interests of Greenland or the Faroe Islands 
and in these cases one will probably more often see Greenland dissenting 
from the EU/Danish position. In such cases the provisions in the Self-
Government Act relating to the international agreements Denmark enters 
into without Greenland’s consent will assume ever greater importance. 
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One example of this is the ongoing Global Climate negotiations where 
Denmark takes its position under the EU-umbrella with Greenland having 
more in common with the needs of developing countries and economies. 
Therefore Greenland is not adopting the same position as Denmark with 
regard to the obligations it has signed up to. 
Greenland has a great need for development, something Denmark has 
already achieved for itself – being an industrialised and developed coun-
try. As such then it has been agreed that Greenland and Denmark will 
negotiate “Greenlandic terms” separate from the Denmark – EU stance 
where appropriate. Whether or not Greenland will be able to negotiate 
internationally in the future on its own behalf will, in part, be decided by 
possible future “membership” or otherwise of the United Nations Frame-
work Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), when the international 
climate negotiations commence. 
That being said the provisions on foreign affairs in the Self-
Government Act have not changed much from the latter years of the 
Home Rule system. Today there is ongoing constructive and cooperative 
contact between the two countries’ foreign affairs services. The years to 
come will show how practice will further evolve in respect of how 
Greenland manoeuvres on the international scene particularly as regards 
the recognition of Greenlanders as “a people” according to international 
law with a right to self-determination. The interpretations of these provi-
sions, not to mention their evolution in practice, will be crucial in this 
process. 
Chapter 5 – Cooperation between the Greenland Self-Government 
Authorities and the Central Authorities of the Realm Regarding Statutes 
and Administrative Orders 
Succinctly put, the provisions here concern how the Danish Govern-
ments’ Bills that may be brought into force for Greenland have to be 
submitted to the Greenland Self-Government authorities for comments 
before they are presented to the Danish Folketing. The same goes for 
administrative orders before they are brought into force. 
Chapter 6 – Dispute Resolution 
This provision is identical to that on the same subject in the Home Rule 
Act. It is to be used in cases where the Greenlandic Self-Government 
authorities and the Danish authorities disagree on a matter and cannot 
settle things normally. When discussions between the two parties do not 
lead to an agreement or compromise, but the matter is of fundamental 
importance and a decision is needed, then this provision is intended for 
use. In such a case the parties can decide to lay the question before a 
board consisting of two members appointed from each side and three 
Danish Supreme Court judges. If the four appointed members however 
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reach an agreement the case will be considered settled. If not the three 
Supreme Court judges will make a decision. 
The provision was never used under the HRA but is thought of as hav-
ing a preventive role – nobody wants a case to be brought before such a 
board – and therefore it can be viewed as being a factor that strengthens 
dialogue. Thus, the GDSG Commission considered the preventive role of 
this provision as being a good element to have, notwithstanding the fact 
that it may never actually be needed. 
Chapter 7 – Language 
The provision states that the Greenlandic language is the official lan-
guage in Greenland. In the Act itself no other languages are mentioned. 
In the Home Rule Act the Greenlandic language had the status of the 
main language of Greenland and it was explicitly mentioned in the HRA 
that Danish would, in addition, have to be taught thoroughly in 
Greenland.  
It is stated in the explanatory notes to the Self-Government Act that 
the Greenlandic language is part of the Greenlandic peoples’ cultural 
identity – and this is why the language is given this new status. Both 
Greenlandic and Danish can be used in public and official matters. In the 
explanatory notes one will also find mention of the need to thoroughly 
teach in Greenlandic, Danish and other languages including English. This 
is done in order to ensure that the Greenlandic youth will be generally 
better prepared for higher education both domestically and abroad. 
The attainment of this new legal status in respect of the Greenlandic 
language sees it given the highest legal recognition available in 
Greenland. What however this actually translates into in real life for 
Greenlandic society as a whole only time will tell. The GDSG Commis-
sion did not have the mandate to decide upon this – on what the internal 
Greenlandic language policies should be and what the effects on society 
will be. That is a matter solely for the Greenlandic Parliament and Gov-
ernment to decide upon. We may speculate that in some societal areas 
where Danish currently dominates that Greenlandic will be strengthened. 
But as already noted, only time will tell what impact this will have in 
societal terms while these changes are themselves not without challenges. 
As indicated in the explanatory notes the provision is not intended to 
exclude other languages in Greenland, and in fact, the explanatory notes 
point in the direction of further strengthening education in other lan-
guages. A large majority of Greenlanders speak and understand 
Greenlandic. A minority do not, but are mainly Danish-speaking 
Greenlanders and Danes. A large group of people speak both languages. 
Chapter 8 – Greenland’s Access to Independence 
This provision states that the decision regarding Greenland’s future inde-
pendence shall be taken by the people of Greenland. The GDSG Com-
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mission’s mandate emphasized that a provision regarding Greenland’s 
access to independence was one of the things wanted by the two Gov-
ernments. The way the Greenlandic peoples’ right to independence was 
expressed in the mandate was however somewhat different compared to 
how it subsequently turned out in the Act itself.  
The mandate noted that it is for the people of Greenland to decide 
whether Greenland wishes independence. An act of law is not however 
needed to guarantee whether or not the Greenlandic people wish for inde-
pendence. Rather, if an act is needed to guarantee something, in this case, 
it should be that the decision is respected when it is taken. Thus in Chap-
ter 8 the main provision is framed such that the decision regarding 
Greenland’s independence shall be taken by the people of Greenland. 
If such a decision is taken then negotiations between Greenland’s 
Government and Denmark’s Government shall commence with a view to 
the introduction of independence in Greenland (as it is expressed in the 
Act) this in order to negotiate all the different practical elements in place 
between the two countries. The negotiations will not be about whether or 
not Greenland will become independent – as that will already have been 
settled through the Greenlandic peoples’ prior decision.5  
In a situation where Greenland has opted for independence there will 
still be a few fields of responsibility that have not yet been assumed – 
primarily, areas which could not be taken over until independence was 
secured. These areas are: – the constitution, foreign affairs, defence and 
security policy, the Supreme Court, nationality, and the currency and 
monetary policy.  
In any future negotiation scenario Greenland will have to come to the 
table well-prepared in order to obtain what it requires in respect of the 
practical elements pertaining to independence. Greenland has however 
yet to opt for independence and thus it will take some time before the 
country is ready to stand on its own feet. Greenland currently still relies 
on the block grant financially while, as of 2010, it continues also to lack 
sufficient educated capacity in its population to carry out and successfully 
implement the task of independence or the duties of a fully sovereign 
state, while authority for a large number of new fields of responsibility 
remains to be assumed. 
While Greenland will probably become independent in the future co-
operation will likely remain between the two countries on areas where 
Greenland continues to require assistance. It is not after all uncommon to 
see close continuing cooperation between two states especially when, like 
Denmark and Greenland, they have a historic relationship. Only time will 
tell however whether or not this will happen. Many factors may be rele-
                                                     
5 The initial decision can be taken through a referendum, but the Greenland Parliament/ 
Government may also make it – if it feels it has a strong mandate, perhaps after an election where the 
overarching theme was independence. Realistically in connection with such a fundamental decision 
the people will probably be consulted from the beginning of an independence process. Even though 
the people would then be heard directly twice in this process (see below). 
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vant in this case. Namely, how successfully has Greenland developed in 
educational, health and societal terms? How is the economic situation in 
Greenland? How have the country’s industries developed? What is 
Greenland’s relationship with its neighbouring states – especially the 
USA, Canada and Iceland? How has the relationship with the Nordic 
countries evolved? How is cooperation between Greenland and the EU? 
What can Greenland offer Denmark? And what can Denmark offer 
Greenland? 
In addition to the independence option, the explanatory notes also 
suggest that “free association” – a form of cooperation where a smaller 
state (former colony), cooperates with and gets assistance in some areas 
from a larger metropolitan state – is also a path that Greenland could 
consider following. Under free association Greenland would be inde-
pendent but would continue to enjoy formalised cooperation with Den-
mark or perhaps even another state (not very likely though). This coop-
eration would then be founded on a form of formalised bilateral agree-
ment while both countries would have their own constitutions. In this 
way neither of the two countries would be directly limited by the other 
country’s constitution. The Cook Islands has such a relationship with 
New Zealand; and Palau, the Marshall Islands and Micronesia are in a 
free association with the USA. Palau, the Marshall Islands and Microne-
sia are all also full members of the UN. 
Returning to the Act itself, when an agreement on independence be-
tween the Greenland Government and the Danish Government has been 
reached the agreement has to be presented to the Inatsisartut which has to 
give its consent to it. Furthermore the agreement has to be endorsed by a 
referendum in Greenland. The Greenlandic people would then have to 
give their approval to the stipulated conditions of independence. 
Because Greenland is still part of the Danish constitutional law system 
Greenland’s move towards independence would also have to be approved 
by the Danish Folketing. Independence for Greenland would, for the 
Danish Kingdom, represent an act of relinquishing territory. Under the 
Danish Constitution in order for this to happen the Danish Parliament has 
to give its consent (See section 19 of the Danish Constitution). 
In the Act it is stated that independence for Greenland shall imply that 
Greenland assumes sovereignty over the territory of Greenland. In the 
explanatory notes this is further elaborated as including sovereignty over 
the land, as well as the sea and airspace above and around Greenland. 
The explanatory notes to the Self-Government Act also state that in 
order to be legally prepared for independence Greenland can begin its 
own preparations for independence in terms of writing its own future 
constitution. This would be an act where the legal foundation for a possi-
ble future sovereign state is prepared.  
Greenland’s potential route to independence entails a carefully 
thought out and thorough process where fundamental decisions will have 
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to be made and several parties will have to be involved – most impor-
tantly and decisively the people of Greenland themselves. There may be 
some stumbling blocks along the way, but the fundamental trick for 
Greenland is to come well-prepared for the process – primarily that the 
people and their society have given themselves the time to develop fur-
ther. Independence is something that should not be rushed; otherwise it is 
unlikely to be either viable or tolerable. It may not however be tolerable 
either for the wait to be too long, particularly if it becomes clear that the 
establishment of a viable state is already possible because the limitations 
of not going “the whole way” to statehood would then have become ob-
vious. It is however stated in the explanatory notes that in consenting to 
this legal process, in respect of its access to independence, that Greenland 
has not given up any of its current rights under international law.  
Chapter 9 – Entry Into Force and Transitional Provisions 
The last chapter in the Act has a more technical character focusing on 
how existing legislation will be affected – what will be repealed and what 
remains in force until new legislation comes into place etc.  
9.9 Conclusions 
As of 2010, the Greenland Self-Government Act is a very new piece of 
legislation and thus it still remains to be seen how it will operate fully in 
practice. Even though this is a new system in place, in many instances the 
routines and practices of the Home Rule system continue in the ruling 
and administration of the country. Much of the previous legislation in 
numerous areas did not change with the introduction of self-governance 
but rather continues as before. If anything is to change as regards govern-
ing practices in Greenland then these matters will be for the Greenlandic 
Government and Parliament to decide upon. 
The foreign affairs area and its future issues arising between Denmark 
and Greenland will probably be one of the more interesting areas to fol-
low in the years to come. The legislation directly pertaining to this area 
has not changed much, but the recognition of Greenlanders as “a people” 
and the undeniably stronger feeling of Greenlandic self-esteem which 
self-governance brought along will probably lead to interesting develop-
ments and might even lead to Greenland’s greater international involve-
ment in various issues. It will be interesting to follow Greenland’s actions 
in connection with memberships of international organisations or the 
cooperation it enters into with such organisations. With the new Self-
Government system in place it will also be interesting to see Greenland’s 
individual stand on different international issues – e.g., on climate issues, 
whaling, cooperation with the EU, etc. Today Greenland is able to adopt 
an individual standpoint or “own view” on almost all issues, if it should 
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wish to do so. This does not necessarily mean though that Greenland will 
automatically become an independent party to multilateral negotiations. 
Whether or not this will subsequently change in some areas is perhaps 
however one of the most interesting future aspects in this regard.  
With the introduction of Self-Government some of the fundamental 
elements in the relationship between Greenland and Denmark have 
changed (e.g., greater equality was added to the relationship). Further-
more, several outstanding or “open” questions on possible future situa-
tions were clarified, e.g., how possible future mineral revenues should be 
handled and how this should affect the block grant; how a possible future 
independence process should progress, etc. New recognitions acquired: 
the recognition of Greenlanders as a people according to international law 
with a right to self-determination and the recognition of their language as 
the official language which also means a legal strengthening of an impor-
tant part of Greenlandic culture. Greenlanders obtained new rights and 
competences, e.g., the right to take over the resources of the sub-soil and 
the explicit legal right to take over the judicial system, etc. Developments 
in these two areas will be particularly interesting to follow in the future. 
The issue of jurisdiction over resources is crucial to Greenland´s future 
economic sustainability. The rights to the Greenlandic mineral, gas and 
oil resources are now controlled and owned by the Greenlandic people 
who may, or may not, boost Greenland’s economic prosperity. The taking 
over of the judicial system will also represent a milestone on the path to 
create something that might in the future become a new independent 
state. 
The introduction of Self-Government fundamentally changed the legal 
platform and gave Greenlanders the ability to more easily address the 
new challenges facing modern Greenlandic society. The old Home Rule 
legal framework was clearly no longer adequate to perform that role. This 
also shows that the Self-Government system is and will continue to be “a 
process.” In a couple of decades it will likely have evolved into some-
thing that is near its full potential (Greenland will probably have assumed 
most, if not all, new areas of jurisdiction and responsibilities that it is 
legally empowered to do so under the Self-Government system). 
Greenland is now clearly and explicitly able to assume still more areas 
of competence relating to the functioning of the Greenlandic society. In 
this way Greenland’s internal self-determination will be further strength-
ened as will the means to form and mould its own society. On the ques-
tion of independence only time will tell how Greenland is able to take 
advantage of the momentum created thus far. If Greenland opts to do so 
the Greenlandic people can choose to secede from Denmark. If 
Greenlanders so wish, they will be able to draft their own constitution 
which will define their own political status. But Greenland can also 
choose to stay within the Kingdom. In addition it can also choose to try to 
develop its relationship with Denmark into a free association – a form of 
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formalised cooperation between two independent countries each with 
their own constitution.  
Aside from the legal aspects further development should and probably 
will be within the areas of education, social policy, health, industrial de-
velopment, the labour market and the economy. Developments within 
these sectors will be crucial for the further evolution of Greenland’s Self-
Government status. This will take time, and this is the reason why the 
process will probably last for decades before the option of independence 
becomes feasible. At the same time one cannot disregard the fact that in 
the coming years the likely new discoveries and exploitation of mineral 
resources and oil may suddenly change the economic prosperity prospects 
for Greenland significantly for the better. 
Before the introduction of Home Rule people in Greenland were not 
satisfied with the fact that much of their society was run from Copenha-
gen. Experience of both the period before HR and of the HR process it-
self have shown that you need to be where things happen, to know the 
people and their culture, to hear what they have to say, and to live with 
the consequences of your decisions, otherwise you will instil a form of 
rule which, ultimately, the people neither identify with nor support.  
This was in part the reasoning behind why Greenlanders wanted to 
control their own country and society and thus why the Home Rule proc-
ess was introduced. The same fundamental reasoning was behind the 
introduction of Self-Government. This does not however mean that the 
new process of self-governance will be easy. It is clear though that 
Greenlanders as a society and as a nation, wanted, and want to, control 
their own society because they want to be responsible for their own af-
fairs and in so doing they can identify much better with how their country 
is run. This is what Self-Government in Greenland is all about. 
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Documents: 
Act on Greenland Self-Government, June 
21, 2009. 
The Greenland Home Rule Act of 1978. 
The Constitution of the Kingdom of  
Denmark. 
The Charter of the United Nations. 
 
Websites: 
www.nanoq.gl – the official Greenland 
Government web page. Among other 
things, you will be able to find and 
download the Act on Greenland Self-
Government and the Executive Sum-
mary of The Greenland-Danish Self-
Government Commission’s Report on 
Self-Government in Greenland – both in 
English. One can also download the full 
report on Greenland Self-Governance 
which is available in Greenlandic and 
Danish only.  
www.inatsisartut.gl – the official web 
page of Inatsisartut – the Greenland  
the Parliament by G. Alfredsson and 
Kleist. Webpages in Greenland. 
www.stat.gl – Greenland Statistics. 
www.dnag.dk – The North Atlantic Group 
of the Danish Folketing contains useful 
publications e.g., by G. Alfredsson and 
M. Kleist. 
www.climategreenland.com – the official 
Greenlandic web page on climate issues 
www.sermitsiaq.gl & www.knr.gl – me-
dia web pages in Greenland. 
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Questions: 
1. What does Greenland’s right to self-determination mean?  
a. Internally and externally. 
b. Which factors limit and which strengthen this right? 
c. Discuss the possible clash between constitutional rights and 
rights according to international law in this context. 
d. Discuss the notion of “equality” in this context. 
2. Discuss the issue of voting rights – compare Greenlandic rights in 
this regard to those of other countries. How do voting rights in 
Greenland differ from voting rights in other countries? 
3. Discuss the economic arrangements under the Self-Government 
system with regards to the principle that there must be accordance 
between rights and obligations (as mentioned in the Greenland-
Danish Self-Government Commissions mandate). 
4. Describe the legal independence process as it is laid down in the Act? 
What are its strong and weak points?  
5. Does the Act on Greenland Self-Government correlate with the right 
of self-determination according to international law? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Inuit of Alaska: Current 
Issues 
 
Dalee Sambo Dorough 
[The Indians] were told that Columbus discovered America and here is 
how you are going to live. If a single Native can speak English at that 
time, he would reply, “No, no, no? We are the first Americans. […] Our 
people have one perpetual goal – self-determination, freedom, and peace. 
Statement by Mike Roger Silook, Gambell, to the Alaska Native Re-
view Commission, September, 1984. 
10.1 Introduction 
This chapter intends to introduce the reader to the Inuit of Alaska and to a 
range of current issues facing their distinct communities, especially in 
light of the 2007 adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indige-
nous Peoples. In addition, the need to re-visit the Alaska Native Claims 
Settlement Act of 1971, which is the key piece of United States legisla-
tion impacting Alaska’s Indigenous peoples, will be briefly discussed. 
Finally, the role and interests of Alaskan Inuit in light of the UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea and climate change will be referenced with 
regard to Alaskan native peoples’ status and rights. 
10.2 Background and History 
The Inuit (of Alaska and those of the entire circumpolar region) have 
essentially occupied the region since the stabilisation of sea levels.1 Their 
pre-history in Alaska dates back to 12,000BC. Inuit oral history and leg-
ends has however recorded their migration from Russia to Eastern 
Greenland. Though once nomadic and consisting of small numbers to 
ensure survival and mobility, Inuit forebears sustained methods for social 
                                                     
1 Inuit or the “real people” are the indigenous peoples settled in the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions 
of Alaska, Canada, Greenland and the Russian Far East, which now number some 150,000. See, 
generally, D. Dumond, “Prehistory: Summary,” and D. Anderson, “Prehistory of North Alaska,” in 
Handbook of North American Indians, Vol. 5, ARCTIC (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute, 
1984) at 72–94. 
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control and order. They lived in relative security where the natural order 
guided cycles and rhythms. Organised communally, Inuit remain hunters 
and gatherers relying primarily upon the land, ocean and rivers for suste-
nance. In all matters, the collective was more important than the individ-
ual. Traditional leaders were chosen based upon their ability to hunt and 
provide for the community as a whole. A balance existed between women 
and men because the combined skills of both were needed for survival.  
Inuit communities remain culturally intact. From the point of first con-
tact with outsiders however they have been adversely impacted. The in-
troduction of diseases for which they had no natural immunity, maltreat-
ment and enslavement, encroachment and exploitation of natural re-
sources by outsiders, and punishment for resistance have all taken their 
toll. The rapid and radical change that occurred has left a deep, dark mark 
on their communities. Even today the “social and physical factors” that 
cause higher mortality rates, addictions, suicide, chronic health issues and 
other poor socio-economic indicators for Indigenous peoples in the North 
remain the focus of study by non-natives (see Driscoll and Dotterrer, 
2009–2010). There is no question that indigenous peoples have been and 
continue to be victims of subjugation, domination and exploitation. Un-
fortunately, there are numerous examples of the denial of the right to self-
determination of indigenous peoples, which has been identified as one of 
the contributing factors to the social ills and dysfunction within northern 
Indigenous communities. 
Like the Indigenous peoples of Latin America, the tentacles of coloni-
sation were manifesting themselves as far back as the 1493 Papal Bull 
purportedly laying claim and undertaking “sovereign acts” within indige-
nous territory, including southeast and south-central Alaska. However, 
there was no real, sustained contact with the aboriginal peoples of Alaska 
(and in particular in the Arctic) until the early 1800s when Russian fur 
traders arrived and even then contact was limited primarily to coastal 
areas. In 1867, the Russian government “fabricated”2 title to Alaska and 
“sold” the territory for 7.2 million dollars to the United States. The rights 
of the Alaska Native peoples were not substantively addressed in the 
1867 Treaty of Cession (Treaty of March 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539) nor 
were they substantively addressed in the 1884 Organic Act, adopted by 
United States Congress. In addition to a range of political and legal provi-
sions, including the establishment of courts, appointment of a Governor, 
the Organic Act provided the following language concerning Alaska Na-
tives: 
That the Secretary of the Interior shall select two of the officers to be 
appointed under this act, who, together with the Governor, shall consti-
tute a Commission to examine into and report upon the condition of the 
                                                     
2 Many indigenous peoples have asserted that Russia never acquired “title” to Alaska and merely 
fabricated title due to their need for finances to support their depressed domestic economy as the 
result of war. 
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Indians residing in said Territory, what lands, if any, should be reserved 
for their use, what provision shall be made for their education, what 
rights by occupation of settlers should be recognized […].3  
This language alone suggests the nature of the relationship between 
the U.S. Commissioners and that of the Indigenous peoples of the terri-
tory as well as how their fundamental rights were being addressed by the 
colonising force. Following this development, the Dawes Act was effec-
tively applied to Alaska through the 1906 adoption of the Alaska Native 
Allotment Act of 1906 (34 United States Statutes 197), which provided 
for individual allotment of land as privately held parcels, creating the 
possibility of loss of lands due to fractionalisation and sale similar to the 
devastating results of the Dawes Act for Indian peoples throughout the 
United States. 
In addition, the 1926 Alaska Native Townsite Act (Pubic Law No. 69–
280) was adopted, with a similar intent to provide lands on the basis of 
individual use. In response to a range of conditions, including the massive 
loss of Indian territory, the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) was 
adopted and later amended (in 1936) to apply to Alaska Natives, provid-
ing recognition of the important collective nature of their land rights as 
well as traditional councils and tribal governments ( Pubic Law No. 74–
538). Under the IRA, a number of Alaska Native communities organised 
themselves for the purposes of self-government, with many still in exis-
tence today. The vast majority of Alaska Native traditional councils were 
maintained, however. Though a couple of Indigenous collectives were 
organised under “reservation” land systems this approach was not put in 
place for Inuit in Alaska. The subsequent 1946 Indian Claims Commis-
sion was hailed as a new policy to ensure redress of Indigenous rights and 
the Commission did in fact address issues brought by the Tlingit and 
Haida in Southeast Alaska. Section 4 of the Statehood Act of 1959 (Pub-
lic Law 85–508) acknowledged outstanding rights and title of Alaska 
Native people to lands by stating: 
the right or title to which is held by the United States or is subject to 
disposition by the United States, and to any lands or other property, (in-
cluding fishing rights), the right or title to which may be held by any In-
dians, Eskimos, or Aleuts (hereinafter called natives) or is held by the 
United States in trust for said natives; that all such lands or other prop-
erty, belonging to the United States or which may belong to said natives, 
shall be and remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control of the 
United States until disposed of under its authority […]. 
Clearly, throughout all of this history as well as the simultaneous 
gradual codification of international law or the Law of Nations concern-
ing the recognition of sovereignty as well as the territory of indigenous 
peoples through treaties and other acts, the United States chose to ignore 
                                                     
3 See: Commission to examine and report on condition of Indians, SEC. 12. District Organic Act 
(An Act Providing for a Civil Government for Alaska) 23 Stat. 24 – May 17, 1884. 
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the fundamental rights and status of Alaska Native peoples. The political 
organisation and collective demands of Alaska Native people (including 
Inuit) from statehood until 1971 effectively resulted in the denial of the 
right to self-determination through the adoption of the Alaska Native 
Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (hereinafter ANCSA). Even the claims 
made by Alaskan Inuit in the context of the Indian Claims Commission 
were summarily dispensed with on the basis that the ANCSA purportedly 
“extinguished” all claims and titles to land.  
10.3 The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 
The experiment of the ANCSA is a concrete example of the adverse im-
pacts of the denial of a peoples’ right of self-determination.4 It was not 
until oil was discovered on Alaska’s north slope that the federal and state 
governments were prompted to discuss and address the aboriginal right and 
title of the Alaska Native people to the territory of Alaska. The state and 
federal governments and private industry felt that congressional legislation 
would better address and fulfil their interests rather than legal action taken 
on the part of the Alaska Natives, who would have had very strong and 
compelling legal arguments to support their assertion of ownership, rights 
and title. The massive lobbying effort of the various stakeholders culmi-
nated in the adoption of the ANCSA. Throughout the process, indigenous 
peoples had very little direct involvement and the final outcome was not a 
matter of referendum. Hence, the basic principles of full, effective and 
meaningful participation and consent were not applied.  
The provisions of the Act transferred to the Alaska Native peoples 44 
million acres of land and 962.5 million dollars in compensation for all 
lands lost. These so-called “entitlements” were channelled through twelve 
regional and two hundred village corporations created by the Act. These 
are for-profit corporations established under U.S. legislation and char-
tered by state statutes. To access these “entitlements,” individuals of one-
quarter Native blood or more, born on or before December 1971, were 
eligible to enrol as shareholders of a corporation. The shareholder rolls 
were then closed. The shares held by Native people are inalienable and 
the profit making corporations hold the land in fee simple, enjoying a tax-
exempt status for a twenty-year period (from 1971 to 1991). Even with a 
minimal understanding of corporate America, one can imagine the over-
night vulnerability of Native ancestral lands under this regime.  
A significant omission in the Act was the fact that there was no single 
provision addressing the right of Alaska Native peoples to self-
determination. In fact, many Alaska Natives contend that it was inten-
tionally omitted in order to assimilate Alaska Natives into mainstream 
society and terminate their distinct relationship with the federal govern-
                                                     
4 See, for example, the four-part Anchorage Daily News series entitled “People in Peril,” 1984. 
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ment. Equally damaging are the ANCSA provisions that purportedly 
“extinguished” aboriginal title to all other lands and aboriginal hunting 
and fishing rights of the Alaska Native people despite their dependence 
upon a subsistence-based economy (ANCSA, ss. 4 (a), (b) and (c)).5 Fur-
thermore, many of the village corporations are without resources to gen-
erate profits. And, even if they do have such resources, to exploit them 
for profit is inconsistent with their values, customs, practices, and land 
and resource use.  
In a short period of time it became clear that ANCSA did not reflect 
and would never reflect the true aspirations of the Alaska Native peoples 
nor was the corporate structure an institutional structure freely chosen by 
them. The vulnerability of the corporations and the exposure of Native 
ancestral lands through taxation, alienation of shares and takeover by 
more powerful forces continued to be very real.6 However, the real prob-
lems of ANCSA lie in the fact that lands, territories and resources, self-
determination, and subsistence were not initially made secure by the Act. 
The very instrument that was to secure the land and a future for Alaska 
Native peoples may be the one by which they lose the distinct character-
istics and status as indigenous peoples. 
In response to this reality and the threats facing Alaska Native com-
munities, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference – which since 2006 has been 
called Council – (hereinafter ICC)7 established the Alaska Native Review 
Commission8 to gain an understanding of the impact of the Act on the 
                                                     
5 For a commentary on the Act, see T.R. Berger, A Long and Terrible Shadow[:] White Values, 
Native Rights in the Americas 1492– 1992, (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 1991) at 133: “In the 
Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 Congress abolished the aboriginal rights of Alaska 
Natives, including their aboriginal rights of hunting, fishing and trapping. Congress had spoken. Yet 
twenty years later Alaska Natives refuse to acknowledge the loss of their tribal right, their right as 
collectivities, to take fish and wildlife and to regulate their own subsistence activities.” 
6 Despite the so-called “1991 amendments” to the ANCSA, the threats to Native ownership and 
control remain and the land is still held by the corporations originally created under the Act. See 
generally E. Smith, “The 1991 Amendments: A Legal Perspective,” 9 Rural Development Exchange 
3 (1988); and B. Anderson and L. Aschenbrenner, “Amendments Provide Stop-Gap Protection for 
Native Land and Corporations,” The NARF Legal Review, Spring 1988. 
7 The Inuit of the Arctic circumpolar region organised themselves internationally through the Inuit 
Circumpolar Conference (hereinafter ICC) founded in 1977 in Barrow, Alaska. The goals of the ICC 
are: To strengthen unity among Inuit of the Circumpolar region; To promote Inuit rights and interests on 
the international level; To ensure and further develop Inuit culture and society for both the present and 
future generations; To seek full and active participation in the political, economic, and social develop-
ment in our homelands; To develop and encourage long-term policies which safeguard the Arctic envi-
ronment; and To work for international recognition of the human rights of all Indigenous Peoples. The 
organisation has an internationally elected President and an Executive Council with two elected Inuit 
from each of the four regions. In addition, the ICC has staff and offices in all four nation-states, as well 
as a number of Commissions and Working Groups that assist in carrying out their four-year mandates. 
These mandates are established through their General Assembly, which is held every four years and 
involve elected delegates from across the entire Inuit territory. The ICC gained United Nations Non-
Governmental Organization (NGO) status in 1983 and has been active in the UN’s work as a leading 
and well-respected indigenous NGO. See generally Dalee Sambo, “Inuit Assert Control Over Arctic,” 
Arctic Policy Review, July/August 1977, Arctic Coastal Zone Management Newsletter, August 1983; 
and A. Lynge, Inuit (Nuuk: Attuakkiorfik, 1992).  
8 The Alaska Native Review Commission (ANRC) was established by the Inuit Circumpolar 
Conference and endorsed by the World Council of Indigenous Peoples. I was the Director of the 
Alaska Office of the ICC, working as the ICC’s liaison to the ANRC, and responsible for raising the 
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lives of Alaska Native peoples. The ICC felt that it was important to pro-
vide a forum that would allow Alaska’s indigenous peoples to speak in 
their own languages and within their own communities. To conduct the 
review of the Act, the ICC appointed former British Columbia provincial 
court Justice Thomas R. Berger of Canada as the sole Commissioner. A 
well-known advocate of Native rights, Berger’s mandate was to conduct a 
comprehensive review of the social, economic, political and environ-
mental impact of the ANCSA, independent of the ICC or any other or-
ganisation in Alaska or elsewhere. 
The backbone of the Commission’s work was the village hearing 
process. Sixty-two village hearings were complimented by eight formal 
roundtable discussions where both indigenous and non-indigenous repre-
sentatives from throughout the world participated. There are over 98 vol-
umes of transcripts from over 800 hours of tapes. The findings of Com-
missioner Berger affirmed and re-affirmed what Native people had been 
saying since the enactment of ANCSA. Berger’s report, Village Journey: 
The Report of the Alaska Native Review Commission amplified the de-
sires of Alaska Natives for continued ownership of their ancestral lands, 
self-government, and recognition of hunting and fishing rights. Alaska 
Natives expressed their desire to retain their lands through governing 
institutions of their choice. Many continue to feel that land and all of the 
renewable and non-renewable resources are key to their survival as dis-
tinct communities. The recommendations made by Commissioner Berger 
reflected these desires and were quite specific as to how to accomplish 
such objectives.  
Following the release of Village Journey, from 1985 to 1988, village 
and tribal leaders from across the state lobbied Congress to amend 
ANCSA in a fashion consistent with Berger’s recommendation and the 
views of the tribal leadership: to ensure that village lands (held by corpo-
rations) could be transferred to traditional governments; to ensure that 
nothing in the legislation would undermine the inherent rights of self-
government and self-determination; and to entrench traditional hunting 
and fishing rights in both state and federal law. The tribal campaign to 
amend ANCSA was spearheaded by the Alaska Native Coalition (ANC), 
a state-wide organisation representing traditional indigenous governments 
and village corporations.9  
The corporate-led effort to amend ANCSA solely within the frame-
work of the corporate structure was spearheaded by the Alaska Federa-
                                                                                                                       
funds necessary to successfully complete its work. The ANRC initiated their work in September 1983 
and concluded in September 1985. 
9 The Alaska Native Coalition (ANC) succeeded United Tribes of Alaska (UTA), state-wide or-
ganisation of tribal governments that subsequently folded due to financial difficulties. The ANC was 
distinct from UTA in that it included village corporation and tribal government representatives, both 
equally concerned about the impact of the ANCSA. The author was the spokesperson for the ANC 
throughout the legislative lobbying effort and headed up much of their fund raising, lobbying, and 
public relations work. 
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tion of Natives (AFN).10 The AFN, at that time considered the Native 
“Chamber of Commerce,” has been the most visible and powerful Native 
institution in Alaska. This “corporate cartel,” has enjoyed a comfortable 
relationship with major industry in Alaska (including the oil industry) and 
the Congressional Delegation of Alaska. In addition, they have a great 
amount of influence over state and federal political agendas.  
The lobbying effort was a fierce battle between the ANC and AFN, 
which divided the Alaska Native community along tribal/corporate lines. 
Unfortunately, due to many factors, the ANC was not successful in gain-
ing the amendments desired. The resulting law (Public Law 100–241) 
does not curb the major threats posed by ANCSA. The land can still be 
lost or sold and there are no provisions to ensure continued Native own-
ership and control of the corporations. The amendments actually allow 
corporations to sell new stock to non-Natives. More importantly, how-
ever, is the fact that the amendments did not provide for returning land to 
the traditional and tribal governments.  
Furthermore, from 1971 until 1993 Alaska Native traditional and 
tribal governments enjoyed, at best, a rather vague political and legal 
status due to the fact that neither the United States’ Congress nor the 
State of Alaska were willing to acknowledge the existence of tribal gov-
ernments in Alaska or their inherent powers. In 1993, Ada Deer, a Me-
nominee Indian woman and former Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, 
published the list of federally-recognised tribes, including 226 Alaska 
Native tribes11 and further drafted preambular language clarifying the 
powers, status, authority and the sovereign immunity of Alaska Native 
governments. This action caused a flurry of political activity prompted by 
the undercurrents in the stream of non-Native opponents to tribal sover-
eignty. 
For example, in the Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie case, the tribe 
was sued by the State of Alaska for imposing a tax on a contractor intend-
ing to build a structure within the tribal community. The State asserted that 
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act purportedly “extinguished” any 
status of Alaska Native lands as “Indian Country” (Ibid.).  
The United States 9th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the right of 
the tribal government of Venetie, as a legitimate third order of govern-
ment in the United States, to impose such a tax, stating that ANCSA did 
not alter the status of Venetie tribal lands as Indian Country. The reaction 
of political leaders and the general public was swift and definitive: appeal 
the decision to the Supreme Court in order to unravel the Appellate Court 
                                                     
10 The Alaska Federation of Natives is a state-wide organisation controlled by the Native re-
gional corporation executives, most of whom feel personally charged to make the ANCSA a success 
and who have personally and individually profited from the institutions. For example, the Native and 
non-Native management of Cook Inlet Region, Inc., a south-central Alaska Native corporation, 
recently divided $17 million as the result of a windfall sale of telecom stock, while a majority of the 
shareholders live at or below the poverty level. 
11 Indian Entities Recognised and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, Federal Register, Volume 58, No. 202, October 21, 1993. 
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decision, believing that it was paramount to ensure that the government is 
the only plenary power that can prescribe the rights and powers of Indi-
ans, whenever and wherever they feel it necessary. And, more impor-
tantly, the State wanted a decision to confirm that Indian Country did not 
exist in Alaska. It is no surprise that the conservative U.S. Supreme Court 
accepted the case and determined that the vague wording of the 1971 
ANCSA supposedly did “extinguish” the status of Alaska Native tribal 
lands as Indian Country and therefore, the tribe had no authority to im-
pose such a tax. The politicians and general public achieved their objec-
tive with this sweeping decision and were only then prepared to engage in 
government-to-government dialogue in an effort to further prescribe the 
rights, powers and authority of Alaska Native tribal governments.  
Despite such legal and political action, tribal governments have per-
sisted and taken on some of the outstanding issues of ANCSA. In 1993, 
the Alaska Inter-Tribal Council (AITC) was organised and modelled after 
the Arizona Inter-Tribal Council. This state-wide organisation has been 
engaged in a number of initiatives to resolve any gray area in terms of the 
State of Alaska’s recognition of tribes.  
For example, in the area of policy development, tribal leaders infused 
a government-to-government dialogue (which followed the Venetie deci-
sion) with the language of the then draft United Nations Declaration, 
which resulted in the adoption of Administrative Order No. 186 by for-
mer State of Alaska Governor Tony Knowles. This order acknowledged 
the existence of Tribes in Alaska and their distinct legal and political 
authority. The order was followed by the adoption of the Millennium 
Agreement in April 2001 by both Tribal governments and the State Ex-
ecutive branch. 
Before the yearlong dialogue with the State of Alaska tribal govern-
ments discussed their strategy and the approach they would need to adopt 
to gain an agreement that would have genuine meaning within their 
communities and for their relations with the State of Alaska. One of the 
first actions was the adoption of a Declaration of Fundamental Principles 
to guide the work and also to put the State of Alaska on notice as to the 
principles that the indigenous peoples of Alaska felt were fundamental to 
their continued existence as distinct collectives. This Declaration of Fun-
damental Principles provided essential procedural and substantive guide-
lines for the dialogue with the State. As a result of the tribal leader’s ac-
tions, the final Millennium Agreement echoes some of the language of the 
original draft United Nations Declaration, albeit adapted for this specific 
context. Specifically, Part III entitled “Guiding Principles” states:  
The following guiding principles shall facilitate the development of 
government-to-government relationships between the Tribes and the State 
of Alaska: 
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 The Tribes have the right to self-governance and self-determination. 
The Tribes have the right to determine their own political structures 
and to select their Tribal representatives in accordance with their 
respective Tribal constitutions, customs, traditions, and laws. 
 The government-to-government relationships between the State of 
Alaska and the Tribes shall be predicated on equal dignity, mutual 
respect, and free and informed consent. 
 As a matter of courtesy between governments, the State of Alaska and 
the Tribes agree to inform one another, at the earliest opportunity, of 
matters or proposed actions that may significantly affect the other. 
 The parties have the right to determine their own relationships in a 
spirit of peaceful co-existence, mutual respect, and understanding. 
 In the exercise of their respective political authority, the parties will 
respect fundamental human rights and freedoms. 
 
In addition, a number of tribal government councils voted to abolish the 
state chartered city governments. They have also transferred assets from 
the village corporations created by ANCSA to the tribal governments. 
Furthermore, they have found creative ways to pool resources without 
triggering “dissenters’ rights.”  
ANCSA represents only one of many examples of the need to address 
the rights of Alaska’s Indigenous peoples in comprehensive terms and in 
a manner consistent with international human rights law. In this regard, a 
careful analysis of ANCSA in the context of international human rights 
standards would immediately bring out the inconsistencies between do-
mestic United States’ policy and international norms. A primary example 
is the purported “extinguishment” of the hunting and fishing rights of 
Alaska Native peoples. Here, even though Article 1(2) of the Interna-
tional Covenants, drafted in 1966, state that “In no case may a people be 
deprived of its own means of subsistence,” the United States Congress, in 
1971, “extinguished” these specific rights. The fundamental rights of 
participation in decision-making, consent, inter-generational rights, de-
velopment, and a wide range of other rights have been violated by the 
terms of ANCSA. However, the denial of the paramount right to self-
determination and self-government has been the most problematic for the 
indigenous communities of Alaska. Therefore, the United Nations Decla-
ration stands as an important document to Alaska Native peoples, includ-
ing the Inuit. Through the Declaration, Alaskan Inuit can begin to right 
the wrongs of ANCSA and other destructive and unhelpful laws, regula-
tions and policies.  
But rather than characterise indigenous peoples solely as victims of 
oppression, it is important to underscore the positive reality of indigenous 
peoples (and their rights) and recent developments that have emerged by 
virtue of the initiatives of the United Nations and other international and 
regional organisations. It is necessary to also highlight a few of the sig-
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nificant positive developments and demonstrate the importance of the 
international indigenous human rights standards to bolster their efforts to 
combat racism, racial discrimination and the denial of rights within their 
communities. 
The first example is that of the Yukon River Inter-Tribal Watershed 
Council (YRITWC). The YRITWC is an initiative that emerged in 1996 
involving over 42 Athabascan, Yupik (who are Inuit and members of the 
ICC) and Tlingit indigenous communities from the headwaters of the 
Yukon River (in Yukon Territory, Canada) to the mouth of the river in 
southwest Alaska, a 2,300 mile watershed.  
An important distinction concerning this indigenous led initiative is 
that it was conceived of by and for indigenous peoples themselves and 
was not in response to a real or perceived threat. The Tribes and First 
Nations of the watershed began with a conference that brought all the 
indigenous peoples and leaders from the river together to meet one an-
other and discuss their visions for watershed protection. It was deter-
mined that an international treaty would be the first step in defining the 
objectives of the Council and goals of the Tribes and First Nations. The 
YRITWC is currently focusing on water pollution and toxics having initi-
ated a water sampling and analysis programme in 2009. They do however 
also intend to consider long-term management and assertion of control 
and ownership issues.  
The Inter-Tribal Treaty was adopted in 2001 (see Accord), and both 
the treaty and the work of the Council incorporate many of the important 
principles that have emerged in the draft Declaration. The YRITWC has 
also been involved in the International Joint Commission (on waterways) 
due to the threat of mining on the Canadian side of the border and its 
impact on the U.S. side. 
In regard to indigenous justice systems, a number of promising and 
unprecedented initiatives have been led by three distinct Tribal Courts in 
the southwest, southeastern and northern regions of Alaska. The first is 
that of the Orutsararmiut Native Council (ONC), which is the traditional 
indigenous government in the village of Bethel. The ONC has developed 
the Mikilgnurnun Alirkutait or Tribal Children’s Code. This Yupik com-
munity felt that it was critical to safeguard the most vulnerable sector of 
their society: the children. The ONC took on the task of developing the 
code by first establishing their long-standing Yupik values, customs, and 
practices or Yupik custom law as the foundation for the Code. 
They followed by reviewing domestic laws and regulations, including 
the Indian Child Welfare Act, and borrowed what they deemed useful 
from this text. They also informed themselves about the international 
indigenous human rights movement and chose to incorporate not only 
provisions from the original United Nations Declaration but also from the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CROC). The final 
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code was adopted by the Council and translated into the Yupik dialect 
and is now used on a daily basis by the ONC Tribal Court (see Code).  
A similar project emerged in Barrow, Alaska on the Arctic slope and 
relates to their Tribal Court. However, the Barrow Tribal Court is devel-
oping an appellate court based upon the traditions of this whaling culture. 
In addition, other tribes have considered the development of tribal codes 
that deal with intellectual property in an effort to safeguard themselves 
from exploitation by outside developers and pharmaceutical companies. 
Each of these projects reflect the development of new regimes based 
upon age old values or, more accurately, on Inuit values and the adapta-
tion of the human rights framework and standards of the United Nations 
for their particular cultural context. Another approach is that of First Na-
tions and Tribal Governments, as legitimate political institutions, adopt-
ing the original United Nations Declaration and various other interna-
tional human rights instruments within their own communities, making 
them applicable to their own members. So, not only are Indigenous peo-
ples incorporating such standards, they are moving to ratify them in the 
way that nation-states ratify the various conventions that emerge from the 
human rights framework.  
Too often indigenous leaders are consumed with the urgent day-to-day 
issues facing their communities and thus have little time to consider the 
activities taking place far away in Geneva, New York and elsewhere. 
Some legitimately ask, what is the point of this work, especially in light 
of the fact that 25 years or more of annual meetings have produced a text 
that still remains “indigestible” to some governments (including the 
United States). It has also been asked by those indigenous peoples who 
have, and continue, to exercise the right to self-determination, and who 
view themselves as independent despite the states that have grown up 
around them and attempted to assimilate and subsume them. These are 
important questions for those that have been intimately involved in the 
process. In some instances, indigenous representatives have been able to 
respond in a direct, proactive and concrete fashion by utilising and giving 
greater meaning to existing and emerging instruments to safeguard and 
advance the political right to self-determination, as well as other eco-
nomic, social, cultural and spiritual rights.  
With regard to policy development, the above example concerning the 
use of the Declaration provisions by Alaska Native tribal governments in 
their government to government negotiations with the state is a good 
model as to how the document has been used to re-define political and 
legal relationships between local governments and indigenous govern-
ments. Similar examples undoubtedly abound in other regions of the 
world. 
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10.4 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
The UN General Assembly adoption, on September 13, 2007, of the 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides 
us with real potential for re-defining the political and legal relationship 
between Alaska Natives, including Inuit, and the State of Alaska, the 
United States government and the third party interests who are some of 
the most powerful forces impacting our communities. Again, there are 
many who would regard the United Nations as irrelevant in addressing 
the issues that face the world community. However, human history and 
the purposes and principles enshrined in the UN Charter, which captured 
aspirations to move the world community away from the horrors of geno-
cide and conflict, are highly relevant to the matters that face Alaskans 
generally and Alaskan Inuit in particular.  
10.5 The Right of Self-Determination 
The fact that the ANCSA did not address the political right of Alaska 
Native peoples to self-determination will be one of the first areas to test 
the latitude for re-defining their political and legal relationships consis-
tent with the minimum standards of the UNDRIP. Articles 3 and 4 (re-
spectively) of the UNDRIP provide: 
“Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of 
that right they  freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development.”  
“Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, 
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their 
internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their 
autonomous functions.” 
Alaska Native youth are now beginning to feel the impact of the 
ANCSA provisions first-hand particularly those who are not enrolled 
shareholders and who have expressed the need to assert their individual 
and collective identity. They have begun to ask about the true impact of 
ANCSA upon their communities. They feel that the Alaska Native com-
munity must re-examine the impact of the ANCSA, especially in light of 
the significant developments concerning international human rights law 
and the UN Declaration on Human Rights.  
Those “disenfranchised” by the Act are unwilling to let go of their 
sense of collective identity or the importance of the right of self-
determination. They have begun to ask the tough questions of who is the 
“self” in self-determination and not only in the context of political rights 
but also in relation to social, cultural, and economic rights as well. Inuit 
youth involved with the Inuit Circumpolar Council have become increas-
ingly involved in local, regional, national and international developments. 
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At the micro-level, the UNDRIP has much to offer in terms of guidelines 
and standards for sorting out difficult questions and outstanding claims. 
At the macro-level, Inuit leaders have already taken important steps to 
address the matter of self-determination in the face of increasing nation-
state claims in respect of Arctic sovereignty. One specific example is the 
November 2008, “Inuit Leaders Summit on Arctic Sovereignty,” which 
was held in Kuujjuaq, Northern Quebec. Inuit leaders from across the 
circumpolar region discussed the matter of Arctic sovereignty at length.12 
The Inuit leaders involved in this topical discussion recognised the com-
plex nature of sovereignty anchored in international law with many over-
lapping elements. However, they affirmed that within the Inuit context, 
the starting point must be the history and reality of Inuit use and occupa-
tion of Arctic lands and waters, and the need for Arctic-rim nation states 
to respect the collective human rights and direct participation of Inuit in 
all international discussions as well as commitments across the whole of 
the Arctic region. With regard to self-determination and Inuit participa-
tion, the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty states:  
3.“Inuit, the Arctic and Sovereignty: Looking Forward” 
The foundations of action 
3.1  The actions of Arctic peoples and states, the interactions between them, and 
the conduct of international relations must be anchored in the rule of law. 
3.2  The actions of Arctic peoples and states, the interactions between them, and 
the conduct of international relations must give primary respect to the need 
for global environmental security, the need for peaceful resolution of dis-
putes, and the inextricable linkages between issues of sovereignty and sover-
eign rights in the Arctic and issues of self-determination. 
Inuit as active partners 
3.3  The inextricable linkages between issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights 
in the Arctic and Inuit self-determination and other rights require states to 
accept the presence and role of Inuit as partners in the conduct of interna-
tional relations in the Arctic. 
3.4  A variety of other factors, ranging from unique Inuit knowledge of Arctic 
ecosystems to the need for appropriate emphasis on sustainability in the 
weighing of resource development proposals, provide practical advantages to 
conducting international relations in the Arctic in partnership with Inuit. 
3.5 Inuit consent, expertise and perspectives are critical to progress on interna-
tional issues involving the Arctic, such as global environmental security, sus-
tainable development, militarization, commercial fishing, shipping, human 
health, and economic and social development. 
                                                     
12 The final outcome of these discussions was “A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the 
Arctic,” adopted on behalf of Inuit in Greenland, Canada, Alaska, and Chukotka by the Inuit Circumpolar 
Council, April 2009. See: http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&source=hp&q=a+circumpolar+inuit+ 
declaration+on+sovereignty+in+the+arctic&aq=2m&oq=inuit+declarat&aqi=g1g-m2. 
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3.6  As states increasingly focus on the Arctic and its resources, and as climate 
change continues to create easier access to the Arctic, Inuit inclusion as ac-
tive partners is central to all national and international deliberations on Arctic 
sovereignty and related questions, such as who owns the Arctic, who has the 
right to traverse the Arctic, who has the right to develop the Arctic, and who 
will be responsible for the social and environmental impacts increasingly fac-
ing the Arctic. We have unique knowledge and experience to bring to these 
deliberations. The inclusion of Inuit as active partners in all future delibera-
tions on Arctic sovereignty will benefit both the Inuit community and the in-
ternational community. 
3.7  The extensive involvement of Inuit in global, trans-national and indigenous 
politics requires the building of new partnerships with states for the protec-
tion and promotion of indigenous economies, cultures and traditions. Partner-
ships must acknowledge that industrial development of the natural resource 
wealth of the Arctic can proceed only insofar as it enhances the economic 
and social well-being of Inuit and safeguards our environmental security. 
 
Furthermore, specific examples of the implementation of the minimum 
standards established by the UNDRIP have emerged in the context of the 
Inuit in the circumpolar region. To date, the most far-reaching example 
may be the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement, adopted by referen-
dum, in December 2004. This Agreement not only provides for Inuit 
rights to lands and resources, including harvesting rights and jurisdiction 
over management of corresponding activities and resources, but it also 
recognises the right of the Labrador Inuit to the adjacent ocean zone ex-
tending to the limit of Canada’s territorial sea. Furthermore, the Agree-
ment specifies Inuit self-government rather than merely public govern-
ment or an ANCSA type corporate structure. The Agreement provides a 
more accurate and expansive understanding of lands, territories and re-
sources as well as the real nature of self-determination, which is consis-
tent with international law and its operation in the Indigenous context. 
Such a comprehensive approach should be seen as a potential model for 
Alaskan Inuit and their internal dialogue to re-define and re-conceptualise 
their collective human rights.  
10.6 Hunting, Fishing and Gathering Rights 
With increased pressures on Inuit hunting, fishing and gathering rights 
there is also an urgent need to address these important collective human 
rights. The highly problematic provisions of ANCSA are largely the 
source of the problems that Inuit in Alaska currently face. Though both 
the State of Alaska and the federal government, through the Alaska Na-
tional Interest Lands and Conservation Act, attempted to address these 
outstanding issues by providing for a rural preference for “subsistence,” 
such a measure is far from adequate. In 1978 specifically, the State of 
Alaska attempted to address the need to secure Alaska Native hunting and 
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fishing rights through a state statute. They were challenged on the basis 
of the State’s constitutional provisions guaranteeing individual “equal” 
access to all of Alaska’s resources by all citizens in the McDowell v. 
Alaska 1989 case. 
With regard to what should be the controlling human rights standards, 
the UN Charter (adopted in 1945) defines as one of its primary purposes 
the need to encourage “respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which all human 
beings are to be beneficiaries of, embraces important fundamental human 
rights such as a “standard of living adequate for the health and well-being 
of himself and of his family, including food,” [Article 25] and “participa-
tion in the cultural life of the community [Article 27].  
With the actual codification of these fundamental human rights taking 
the form of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul-
tural Rights (ICESCR), when read in context, these three instruments (the 
UDHR, ICCPR, and ICESCR collectively referred to as the International 
Bill of Rights) provide the minimum standard. The ICCPR and the 
ICESCR were open for ratification in 1966, five years prior to the adop-
tion of the ANCSA, and eventually both instruments entered into force in 
1976. The point of this chronology is to highlight common Article 1(2) of 
the ICCPR and the ICESCR: “In no case may a people be deprived of its 
own means of subsistence.” This unequivocal language was regarded as a 
human rights standard in 1966.  
The 1971 ANCSA purportedly “extinguished” aboriginal hunting and 
fishing rights. However, when viewed both in fact and in law, the Indige-
nous peoples of Alaska maintain their subsistence hunting and fishing 
rights and have never relinquished this fundamental individual and col-
lective human right. One may recognise the fact that Congress acknowl-
edged the profound relationship that Alaska Natives have to their lands, 
territories and resources as well as our distinct collective rights to nearly 
44 million acres of the state by congressional approval of ANCSA. How-
ever, the standards established by the UNDRIP must be recognised as the 
controlling universal human rights standard concerning Alaska Native 
subsistence hunting and fishing rights. The United States government 
ratified the ICCPR in 1991 and is therefore, legally bound to uphold these 
provisions. In relation to “subsistence,” the UNDRIP does not create new 
rights but rather provides the specific cultural context of Indigenous peo-
ples in the interpretation of the International Bill of Rights and all other 
international human rights instruments.  
The significance of the UNDRIP for Alaska Inuit includes a range of 
the minimum standards embraced by the document. Specifically, the Dec-
laration elaborates upon equality, self-determination, freedom from dis-
crimination, land, territorial and resource rights, culture, and of course, 
 Polar Law Textbook 214 
subsistence. There are many in the State of Alaska who insist that the 
state Constitution guarantees “equal access” to the resources of the state 
and further argue that any recognition of the distinct rights of Alaska 
Native peoples creates a “privilege” not afforded to others. Such an ar-
gument distorts history as well as denies the fundamental human rights of 
the Indigenous peoples of Alaska.  
With regard to equality, the UNDRIP affirms the equal rights of In-
digenous peoples (preamble, Articles 2 and 46) as well as their right to be 
different and to be respected as such (preamble). This language coupled 
with the long-standing prohibition against racial discrimination creates 
the broader framework within which “equal access” by Alaska Natives 
must be understood. Equality does not, however, mean equal treatment. 
Those who argue for “formal” equality would in fact be supporting ra-
cially discriminatory acts in violation of the fundamental human right of 
Alaska Native peoples to subsistence. Rather, “substantive” equality must 
guide this debate. In order to ensure “equal access” as well as balancing 
the competing rights and interests of others, including Indigenous peo-
ples, the history, distinct human rights to equality, subsistence and culture 
(among other rights) of Alaska Native peoples must be recognised and 
respected. In order to reconcile these conflicts in law and reality, one 
approach is being pursued by the Athabascan Indian peoples of interior 
Alaska (distinct from the Inuit) through a strategy of “community har-
vest” rights.13 This strategy is a possible step forward, however, this out-
standing issue should be addressed consistent with the standards estab-
lished under international law, including the UNDRIP, and the aspirations 
of the Alaska Native peoples in order to once and for all recognise and 
entrench this fundamental individual and collective human right.  
10.7 UNCLOS and Climate Change 
There is no question that the Arctic Ocean should be of immediate con-
cern to all Arctic indigenous peoples, including the Inuit of Alaska. The 
insistence by the Canadian government as to control over and sovereignty 
of the High Arctic Islands as well as the recent moves by the Russian 
Federation to stake a claim to the seabed of the extensive continental 
shelf extending from the Russian shoreline, are both trumpeters of the 
importance of the circumpolar Inuit right to participate in any and all 
future debates, dialogues and decisions concerning their lands and territo-
ries. This includes the related issue of climate change and its impact on 
Inuit communities and the fragile Arctic environment as well as the esca-
lating speculation about how a significant reduction in the ice coverage 
                                                     
13 Additional information can be found at Ahtna Tene Nene’s website, at http://www.ahtna-inc. 
com or http://www.adfg.state.ak.us/news/2009/7-31-09_nr.php. 
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will open up the Arctic waterways to increased shipping traffic and expe-
dite oil and gas development, instead of.  
Again, the international human rights developments, and in particular, 
the UNDRIP, which emerged after the formal codification and eventual 
adoption of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), are 
necessary benchmarks for determining the shortcomings of the UNCLOS 
provisions. Even a cursory review of the long list of participants engaged 
in the decades of drafting of UNCLOS will quickly show that despite 
their direct rights and interests in the Arctic Ocean, the Inuit, indigenous 
to the region, did not have any measure of direct, meaningful and effec-
tive participation in the preparation of its content. Such a lack of partici-
pation, consultation or collaboration must be corrected in any future con-
sideration and implementation of UNCLOS in the Arctic Ocean arena. 
The right of indigenous peoples in the Arctic to direct participation in all 
relevant circumpolar regimes and dialogue is reinforced by the UNDRIP 
specifically in Articles 5, 18, and 27 These provisions were deemed es-
sential to the notion of “partnership and mutual respect” noted in the pre-
amble of the UNDRIP, which was insisted upon by nation-state represen-
tatives engaged in the process. 
Though some may argue that the UNCLOS provisions dealing with 
ice-covered areas are fast becoming irrelevant they remain critical to 
indigenous peoples throughout the circumpolar region. Such provisions 
were never dealt with in a comprehensive fashion in the context of UN-
CLOS. Furthermore, indigenous peoples’ interests were wholly ignored 
in terms of recognition of their distinct resource rights, which have now 
been affirmed by the UNDRIP. The matters of peaceful uses, peaceful 
purposes and collective security also need to be scrutinised against the 
backdrop of the rights and interests of indigenous peoples and should not 
solely be seen in military terms. An expansive approach that goes beyond 
freedom of navigation and military and strategic interests would respond 
to the absence of adequate environmental protections and move us closer 
to global security. Here again, the UN Declaration would be extremely 
helpful in providing the human rights based approach to peace and secu-
rity, which we would all benefit from. 
As previously argued by this author and other interested scholars, one 
potential path forward is the designation of the Arctic Ocean as a semi-
enclosed sea, which would trigger important safeguards in response to the 
concerns and interests of many, including Arctic indigenous peoples. For 
example (and consistent with the interests of indigenous peoples and 
members of the Arctic Council), environmental protection, management 
and conservation of marine resources and marine scientific research are 
all matters of direct relevance.  
The Arctic Council and previous initiatives such as the Arctic Envi-
ronmental Protection Strategy have been good starting points. However, 
the Council does not go far enough in light of the political and interna-
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tional human rights developments, the expansion of interests, and the 
urgent issues facing Arctic indigenous inhabitants and each coastal na-
tion-state. A new regime is needed to take into account the dramatic 
changes impacting this fragile ecosystem. Even the single issue of ice-
free navigation of the Arctic Ocean itself necessitates a comprehensive 
response and new regime that will effectively involve the Inuit as well as 
other stakeholders. Any such regime must include all Arctic indigenous 
peoples and must afford them full recognition of and respect for their 
fundamental human right to participate. Given the adoption of the UN-
DRIP, the Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Arctic Sovereignty as well as 
the existing Arctic Council regime, and the role of Arctic indigenous 
peoples as permanent participants within the Council, there is ample op-
portunity to establish a human rights-based approach to a wide range of 
issues in a collective fashion. In response to this need and in recognition 
of the positive developments concerning Inuit rights, the ICC has deter-
mined that an update of its own Arctic Policy Principles is necessary. 
Through such an exercise, a programme focused on human rights educa-
tion of both Inuit and non-Inuit could be initiated. In this way, Inuit and 
others could strengthen all of the relevant international and regional sys-
tems as well as all relevant existing international instruments.  
10.8 Conclusion and Recommendations 
The UNDRIP illustrates the transformation of international human rights 
law through the infusion of indigenous worldviews and perspectives. The 
international processes that have emerged in a relatively short period of 
time represent a tidal change in the ability of indigenous peoples to en-
gage in international legal diplomacy to advance their perspectives. It is 
clear that the human rights discourse and framework has the capacity to 
include indigenous peoples and their perspectives. However, it is also 
clear that there are a number of rights that are considered non-negotiable 
and that without these very rights, indigenous peoples, nations and com-
munities will remain vulnerable on the international stage. Furthermore, 
the implementation of the UNDRIP is uncertain in the Alaskan Inuit con-
text. However, this international development should be seen as an im-
portant trigger for developments at the local, regional, and international 
level. Indigenous peoples in Alaska should begin the dialogue about how 
to operationalise and implement the standards within their specific com-
munities and consistent with their respective values, customs, and institu-
tions. One starting point here may be the reading of the original docu-
ments outlined in this article within the framework of the UNDRIP 
minimum standards and to carefully analyse the shortcomings of the 
ANCSA, ANILCA, UNCLOS and other relevant laws and policies im-
pacting Alaskan Inuit.  
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Secondly, comprehensive, inclusive dialogue should take place within 
Inuit communities as to who is the “self” in self-determination and what 
are the genuine political aspirations of the peoples concerned. This should 
be followed by a discussion of how to collectively achieve mutual objec-
tives in a strategic and tactical fashion. The UNDRIP should be recog-
nised as a useful tool in such a collective exercise. At the same time, the 
history of Alaska Native peoples, including the Inuit of Alaska should be 
recognised as educational for the purposes of determining the future. The 
indigenous peoples should be focused on how to realise, enjoy and exer-
cise the important fundamental individual and collective human rights 
enshrined in the UNDRIP and relate them to their unique status and rights 
as the Inuit of Alaska. The ultimate objective should be to ensure their 
continued existence as a distinct culture with the incredible potential to 
contribute to the common heritage of humankind that is the Arctic.  
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11. Chukotka’s Indigenous 
Peoples: Issues and Prospects for 
Development 
 
Galina Diatchkova 
11.1 Introduction  
This chapter deals with the rights and concerns of the indigenous peoples 
of Chukotka. To begin with, it sketches a brief historical overview of the 
situation of the indigenous people in Chukotka. It then turns to look at 
indigenous interests in the management of local resources and draws 
some conclusions on the prospects of indigenous political development in 
Chukotka. 
Chukotka, or the Chukotkan Autonomous Okrug (District) of the Rus-
sian Federation, is located at the north-easternmost extreme of the Eurasian 
landmass and separated from Alaska by the Bering Strait. It is a territory 
containing a number of ethnic groups, including indigenous peoples like 
the Chukchi (12,622 people of the total number in Russia of 15,767 being 
resident in Chukoka), Eskimos (1,750), Kereks (8 persons), Koriaks (55 of 
8,743), Yukagirs (112 of 1509), Chuvans (951 of 1,087), and Evens (1,407 
of 19,071) (numbers taken from the Russian census of 2002).  
The Chukchi form the largest indigenous group of Chukotka. Beyond 
this region they also reside in Kamchatskaya Oblast’, Magadanskaya 
Oblast’, and Sakha Republic (Yakutia). Their self-designation is 
Lyg’oravetl’an (the true human being, in Chukchi), or derived from this 
word Luoravetlan (singular). The Chukchi have a traditional twofold 
cultural subdivision into nomadic reindeer-herding (70% at the beginning 
of the 20th century), and sedentary marine mammal hunting (30%).  
The language of Chukchi belongs to the Chukotko-Kamchatkan fam-
ily which also includes the Kerek, Koriak, and Itel’men languages (see 
Vakhtin 2001). Itel’mens mostly live in Kamchatskaya Oblast (9 of 3,180 
reside in Chukotka). The Koriaks are close to the Chukchi, their self-
designation is Chauchu (the reindeer-herders, in Koriak), and Nymylan 
(the coastal inhabitants, in Koriak). Traditionally they are reindeer-
herders and hunters. Kereks’ self-designation is Ankalakku (the coast-
dwellers, in Kerek) – they combine subsistence fowling, fishing, rein-
deer-herding, hunting, and coastal marine mammal hunting. The Eski-
 Polar Law Textbook 222 
mos, or Yupiit (plural) (the true human being, in Yupik) are the native 
population of the Bering Strait coast. Marine mammal hunting is the pri-
mary traditional occupation of the Yupiit. The Chukotka population 
speaks four languages, which belong to the Eskimo branch of the Es-
kimo-Aleut family: Central Siberian Yupik (called Chaplinskii in Rus-
sian), Naukanskii Yupik, Sirenikskii, and Imaklikskii Inupiaq. Central 
Siberian Yupik and Naukanskii Yupik belong to the Western, or Yupik, 
subgroup of Eskimo, while Imaklikskii belongs to the Inuit, or Eastern, 
subgroup of Eskimo.  
The Yukagirs form a small indigenous group in Chukotka; their self-
designation is Vadul (also Odul, the human being, in Yukagir). They are 
considered to be semi-nomadic hunters. Their language belongs to the 
Uralic-Yukagirian family. The Chuvans are ethnically derived from the 
Yukagir clans. Their people speak in the Chukchi, Yukagir, and Russian 
languages. The Evens also constitute a small group of Chukotka’s indige-
nous peoples. Their self-designation is Even, also Lamut (local resident, 
in Even). They are traditionally semi-nomadic, mainly reindeer-herders 
and hunters. Their language belongs to the Altaic family, Tungus-
Manchurian group.  
Specialists note that the mechanisms for the transmission of languages 
in native families have however been weakened because of changes in 
their traditional patterns of life during the Soviet period.  
11.2 Indigenous Peoples and the Natural Environment 
The local resources that were available to the various indigenous peoples 
(whether nomadic, semi-nomadic, or sedentary) had an adaptive influ-
ence with regard to their overall lifestyle and their approach to subsis-
tence (see Krupnik 1989 and 1993). Natural factors affected the specific 
approach to indigenous land use. Over a period of thousands of years 
highly specialised native sea mammal hunting and reindeer husbandry 
developed. The latter was characterised by large-scale reindeer breeding 
among the Chukchi and Koriaks. The state of the habitat environment 
was defined as natural (unchanged by human influence) or stable: the 
restoration of natural conditions was faster or at least equally as fast as 
the alterations caused by human activity (see Yablokov 1996).  
In the course of adapting to their natural environment these northern 
indigenous peoples developed specific principles and practices enabling 
them to live in balance with that environment. These have included: ecol-
ogically compatible occupations and means of transport, collective kinds 
of property relations, particular types of dwellings and clothing, and spe-
cific tools for their household activities and beyond (see Arutiunov 2000, 
86). In acclimatising themselves physically to the severe climatic condi-
tions of the North, certain psycho-physiological features evolved that 
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required particular types of protein-rich foods. The family has become an 
important information channel for passing along norms of conduct with 
respect to the given environment; subsistence skills (dwelling, clothing, 
and tools); methods and customs of land use; language, food, folklore, 
songs and dances. This continuity of cultural values had a decisive impact 
on the sustainability of indigenous groups which were mainly governed 
by customary law.  
The sustainability of the reindeer husbandry contributed to Chukchi’s 
political stability (Znamenski 1999). During colonisation, the Chukchi 
managed through warfare with the Russian Cossacks to protect their terri-
tory and to avoid payment of taxes to the colonisers (Al’kor 1935, 78). 
This led to their status of being “not totally dependent on the govern-
ment,” as stated by the Decree of Empress Catherine II dated 1789. The 
northern indigenous peoples were however eventually to be colonised by 
the Russian Empire. Somewhat later, the 1822 Charter of the Russian 
Empire on Aliens (Polozhenie ob Inorodtsakh) outlined how the indige-
nous peoples of Siberia were to be managed and linked indigenous rights 
to native territories and their resources (provisions 34, 35, and 37). An 
authority like Arutiunov (2007) considers this Charter, moreover, to be a 
document that can even now be regarded as being ahead of its time – 
particularly in terms of the rights it granted indigenous peoples to the 
lands they occupied. 
Despite the fact that the indigenous peoples of the North were exposed 
to the legal and economic demands and requirements of the Russian Em-
pire they largely retained their self-sufficiency (see 1822 Charter – provi-
sions 9, 11, 33–35). This helped them in the preservation of their tradi-
tional subsistence systems assisting also to maintain the ways in which 
some of them transfer cultural information even today.  
11.3 The Soviet Period 
While in previous centuries the Northern indigenous peoples had lived 
and developed in relative isolation, in the 20th century that isolation was 
undermined by the political events of 1917. The consequences of the 
Russian Revolution eroded the structure of the traditional societies of the 
North, the subsistence systems, inter-generational relationships, and the 
cultural transfer of the skills needed to live in such severe climatic condi-
tions. The disruption of the traditional way of life that followed the estab-
lishment of the Soviet state in the 1920s was due to forced collectivisa-
tion, the liquidation of rights to land and natural resources, and the de-
struction of traditional self-management. The nomadic population was 
thus forced into adopting a sedentary style of life. The institution of the 
family as a device for transferring indigenous knowledge was replaced by 
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state boarding-schools with its “Russian” standards, forcing out the in-
digenous outlook, customs and traditions. 
The policy towards the indigenous population of the North during the 
Soviet period, based on class distinction and paternalism, fundamentally 
altered traditional land use patterns and resulted in a gradual decline of 
sea mammal hunting and reindeer herding. The extensive industrial de-
velopment of Chukotka’s natural resources (gold, tin and tungsten min-
ing) during the Soviet period and in particular the unsustainable and envi-
ronmentally damaging extraction methods used resulted in the creation of 
multiple centres of industrial pollution and environmental degradation. 
According to the Report of the Chukotkan State Committee on Environ-
ment (2000), extensive destruction of the tundra landscape occurred as 
well as atmospheric and freshwater contamination, the decline of bio-
resource levels, and increases in radioactive contamination, toxic materi-
als and toxic effluents. The “contaminated” and/or affected area of land, 
as of 1 January 2000, amounted to 49,839 hectares (some 0.07% of the 
Chukotkan District). 
11.4 The Post-Soviet Period – Indigenous Movement 
The democratisation processes that took place in the USSR at the end of 
1980s encouraged initiatives supporting the establishment of indigenous 
institutions as potentially important tools in the struggle to address a 
range of problems including environmental degradation, the need to sup-
port traditional land use and the preservation of indigenous languages and 
knowledge.  
Institutions representing indigenous interests within Chukotka today 
include: The Association of Chukotka’s Indigenous Peoples, women’s 
councils, Elder’s councils, indigenous languages societies, indigenous 
enterprises, and the Chukotka Union of Reindeer Herders, the Associa-
tion of Traditional Marine Mammal Hunters of Chukotka, and Yupik 
community. International organisations like the Inuit Circumpolar Coun-
cil have also aided in the development of an indigenous infrastructure 
with modern equipment and the provision of new communication tech-
nologies, especially within the Yupik community. The state of local in-
digenous organisations within Chukotka, their awareness of their rights, 
their access to the media and the relationships between them and gov-
ernmental bodies can be tracked due to the monitoring programme sup-
ported by the Ford Foundation at the beginning of 2000s. The findings 
here showed that 1) while rural indigenous associations often had a very 
formal relationship with various indigenous organisations they did not 
actually represent these organisations in discussions with the authorities; 
and 2) most indigenous people were not fully aware of their indigenous 
rights and laws.  
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Although Russian officials of the Okrug initially supported the emerg-
ing indigenous movement during the early 1990s this support soon gave 
way as political opposition to regional autonomy and local self-
government developed. A history of paternalistic control, coupled with a 
disregard for international standards in respect of human and aboriginal 
rights thus prevailed. That is why indigenous representatives quickly 
came to the view that their problems would only be solved by the grant-
ing of the right of self-government. The leaders of the local associations 
thus realised that it was necessary to achieve the status of a political or-
ganisation which only then will be recognised by the authorities.  
In relation to government policy the leaders insisted that the main di-
rections of government activity should be reflective of indigenous laws 
and customs, cooperation with indigenous peoples, supporting traditional 
occupations, and making use of international experience gained in the 
course of collaboration with indigenous peoples around the globe. The 
monitoring results pointed to the weakness of the indigenous movement 
of Chukotka with the reasons for this being their lack of knowledge in 
respect of legislation related to indigenous rights, their minimal experi-
ence in the protection of their rights and their limited access to decision 
making processes. Respondents interviewed for these findings have rec-
ognised the need to create indigenous representative institutions within 
the regional government bodies to ensure control over the conceptualisa-
tion and implementation of the various social, economic and cultural 
programmes utilised in the region. It has been found that problems ex-
isted not only with regard to indigenous representation but also in respect 
of their underdeveloped knowledge base, the lack of institutional struc-
tures and activities and the absence of state support for these activities. 
To increase the strength of indigenous institutions participants in the 
monitoring programme stressed that the next task of Chukotka’s indige-
nous associations should be to: 1) discuss the laws and legislative drafts, 
social programmes, and information from different organisations; 2) raise 
issues at the community meetings; 3) maintain indigenous representation 
in the district Duma (Parliament) and government; and 4) collaborate 
with the regional government of the Okrug and other organisations. 
In August 2005, the participants of the Roundtable “Indigenous 
Movement: Issues and Tasks” which was held in Anadyr’ also noted the 
absence of information as a major reason for the weakness of Chukotka’s 
indigenous organisations in conjunction with the need to spread informa-
tion on indigenous rights. These findings emphasise the importance of 
systematically transmitting information via special media channels such 
as newspapers, indigenous Information Centres etc., and also demonstrate 
the cumulative role of information in the development of the indigenous 
movement.  
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11.5 Media as an Important Resource for Indigenous 
Development  
Provoked by the democratisation of Soviet society during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, the success of Chukotka’s indigenous peoples in preserv-
ing and revitalising their ethnic identity stimulated many indigenous repre-
sentatives to use the media to better express their interests. Most Informa-
tion Centres within Russia address legal issues providing legal and indige-
nous rights information and advocacy. Citizens are familiar with, and make 
extensive use of, their “right to be informed.” In the mass media (newspa-
pers, magazines, broadcasting, and on the Internet), the overall volume of 
information on and for different indigenous groups and cultures increased 
significantly during the 1990s. These media channels have primarily ad-
dressed the issues of the social and cultural development of ethnic groups, 
inter-ethnic relations, and the relationship between central and peripheral 
regions. The native newspaper within Chukotka was published in the 
Chukchi language with the addition, during the first half of 1990s, of con-
tributions in the Yupik and the Evens languages. This up-to-date indige-
nous newspaper, staffed by native journalists, reflected social, cultural, 
economic and political events among Chukotka’s indigenous peoples, and 
Murgin Nutenut (“My Land,” in Chukchi) became the main means for the 
expression of indigenous interests and rights.  
During the second half of the 1990s, however, the situation changed. 
Governor A. Nazarov of the Chukotkan Autonomous District closed the 
newspaper for what he deemed to be “financial reasons.” The journalists 
were given the sack, and the newspaper was transformed into an attach-
ment to a Russian newspaper Krainii Sever (“Far East North,” in Rus-
sian) and staffed by only one journalist. The contents no longer ade-
quately reflected indigenous movement issues. The disruptive interfer-
ence by the regional administration in the social channels connecting 
Chukotka’s indigenous peoples, and the dismantling of the creative col-
lective of indigenous journalists, resulted in the disintegration of the in-
digenous movement against the background of social and economic crisis 
in Russia and especially in Chukotka. This period, according to the inter-
views conducted by this author in 2009, and to an analysis of Chukotka’s 
current media output, saw an end to the production of information on 
indigenous rights. The participants of the 2009 Congress of Chukotka’s 
indigenous peoples also discussed the absence of any critical information 
on regional politics or indigenous issues in the media. This is the main 
reason for the lack of knowledge in respect of indigenous rights among 
current indigenous representatives.  
These developments show that the establishment and further operation 
of indigenous media opened up many channels for the expression of eth-
nic identity during the 1990s. This, in turn, created an increasingly impor-
tant informational space for and about indigenous peoples in the media, 
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as well as a space for indigenous media producers to create media forms 
in their own languages and from their own cultural perspectives. The 
media of indigenous peoples is viewed as a necessary and important re-
source, providing access to information on indigenous rights. In Chu-
kotka, currently, the role of indigenous media is not so influential. This 
affects its ability to advocate and report on events and activities relating 
to indigenous movements in the Okrug. The indigenous media could, 
potentially, play an essential role in stabilising the social and cultural 
conditions of the Okrug’s indigenous peoples but, for the reasons already 
noted, this is currently not the case. 
11.6 Wildlife Management  
During the 1990s, transition to the market economy was accompanied by 
widespread socio-economic crisis across the country, with Chukotka being 
one of the most badly affected regions. In these conditions, the growing 
indigenous movement focused on issues of sustainable development and on 
the attainment of equal social status within the dominant society which 
remains represented by ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, Tatars, and others.  
The right to the preservation of nature and biodiversity has become an 
important source in the establishment of new types of partnerships within 
Chukotka such as, for example, government – research institutions – and 
indigenous peoples. A unique example is the 1992 Agreement on 
Greenland Whale Migrations between the native community of Naukan 
(Chukotka) and the Government of Alaska. The objectives of this agree-
ment range from the development of traditional land use and the rational 
use of bio-resources to the establishment of a network of indigenous ob-
servers. The project based on this agreement facilitated the revival of 
native sea mammal subsistence hunting under critical social and eco-
nomic conditions and the absence of state food deliveries within Chu-
kotka. First of all, this experience of international cooperation contributed 
to the sustainable development of native enterprises and the coastal popu-
lation. Secondly, scientific guidance of sea hunting from the 1990s on-
wards stimulated the indigenous peoples of Chukotka to acquire patterns 
of environmental conservation based on international experience (see 
Ainana et al report 1995).  
Another example of partnership is the international Pacific Walrus 
project. During a conference in 1998 in Alaska the project participants – 
indigenous representatives – remarked that investigations, connected to 
the walruses were important not only to preserve this mammal but also in 
maintaining the indigenous culture of the Chukchi and Yupiit. This Chu-
kotka Walrus Harvest Monitoring Project was developed by the Coopera-
tion Agreement on Walrus Monitoring. Its framework was similar to the 
Russian-American Agreement concerning Joint Environmental Conserva-
 Polar Law Textbook 228 
tion between the U.S. National Park Service, the Naukan community, and 
the indigenous community of Yupik. The goals of this agreement were to 
involve indigenous peoples in the programme of bio-resources manage-
ment and train them in such activities. The cooperation of the Association 
of Traditional Marine Mammal Hunters of Chukotka (known as 
ChAZTO), the community of Yupik, and international institutions al-
lowed these organisations to facilitate project activities and develop cul-
tural activities. They also represent indigenous interests at the Interna-
tional Whaling Commission and at the ICC meetings.  
It should be noted however that since the 1990s indigenous peoples 
have become active partners – along with scientists and the governments 
of Chukotka and Alaska – in the preservation of both the natural and the 
cultural heritage of Chukotka. Traditional self-sufficiency, based on in-
digenous knowledge and sustainable forms of land-use, has promoted 
ecosystem stability. Under current conditions, indigenous participation in 
environmental programmes and projects promotes the mastering of mod-
ern methods of environmental and cultural preservation.  
Concern about the environmental situation and the preservation of tra-
ditional knowledge resulted in the revival of the ancient way of walrus 
harvesting in the village of Vankarem, situated in the vicinity of archaeo-
logical sites, in 1997. The largest walrus resting site is situated in this 
area. Traditional harvesting, as opposed to the use of firearms, allows 
hunters to take out a walrus without disturbing the others around it, 
avoiding the unnecessary loss of animals. In 2006, the indigenous com-
munity of Vankarem worked with an initiative to establish a protected 
nature territory status for the Cape Vankarem area, with special restric-
tions on economic activities, and for the development of traditional land-
use management. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) has supported this 
initiative and worked at creating such a territorial status.  
Recognising that a polar bear is a significant resource in the Arctic re-
gion, especially in Chukotka, required that additional protection be given to 
these animals. Thus, the Agreement between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation On the 
Conservation and Management of the Alaska-Chukotka Polar Bear Popula-
tion was signed in Washington, USA (2000). The implementation of this 
agreement provides a framework for the development of research and man-
agement actions including the establishment of enforceable harvest limits. 
The primary objective of the polar bear programmes within the agreement 
is to ensure that polar bear populations remain a healthy, functioning com-
ponent of Bering and Chukchi seas ecosystems. The polar bear is a signifi-
cant part of the cultures of Yupiit and Chukchi, who have created legends 
and religious ceremonies about it. In the former Soviet Union, polar bear 
hunting was banned since 1956. In 1989, this animal was reclassified as a 
“recovered population,” and the indigenous peoples of Chukotka were 
allowed to harvest polar bears from the beginning of 1990s.  
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The 2000 Agreement let indigenous peoples enter into co-
management agreements with appropriate governmental, native, and 
other organisations. Pursuing the goal of preserving traditional knowl-
edge about the polar bear’s role in the cultural life of the peoples of Chu-
kotka, from 2004 to 2007 the study “Traditional knowledge about the 
polar bear, cultural values and practices in Chukotka” was undertaken by 
the Polar Bear Commission of the Association of Traditional Marine 
Mammal Hunters of Chukotka. The project was funded by the U.S. Na-
tional Park Service through the Alaska Nanuuq Commission (see Zdor 
2007). The provisions of the 2000 Agreement provide for direct indige-
nous participation in the joint U.S./Russia Polar Bear Commission which 
is responsible for overseeing the development and implementation of 
management and research programmes. Both the United States and the 
Russian Federation have appointed Commissioners for the Agreement 
including indigenous representatives from Alaska and Chukotka. The 
Chukotka/Alaska Polar Bear Management programme is an important 
example of the implementation of an equal partnership between indige-
nous groups and the state. Joint agreements on wildlife co-management, 
building upon a partnership principle involving indigenous peoples, can 
guarantee the protection of the environment, cultural heritage, and the 
sustainable use of biodiversity. 
11.7 Indigenous Representation on Various Government 
Bodies 
As Schweitzer and Gray (2000, 24) note, “the transformation of the local 
political culture” in the 1990s has resulted in the ending of “reserving 
positions in the government of Chukotka for natives.” In the second part 
of 1990s, under a totalitarian governor criticism was not tolerated so it 
was “very difficult to develop even a discussion about native rights and 
interests, much less an active advocacy movement” (Ibid.). From 2000, 
the residents of Chukotka experienced a further shift in regional policy in 
the economic and social sphere under Roman Abramovich’s leadership as 
a governor (until 2008). An Indigenous Representative Council was es-
tablished in 2002 under the Chukotka’s government to address indige-
nous issues, in accordance with Article 1 of the Federal Law of 1999: 
“On Guarantees of Rights of Small-Numbered Indigenous Peoples” 
where an authorised representative is defined as an indigenous person or 
an organisation representing the indigenous peoples’ interests. 
Despite this it is clear that indigenous peoples still do not influence 
regional policy effectively. In interviews conducted by this author in 
2009 the participants of the Congress of Chukotka’s Indigenous Peoples 
mentioned that the indigenous representative council is not an effective 
tool because it does not solve the key indigenous problems. Currently, 
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within Chukotka only two indigenous representatives are present in the 
regional government. This low level of indigenous representation in gov-
ernment bodies can be explained by the general lack of knowledge and 
awareness of indigenous rights and of the mechanisms for the election of 
representatives by indigenous people directly. 
In other areas of the North, due to the active advocacy movement, re-
gional governments have developed mechanisms for indigenous partici-
pation in decision-making process. In only a few regions of Northern 
Russia however have indigenous peoples used the right of indigenous 
representation on regional state bodies. For instance, there is an Assem-
bly of Indigenous Representatives connected to the Parliament of Khanty-
Mansiysk Autonomous Okrug (6 of 23 deputies are indigenous). This 
structure effectively provides for indigenous interests in the social policy 
of the region through the discussion of legislative bills and social pro-
grammes related to the indigenous population. Unfortunately, since 2000 
indigenous people in Russia have been underrepresented in the Federal 
state bodies. One of the main reasons for this is the underdevelopment of 
federal laws on indigenous rights preventing indigenous representatives 
from effective participation in the policy-making process.  
Despite these difficulties at the national level, public organisation such 
as the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, Siberia 
and the Far East (RAIPON) have undertaken efforts to protect indigenous 
rights. One of the goals of this organisation is to achieve recognition from 
the dominant society for indigenous interests and rights. The activities of 
this organisation concentrate on obtaining the right to self-government 
and property rights to land and resources. In so doing, the main means for 
the development of indigenous representation in Russian state bodies are 
a) the inclusion of guarantees and effective mechanisms for indigenous 
representation in the federal and regional legislations; b) involving in-
digenous representatives in the process of making decisions via different 
state and consultative bodies. 
11.8 Conclusions  
Over a period stretching back thousands of years the indigenous groups 
of Chukotka have adapted their cultural systems to the Arctic and sub-
Arctic environment. Ecologically compatible occupations, the transmis-
sion of cultural values from one generation to the next via the family unit 
formed the basis for the self-sufficiency of these indigenous groups. The 
traditional lifestyles of indigenous peoples had been preserved more or 
less intact under the Russian Empire which granted them self-
management status as well as the rights to native territories and the re-
sources they contained. These factors had a decisive impact on the sus-
tainability of such northern population groups in pre-Soviet period. These 
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traditional lifestyles were however severely disrupted during the Soviet 
period. The dismantling of the self-management structure and of tradi-
tional family functions forced through, undoubtedly resulted in the grad-
ual loss of cultural “information” within these societies.  
The democratisation processes of the 1990s promoted once again the 
development of the indigenous movement in Chukotka; established in-
digenous institutions are currently seeking greater self-determination via 
indigenous representation in state bodies and equal participation in deci-
sion-making. Due to the Okrug’s indigenous institutions and international 
support, especially from the Alaskan government and its native organisa-
tions while Chukotka’s indigenous peoples have gradually gained experi-
ence in wildlife management.  
The crux of the problem is that legal avenues means to protect indigenous 
rights do not exist. This is because federal legislation concerning indigenous 
rights remains underdeveloped in that respect; Chukotka’s own legislation on 
this subject is also insufficient, and there is a basic lack of knowledge on the 
part of indigenous representatives relating to their own rights. The practice of 
state paternalism which was revived in the Okrug during the latter part of the 
1990s ultimately however prevents indigenous peoples from receiving rec-
ognition as equal partners in the decision-making process. To effectively 
solve these problems the creation of stable support for indigenous affairs at 
the state level is vitally important. To achieve these goals, the indigenous 
peoples of Russia will continue to attempt to increase their capacity for self-
government and for self-determined sustainable communities via the national 
organisation RAIPON. 
Notes: 
Sergei Arutiunov (Сергей Арутюнов), The discussion at the congress “The Arctic Prob-
lems: Environment, Society, Heritage”, 2007, 8–10 March, Paris, France.  
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The Agreement between the Government 
of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Russian Federation 
On the Conservation and Management 
of the Alaska-Chukotka Polar Bear Popu-
lation http://pbsg.npolar,no/en/agreements 
/US-Russia.html.  
Questions: 
1. What factors affected the sustainability of Chukotka’s indigenous 
peoples in the pre-Soviet period? 
2. Outline the reasons for the instability of Chukotka’s indigenous 
peoples’ development during the Soviet and Post-Soviet Periods? 
3. What factors facilitate the development of indigenous representation 
in the regional government bodies? 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
Natalia Loukacheva 
Developments in the Polar Regions – the Arctic and Antarctica – are now 
the subject of much public interest and growing political, academic, sci-
entific, and media discussion. The changes that occur and the processes 
that take place in the Polar Regions are, moreover, increasingly linked by 
the existence of a shared concern for certain legal issues. The growing 
importance of both regions across a divergent range of global and re-
gional development issues prompted further inquiry into the role of law in 
dealing with many of these issues. This textbook attempts to highlight the 
importance of law in this framework by drawing on a number of issue-
area examples illustrating the importance of legal values in addressing 
various challenges across the Nordic region, among remote Arctic com-
munities and globally.  
The Nordic Council of Ministers, under the auspices of its Arctic Co-
operation Programme, endorsed the Polar Law Textbook project which 
was housed in 2009–2010 by the Master’s Programme in Polar Law run 
by the University of Akureyri situated in Northern Iceland. This project 
was led by the programme director Dr. Natalia Loukacheva who also 
served as the textbook editor. The textbook is the result of the cooperative 
efforts of an international team of experts (academics, practitioners, poli-
ticians and Arctic Indigenous peoples) with many years of experience in 
the field of Polar Law and related studies (see biographies). This collabo-
ration was based on a shared belief that there is a basic need to promote 
legal knowledge, information and values within the Nordic and Arctic 
communities and indeed, globally. With the generous support of the 
NCM it became possible to produce this educational tool which is the 
first of its kind and it is electronically available on the NCM website and 
in hard copy form to allow readers interested in Polar Law to access this 
information easily.  
The idea for this textbook developed from the recognition of the need to 
disseminate information about Polar Law as an emerging field of legal 
studies – an area of study long overdue greater recognition. By supporting 
this project the NCM has shown leadership in the promotion of this vital 
educational initiative which it is hoped will create better opportunities for 
the residents of the North located in remote Arctic areas, as well as all other 
interested parties, gain better access to the legal educational tools and in-
formation. The objectives of this textbook are numerous and varied: 
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 to promote legal and inter-disciplinary education in and for remote 
Northern areas; 
 to disseminate new knowledge on the most topical developments in 
the Polar Regions, developments which are of the utmost importance 
to the Nordic communities, the Arctic and beyond;  
 to strengthen cooperation within the Nordic region and Northern areas 
of the Arctic States (e.g., the textbook can be valuable for University 
of the Arctic initiatives and the Arctic Council and its working groups 
as a follow-up to the legal chapter in the 2004 Arctic Human 
Development Report); 
 It is also hoped that this textbook will provide the basis for future long 
distance courses in Polar Law and that it shall enhance an interdiscipli-
nary dialogue between the legal and other social sciences in relation to 
the North; it will also facilitate Nordic synergy by developing further 
collaboration with various Nordic and Arctic partners in advancing 
further virtual or standard legal education in this area.  
 
Despite its primary educational focus the textbook contains information 
which will be useful for those with an interest in Polar Law. The text-
book, designed for lawyers and non-lawyers, focuses on the various de-
velopments in international and domestic law concerning the Polar Re-
gions. In addition it also explores the relevant aspects of the economic, 
resource, social and political developments affecting both Polar areas.  
The structure of the textbook is different from typical academic books. 
All chapters have to a certain degree been written in the form of lectures 
and include information for further reading, documents and a series of 
questions encouraging students to think about current or emergent issues 
and analyse the presented material. The textbook is divided into 11 chap-
ters including the introduction, which attempts to define “Polar law” 
while also outlining the linkages between different areas of law and the 
other social sciences. The remaining chapters are built around two major 
areas. The fist covers issues of Environmental Law, Law of Sea issues 
and Resources in the Polar Regions with some linkages made here to 
Economies and Trade in the Arctic.  
The second major focus area is Arctic Governance, International Hu-
man Rights, the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Self-governance and the 
political situation in some of the Arctic areas. All chapters contain refer-
ence to some theoretical materials and to practical examples from specific 
case studies. The scope of topics covered in this textbook range from 
questions of environmental protection, shipping and navigation and ac-
cess to and the development of non-renewable resources and minerals, to 
questions of marine resources, biodiversity and climate change. Other 
topics include questions of sustainable development, Arctic cooperation, 
community well-being, political activism, economic indicators, Indige-
nous Peoples’ rights and prospects, and the challenges of governance in 
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the far North. Most chapters begin from the legal basis but where possible 
the nexus between law and other areas of the social sciences (e.g., inter-
national relations, policy and socio-economic studies) is also explored.  
Despite its comprehensiveness the textbook is limited in scope and 
leaves room for further research, cooperation and knowledge in this de-
veloping area. This textbook can be seen as the first milestone in what 
will hopefully become a series of educational materials on Polar law and 
other related disciplines.  
The views expressed in this textbook do not necessarily reflect the po-
sition of the Nordic Council of Ministers. The authors hope that this pio-
neering work will encourage anybody interested in Polar Law to pursue 
further studies, research or cooperation on the many initiatives which take 
place within the Nordic, Arctic and global community in relation not just 
to the Arctic but also to the Antarctic. 
Further information about this textbook can be obtained from the text-
book editor Dr. Natalia Loukacheva at natalial@unak.is or at n.loukacheva 
@utoronto.ca or from the website of the Nordic Council of Ministers 
www.norden.org. 
 
 
Sammenfatning 
Udviklingen i polar regionerne – Arktis og Antarktis – er nu i stigende 
grad emnet for stor interesse i befolkningen og med voksende politisk, 
akademisk, videnskabelig, og medie debat. De forandringer der sker og 
de processer som finder sted i polar regionerne er, endvidere, i stigende 
grad forbundet via fælles anliggender omkring en række juridiske 
spørgsmål. Polar regionernes voksende betydning for en række globale 
og regionale udviklingsmæssige spørgsmål har rejst spørgsmål omkring 
lovens rolle. Denne lærebog forsøger at belyse vigtigheden af jura inden-
for disse rammer ved at fremhæve et antal eksempler som illustrerer vig-
tigheden af at bringe juraen ind i diskussionen omkring de udfordringer 
norden, i de fjerntliggende arktiske samfund, samt den globale verden 
står overfor. 
Nordisk Minister Råd har via det Arktiske Samarbejds Program støttet 
Polar Jura Lærebogs projektet.  Projektet har været hjemmehørende i 
2009-2010 ved Polar Law programmet ved Akureyri universitet i det 
nordlige Island. Projektet blev styret af lederen af Polar Law programmet, 
dr. Natalia Loukacheva, som ligeledes er bogens redaktør. Lærebogen er 
resultatet af et samarbejde mellem eksperter på et internationalt team 
bestående af akademikere, praktiserende folk, politikere og arktiske ind-
fødte folk, med mange års erfaring indenfor polar jura og andre relaterede 
studier (se biografierne). 
Dette samarbejde var baseret på en fælles holdning om at der er et be-
hov for at fremme viden om jura, videregiv information og fremme vær-
dier i nordiske og arktiske samfund, samt globalt. Med støtte fra NMR 
har det været muligt at producere denne lærebog, den første af slagsen, og 
at gøre den elektronisk tilgængelig på NMRs hjemmeside og ligeledes i 
prentet bog format, og dermed gøre det muligt for interesserede læsere at 
have nem adgang til dette materiale. 
Ideen bag denne lærebog kom fra erkendelsen af et eksisterende behov 
for at disseminere information om polar jura som et nyt område indenfor 
jura studierne. Ved at støtte dette projekt har NMR vist lederskab med at 
fremme dette vigtige uddannelses initiativ, og det er  håbet at det vil ska-
be bedre muligheder for folk i det nordlige og i de mere fjerntliggende 
områder i Arktis, samt for andre interessanter, til at have bedre adgang til 
uddannelses redskaber og information indenfor jura. Formålet med denne 
lærebog er: 
 
 at fremme jura og interdisciplinær uddannelse i og for de 
fjerntliggende nordlige områder; 
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 at disseminere ny viden om de mest aktuelle udviklinger i polar 
regionerne, udviklinger som er yderest vigtige for de nordiske 
samfund, Arktis og den øvrige verden; 
 at forstærke samarbejdet indenfor den nordiske region og de nordlige 
områder i de arktiske stater (f.eks. University of the Arctic samt 
Arktisk råd og dets arbejdsgrupper vil kunne drage nytte af denne 
lærebog som et follow-up til jura kapitelet i Arctic Human 
Development Report (2004) rapporten).  
 Det er endvidere håbet at denne lærebog vil kunne danne basis for 
fremtidige lang-distance kurser i polar jura og at det ligeledes vil 
fremme den interdisciplinære dialog mellem jura og den øvrige social 
videnskab omkring den Nordlige region; bogen vil ligeledes kunne 
facilitere dannelsen af nordiske synergier ved at skabe samarbejde 
med forskellige nordiske og arktiske samarbejds partnere i deres 
arbejde for at fremme både virtuel og mere standard former for jura 
uddannelse indenfor dette område. 
 
Trods denne lærebogs primære uddannelses- og undervisnings fokus 
indeholder bogen information for enhver med interesse i polar jura. Læ-
rebogen, udarbejdet for jurister såvel som andre, fokuserer på en række 
udviklinger indenfor international samt indenlandsk jura i relation til 
polar regionerne. Bogen udforsker endvidere relevante aspekter af de 
økonomiske, ressourcemæssige, sociale og politiske udviklinger der på-
virker polar områderne. 
Opbygningen af denne lærebog er anderledes end den almene akade-
miske bog. Alle kapitler er tildels skrevet i form af forelæsninger og in-
deholder derfor forslag til yderligere læse materiale, samt en række 
spørgsmål rettet mod elever med henblik på at opfordre elever til at tænke 
på aktuelle emner og analysere tekstens materiale. Lærebogen er inddelt i 
11 kapitler: introduktionen forsøger at komme med en definition for ”Po-
lar Jura (Polar Law)” og beskriver forbindelserne mellem forskellige 
områder indenfor jura og anden social videnskab. De resterende kapitler 
er opbygget omkring to hovedområder. Det første dækker spørgsmål 
omkring miljø loven, Law of Sea problemstillinger og ressources i polar 
områderne, hvor der ligeledes fremhæves nogle forbindelser til økonomi 
og handel i Arktis. 
Der sættes også stor fokus på arktiske styreformer, internationale 
menneskerettigheder, de indfødtes rettigheder og deres fremtid, selvstyre, 
og den politiske situation i nogle af områderne i Arktis. Alle kapitler in-
deholder henvisninger til teoretisk materiale samt til eksempler fra speci-
fikke case studier. 
Omfanget af denne lærebog strækker over en række spørgsmål om mil-
jø beskyttelse, shipping og navigation, og adgang til - og udvikling af - 
ikke fornybare ressourcer og mineraler, til spørgsmål om marine ressour-
cer, biodiversitet, og klima forandring. Andre emner sætter fokus på 
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spørgsmål omkring bæredygtig udvikling, arktisk samarbejde, samfundets 
levevilkår, politisk aktivisme, økonomiske indikatorer, indfødte folks ret-
tigheder og udvikling, og udfordringer omkring styreformer i det høje nord. 
De fleste kapitler tager udgangspunkt i juraen, men såvidt muligt udforskes 
endvidere forbindelsen mellem juraen og andre områder i social videnska-
ben (f.eks. internationale relationer,og socio-økonomiske studier). 
Lærebogen er omfangsrig men samtidig begrænset idet den peger på 
områder for videre forskning, samarbejde og viden. Denne lærebog bør 
ses som en milepæl i det som forhåbenligt vil blive en serie af udannelses 
materiale indenfor Polar Jura og relaterede discipliner. 
Synspunkterne udtrykt i denne lærebog reflekterer ikke nødvendigvis 
holdningen udtrykt af Nordisk Minister Råd. Bogens forfattere håber at 
dette stykke aktuelle arbejde vil øge interessen i at søge studier, forsk-
ning, eller samarbejde indenfor de mange initiativer som finder sted i det 
nordiske, arktiske og globale samfund i relation ikke blot til Arktis men 
også Antarktis. 
Yderligere information om denne lærebog kan indhentes fra bogens 
redaktør dr. Natalia Loukacheva natalial@unak.is eller n.loukacheva@ 
utoronto.ca eller fra Nordisk Minister Råds hjemmeside www.norden.org  
 
Translated by Dr. Joan Nymand Larsen 
 
 
Samantekt 
Þróun á heimskautasvæðunum – norður- og suðurskautinu – nýtur nú 
mikils almenns áhuga og um hana er vaxandi umræða meðal stjórnmála-
manna, fræðimanna, vísindamanna og í fjölmiðlum. Þær breytingar og 
ferli sem eiga sér stað á heimskautasvæðunum eru einnig í auknu mæli 
tengd sameiginlegum áhuga á tilteknum lagalegum álitaefnum. Aukið 
mikilvægi beggja heimskautasvæðanna fyrir margvísleg þróunarmál, 
bæði hnattræn og staðbundin, varð hvatinn að frekari rannsóknum á hlut-
verki laga við úrlausn slíkra mála. Með þessari kennslubók er reynt að 
draga fram mikilvægi laga í þessu sambandi með fjölmörgum dæmum 
um málefni sem sýna mikilvægi lagalegra gilda við úrlausn ýmissa van-
damála á Norðurlöndum, í afskekktum samfélögum norðurslóða og á 
heimsvísu. 
Norræna ráðherranefndin styrkti kennslubókina í heimskautarétti í geg-
num samstarfsáætlun sína um norðurheimskautssvæðin, en verkefnið var 
vistað árið 2009-2010 við lagadeild Háskólans á Akureyri í tengslum við 
meistaranám í heimskautarétti. Verkefninu var stýrt af stjórnanda meista-
ranámsins, dr. Nataliu Loukachevu, sem einnig er ritstjóri verksins. 
Kennslubókin er afrakstur af samstarfi hóps alþjóðlegra sérfræðinga 
(fræðimanna, starfenda, stjórnmálamanna og frumbyggja á norðurslóðum) 
með margra ára reynslu á sviði heimskautaréttar og í skyldum fræðum (sjá 
ferilskrár). Grunnurinn að samstarfinu er sú sameiginlega trú að grundval-
larnauðsyn beri til að efla lagalega þekkingu, upplýsingar og gildismat 
meðal samfélaga á Norðurlöndum, á norðurheimskautssvæðinu og á 
heimsvísu. Með rausnarlegum styrk frá Norrænu ráherranefndinni varð 
mögulegt að búa til námsgagn sem er hið fyrsta sinnar tegundar og aðgen-
gilegt á rafrænu formi á vefsíðu Norrænu ráðherranefndarinnar og einnig í 
prentaðri útgáfu þannig að allir þeir sem áhuga hafa á heimskautarétti geti 
nálgast þessar upplýsingar á auðveldan hátt. 
Hugmyndin að baki kennslubókinni spratt af skilningi á nauðsyn þess 
að dreifa upplýsingum um heimskautarétt sem sprotasvið innan lögfræði 
svið sem löngu tímabært er orðið að fái meiri viðurkenningu. Með því að 
styrkja þetta verkefni hefur Norræna ráðherranefndin sýnt frumkvæði í 
eflingu þessa mikilvæga menntunarframtaks sem vonandi mun skapa 
betri tækifæri fyrir íbúa norðursins í afskekktum byggðum norðurslóða, 
sem og aðra sem eiga hagsmuna að gæta, til að hafa aðgang að námsgög-
num og upplýsingum. Markmið kennslubókarinnar eru margvísleg: 
 
 að efla lögfræðilega og þverfaglega menntun á norðurslóðum og í 
þágu norðurslóða; 
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 að dreifa nýrri þekkingu á áhugaverðustu þróuninni á 
heimskautasvæðunum, þróun sem er afar mikilvæg fyrir 
Norðurlöndin, norðurheimskautssvæðin og fleiri svæði; 
 að styrkja samvinnu milli Norðurlandanna og norðursvæða 
heimskautaríkjanna (t.d. getur kennslubókin komið sér vel fyrir starfsemi 
Háskóla norðurslóða og fyrir starfshópa Norðurheimskautsráðsins í 
eftirfylgni þeirra við lögfræðihluta Skýrslu um þróun samfélaga á 
norðurslóðum (Arctic Human Development Report) sem kom út árið 
2004). 
 Einnig er vonast til þess að kennslubókin skapi grundvöll fyrir 
fjarkennd námskeið í heimskautarétti í framtíðinni og að hún efli 
þverfaglega umræðu milli lögfræði og annarra félagsvísinda um 
málefni norðurslóða; hún mun einnig stuðla að samlegðaráhrifum með 
því að ýta undir frekara samstarf ýmissa aðila á Norðurlöndum og 
norðurslóðum við framþróun lögfræðimenntunar á þessu sviði, bæði í 
hefðbundnu formi og í fjarnámi.   
 
Þótt megintilgangur bókarinnar sé menntunarlegur hefur hún að geyma 
upplýsingar sem munu reynast gagnlegar fyrir þá sem áhuga hafa á 
heimskautarétti. Bókin er ætluð lögfræðingum og lesendum án lögfræði-
menntunar og hún beinir sjónum að margvíslegri þróun í þjóðarétti og 
landsrétti í tengslum við heimskautasvæðin. Til viðbótar kannar hún þá 
þætti í þróun efnahagsmála, auðlinda, samfélaga og stjórnmála sem snerta 
bæði heimskautasvæðin. 
Uppbygging bókarinnar er ólík því sem gerist í dæmigerðum 
fræðibókum. Allir kaflarnir hafa að vissu leyti verið skrifaðir sem fyrir-
lestrar og hafa að geyma upplýsingar um ítarefni, skjöl og röð spurninga 
sem hvetja nemendur til að hugsa um þau málefni sem nú eru til umræðu 
eða í deiglunni og greina það efni sem reitt er fram. Kennslubókin skiptist í 
11 kafla að meðtöldum inngangi sem leitast við að skilgreina “heimskauta-
rétt” og lýsa tengslum hinna ýmsu sviða lögfræðinnar og annarra fé-
lagsvísinda. Hinir kaflarnir snúast um tvö meginefni. Það fyrra spannar 
málefni umhverfisréttar, hafréttar og auðlinda á heimskautasvæðunum með 
ákveðnum tengingum við hagkerfi og viðskipti á norðurslóðum. 
Síðara meginefnið er tilhögun stjórnar á norðurslóðum, alþjóðleg mann-
réttindi, frumbyggjaréttur, sjálfstjórn og stjórnmálaleg staða tiltekinna 
svæða á norðurslóðum. Allir kaflarnir hafa að geyma tilvísanir til kennin-
galegs efnis sem og tiltekinna dæma úr vettvangsrannsóknum. 
Kennslubókin spannar allt frá umhverfisvernd, skipaflutningum og siglin-
gum ásamt aðgengi að og þróun óendurnýjanlegra auðlinda og málma, til 
spurninga er varða auðlindir hafs, fjölbreytileika lífríkisins og veðurfars-
breytingar. Meðal annarra umræðuefna má nefna spurningar um sjálfbæra 
þróun, norðurslóðasamvinnu, velferð samfélaga, aðgerðamiðuð stjórnmál, 
hagvísa, réttindi og horfur frumbyggja og stjórnunarleg vandkvæði lengst í 
norðri. Flestir kaflarnir hefjast á lögfræðilegum grunni en kanna eftir því 
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sem tilefni gefast snertipunkta lögfræði og annarra félagsvísinda (t.d. við 
alþjóðatengsl, stefnumótun, þjóðfélagsfræði og hagfræði). 
Þótt kennslubókin nái yfir vítt svið eru henni takmörk sett og hún ski-
lur því eftir svigrúm fyrir frekari rannsóknir, samvinnu og þekkingu á 
þessu sviði sem nú er í þróun. Líta má á kennslubókina sem fyrstu vörðu-
na á þeirri leið sem vonandi verður röð námsgagna um heimskautarétt og 
skyldar greinar. 
Þau viðhorf sem lýst er í þessari kennslubók fara ekki nauðsynlega 
saman við afstöðu Norrænu ráðherranefndarinnar. Höfundar bókarinnar 
vona að þetta frumkvöðlastarf muni hvetja sérhvern þann sem áhuga he-
fur á heimskautarétti til að leggja í frekara nám, rannsóknir eða samvinnu 
um þau fjölmörgu verkefni sem starfrækt eru á Norðurlöndum, 
norðurslóðum og á heimsvísu, í tengslum við bæði norðurheimskauts-
svæðin og suðurskautið. 
Frekari upplýsingar um kennslubókina fást hjá ritstjóranum dr. Nataliu 
Loukachevu í gegnum netfangið natalial@unak.is eða n.loukacheva@ 
utoronto.ca, sem og á vefsíðu Norrænu ráðherranefndarinnar www. 
norden.org. 
 
Translated by Dr. Sigurður Kristinsson 
 
 
 
